The PoR/BYuT party coalition talks having collapsed, their leaders Viktor Yanukovych and Yulia Tymoshenko have instantly declared they will both stand for president in elections taking place in half a year's time.
Most commentators consider both parties entered into negotiations for cynical, self-serving purposes - dividing political power between themselves and shutting out other political opponents.
Despite their failure to come to agreement, it would appear both sides entered their long and difficult negotiations in a serious and committed manner. And it is likely that negotiations between the two biggest Ukrainian political parties will again be rejoined, both on ammending the constitution, and on a common economic crisis resolution program, after the presidential elections, as both agree these are the most critical matters requiring attention.
Most speculations on the parties' secret negotiations had been focussed on constitutional issues, but one of PoR's most senior figures, Boris Kolesnikov, also mentioned economic matters in an interview in 'Segodnya' last Friday.
Here is a portion:
Qu - What the point of moving parliamentary elections 15 months forward from September 2012 to the Spring of 2014?
A - The central objective of this extension [is that] this [would be] the end of the first stage of reforms for overcoming the crisis. In order to restore production volumes and to go further, two and a half years would not be sufficient.
Qu Do you have some concrete reform plan already? For example, the first 10, 50, 100 steps?
A - I would not want to get ahead of myself, but, certainly, such a plan exists or, to be more precise, is near finalisation. Soon the leaders of our parties [PoR and BYuT] will announce it. But certainly, it will be directed toward the creation of favorable conditions for the attraction of investments. Including by means of reductions in taxes. Further - the state's policy must be transparent for investors. The supremacy of the law, guarantees of investments, are necessary.
Qu - Can you tell us the order of actions: what comes first - changing the constitution or forming the coalition?
A There is no point to forming a coalition without [first making] constitutional changes. So first changes to the constitution, acceptance in the first reading, and then formation of a coalition as a mechanism for realising the constitutional changes.
17 comments:
LOST OR DELAYED OPPORTUNITY
The collapse in negotiations in the formation of a coalition between BYuT and PoR is disappointing as it was seen as a opportunity for Ukraine to put an end to the destructive policies and dominance of Presidential rule.
If the parliament is to introduce reform to Ukraine's constitution before the next scheduled round of Presidential elections, it must do so this Parliamentary session.
Under the terms of Ukraine's Constitution amendments to the constitution must be referred to Ukraine's Constitutional Court and held back until the next regular parliamentary session (scheduled to commence in September, 2009) before the parliament can vote to adopt the changes.
YUSHCHENKO'S ALTERNATIVE UNDER REVIEW
Whilst the focus of attention has been on the proposed coalition agreement detailed analysis of Yushchenko's proposed reforms has been missing.
YUSHCHENKO'S HOUSE OF HORRORS - CLUB FEDERATION
Yushchenko's proposal to create a bicameral parliament has little to desire and would result in the creation of a second parliamentary chamber that would turn Ukraine into a federation of regions/Oblasts.
Yushchenko's proposed senatorial representation model is undemocratic and would result in a serious imbalance in the allocation of power.
Each regions/oblast would elect three members Ukraine's upper-house appointed to a six year term of office with one member facing re-election every two years.
THE UNDEMOCRATIC UNREPRESENTATIVE HOUSE OF DIVISION
Yushchenko has proposed the introduction of a first-pass-the post voting system which would see candidate that has less then 50% of the vote win the right to represent the regional electorate.
Given that some oblasts have less then one third of constituents then other oblast Yushchenko's proposed Senate will not fairly or democratically represent Ukraine.
Western Ukraine would have more representation and power to override then those regions located in the East that have three times the number of constituents.
Gone is the democratic principle of one vote one value.
With Senate elections being held every two years the same electors will elect three members of the Senate.
Minor parties such as the Communist party, Lytvyn or Yatsenuiuk would be denied representation in Yushchenko's senate.
The senate would have absolute right of veto over the lower house.
THE PROHIBITIVE COST OF YUSHCHENKO'S SYSTEM TO BANKRUPT THE NATION
Yushchenko's attempt to rig the election system in his favour comes at a significant cost to Ukraine
At an estimated cost of over 300 Million dollars to conduct national ballot one has to as who is going to pick up the costs of Yushchenko's state.
When this is added to the distortion and imbalance in representation, Yushchenko's senate become a dominate house of horrors.
YUSHCHENKO'S ALSO SEEKS TO EXTEND HIS TERM OF OFFICE BY CREATING A EX-OFFICO POSITION FOR THE PRESIDENT IN THE SENATE FOR LIFE.
If Yushchenko is not re-elected to office for a second term or no longer maintains the support and respect of the Ukrainian people he would still retain power and office as a member of Ukraine's upper house. The ex-offico position is not limited to President who serve two full terms. Yushchenko who has only 2% support will continue to wield authority and control as an un-elected office bearer until his death.
RESTORATION OF PRESIDENTIAL RULE AND ABSOLUTE POWER AND DOMINANCE
Yushchenko's constitution seeks to restore presidential dominance. It gives the president absolute control over the legislator. The president would have the right to dismiss the peoples elected Parliament without limitation.
PRESIDENT RETAINS ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY
The only grounds for impeachment of the President is if they are convicted of a serious crime. Given the fact that the President has absolute immunity against prosecution this renders the impeachment of the president impossible. The Impeachment procedures are only carried out by the Senate.
If the President acts unconstitutionally or is in beach of his/her oath or has not acted in good faith they can not be held accountable for their actions.
ABUSE OF PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY UNCHECKED
There is no provision for a dissolution of the President's term of office if the president decided to dismiss the parliament.
The president has the unlimited rights to dismiss the parliament
Gone is the limitation of Article 90.
With no means of forcing the President to the polls in order to renew his mandate, the Presidents authority over the Parliament is absolute with no checks and balance to prevent misuse and abuse of Presidential power
SHIFTING ELECTIONS
With the absence of a fixed date for elections the terms of office of the Senate and the lower house would drift over time.
Thankfully Yushchenko's model of division and power will not be adopted.
Without substantial support Yushchenko's proposed changes will fail, but Ukraine will once again be left to pick up the tab for Yushchenkos's undemocratic foolishness.
From the Venice commision on proposed ammendments to constitution submitted by Yanukovich, Lavrynovich et al:
"The proposed amendments do not only change the semipresidential system into a parliamentary one, but they completely change the general rules establishing the structure of the democratic system. The powers of the President would in many cases be transferred to a structure called “coalition of Deputies’ factions in the Verkhovna Rada”. This can transform the Ukrainian state into a kind of a “party state”. A part of a state organ (the coalition of deputies’ factions) would play the role of a state organ (parliament). The normal role of the “coalition of factions” in a democratic system is to support the government and to play an important role inside the parliament. It should never become an independent structure in the system of separation of power, in addition to the organs of the state. In the communist period the political party was placed above the organs of the state. While it was certainly not the intention of the drafters to re-establish a similar system, one has to bear in mind that some reminiscences of the previous system remain. Questionable solutions should therefore be avoided.
30. To sum up, the draft seems problematic in many respects. The proposed electoral system seems questionable and ill-suited to conditions in Ukraine, power is too concentrated in the leadership of the strongest party or coalition, the role of the President is weakened to an excessive degree. The proposal to have judges elected by the people for a fixed term contradicts European standards. The Commission can, therefore, only welcome that, at the moment, the draft no longer seems to be seriously pursued in Ukraine."
Maryna Stavnijchuk reminded that the Venice Commission had positively assessed Yushchenko-proposed changes, something that lays a good groundwork for serious work on the constitution.
The Venice Commission also welcomed proposed changes in the judicial system, in the Highest Board of Justice and in strengthening the rights and freedoms of Ukrainians, Stavnijchuk noted.
The Venice Commission also praised the Yushchenko version for its avoidance of such dubious institutions as the coalition, imperative mandate and double accountability of the cabinet to Verkhovna Rada and president, M. Stavnijchuk stressed.
The Venice Commission's comments on President Yushchenko's proposed changes to the Ukrainian Constitution are here:
http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2009/CDL-AD(2009)024-e.asp
No need to slog through assorted self-serving spin doctors seeking to attack or support Yushchenko.
The Conclusions are pasted in below, but they must be read together with the entire document:
-------------------
III. CONCLUSIONS
131. The present draft shows that the process of constitutional reform in Ukraine is moving into the right direction although no reform has yet been adopted.
132. First of all, as regards the procedure, the Venice Commission welcomes that the draft was submitted by the President to the Verkhovna Rada, thus showing his acceptance of the constitutional requirement that any new version of the Constitution has to be adopted by a two-thirds majority in the Verkhovna Rada before its final approbation by referendum.
133. Secondly, as regards substance, the Venice Commission notes clear improvements both with respect to previous drafts and to the current Constitution. These improvements are particularly apparent in the Section on the judiciary, regarding in particular the appointment of judges, the composition of the High Judicial Council and the new rules on the prosecution service. The draft no longer reflects the Soviet model of prokuratura but a model of the prosecution service in line with European standards and in compliance with Ukraine’s commitments to the Council of Europe.
134. The draft also abandons a number of questionable provisions of the current Constitution, e.g. on the formalised majority coalition in the Verkhovna Rada, on the so-called imperative mandate, the double responsibility of the Cabinet of Ministers to the President and to the Verkhovna Rada and the distinction between ministers appointed on the proposal of the President and ministers appointed on the proposal of the Prime Minister. It should strengthen the coherence of the Cabinet of Ministers.
135. On one of the major innovations of the draft, the establishment of a second chamber, opinions may differ. Advantages and drawbacks of this solution have to be weighed carefully.
136. Other proposed amendments merit a more critical assessment. The requirement that all constitutional amendments require a referendum risks making the Constitution excessively rigid and the expansion of direct democracy at the national level creates additional risks for political stability. While changes with respect to the position of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea are not dramatic, they tend to decrease the autonomy.
137. Finally, the Commission notes that the draft describes the powers of the state organs more precisely and removes a number of sources of tensions between them. Nevertheless, it is not evident that it attains its main aim of putting an end to the constant institutional conflicts between the main state organs. The draft maintains a semi-presidential system with a double executive and areas of potential conflict between the President and the Cabinet of Ministers remain.
Maryna Stavnijchuk would of course try and push the positives and white wash the negatives, after all she is Yuschenkos agent and appointee to the Venice Commission.
It is wrong and misleading to portray the Venice commission as endorsing (Note that there is no link to any official statement or assessment only her personal opinion).
Yuschenko's constitution. to the contrary, the Venice Commission was very critical of Yuschenko's proposal stating that it would not address the divisions and political conflicts in Ukraine.
In fact it would make it worst.
You have all the power invested in the President who has absolute immunity under Yushenkos proposal would can only be impeached if he/she is found to be guilty of Intentionally committing a crime. The President can breach his oath and act unconstitutionally but can not be impeached as a result.
The fact that the Senate is unrepresentative and has a distinct bias towards Western Ukrainian regions raises serious issues of concern. Not to mention the fact that it is inconsistent in its approach
You have a situation where Закарпатська with approximately 600,000 constituents elects three members of the Senate, the same number as Donetsk with 2.5 Million constituents. (Four times the number of voters) Based on the 2007 Parliamentary results Yuschenko's Party Our Ukraine would elect, with less then 32% of the vote, all three Senate positions, Yulia Tymoshenko with 28% would elect none.
Then there is the issue of foreign policy. It is unclear under Yuschenko's model who actually defines Foreign Policy or what rile is played by the Parliament or the government. The president has a leadership role with limited right of review granted to the Sen ate. then parliament administers policy but who determines policy?
In a underhanded attempt Yuschenko seeks to prevent any All-Ukrianian referendum from considering issues related to International Treaties. So the people of Ukraine will not have a say or a right in opposing Ukraine joining NATO.
Clearly Ukraine should have a constitutional requirement that stipulates that Ukraine can to join any Military alliance without first seeking approval of the Ukrainian people voting in Referendum
One step forward six steps backwards
Yes scraping the Imperative mandate is a step forward but with Yuschenkos' proposal is a host of other non-democratic initiatives.
Yushchenko, who previously supported Ukraine's imperative mandate provisions in his attempt to justify his dismissal of Ukraine's previous Parliament now seeks to its removal.
The good news is that Yushchenko's proposed Constitutional reforms will not see the light of day let alone be supported.
"The present draft shows that the process of constitutional reform in Ukraine is moving into the right direction"
"First of all, as regards the procedure, the Venice Commission welcomes that the draft was submitted by the President to the Verkhovna Rada, thus showing his acceptance of the constitutional requirement that any new version of the Constitution has to be adopted by a two-thirds majority in the Verkhovna Rada before its final approbation by referendum."
Unlike the coup attempt by Yanukovich and TYMOSHENKO. I guess this shows who's really democratically minded in Ukraine, obvious its not Tymoshenko or Yanukovich, who tried to underhandedly undermine Ukraines democracy. Seems the Venice commision is only right when it fits your agenda Craats, otherwise its useless.
QUOTE: Nevertheless, it is not evident that it attains its main aim of putting an end to the constant institutional conflicts between the main state organs. The draft maintains a semi-presidential system with a double executive and areas of potential conflict between the President and the Cabinet of Ministers remain.
There are many issues of significance and importance that has not been addressed by the Yushchenko draft.
The Venice Commission has this to say about Yushcheko's proposed Senate.
Section IV – National Assembly of Ukraine
General comments
48. The draft opts for the introduction of a bicameral system. This is a political choice which has both advantages and drawbacks. Since the territorial structure of Ukraine is not based on federal or regional principles, a bi-cameral system is not a natural choice. Nevertheless, even in a unitary system, it can improve territorial representation and, due to the longer term of office of the Senate, enhance continuity. On the other hand, bi-cameralism complicates legislative and budgetary processes and may introduce new causes for political dead-locks.
49. The Senate seems to be seen by the drafters as a “less political” body due to the system of election of senators. It consists of three senators who are elected in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, each region (oblast), the City of Kyiv, and in the cities that have the same status as an oblast. The former Presidents, who were not removed from the office by the procedure of impeachment, are also members of the Senate. One third of the Senate is elected every two years. The Senate can be seen as an instrument which should balance the competences of Verkhovna Rada. The main role of the Senate is to participate in the legislative process, and to replace the Verkhovna Rada in the process of the appointment to important positions in the state. One may have doubts whether this role of the Senate as a less political body is not overestimated.
50. All in all, the expected benefits and the possible disadvantages of a second chamber should be carefully weighed against each other.
Article 86
51. As regards the composition of the Senate, the draft provides that all regional units would have the same number of representatives while there are important demographic inequalities between these units (e.g. 4.6 million inhabitants in the Donetsk oblast; 900.000 inhabitants in the Chernivtsi oblast). This would lead, in practice, to great inequality between voters (the weight of their votes) in different regions.
The summary comments of the Venice commission is a bit like a child's report card. It is designed to encourage further development and learning. One hopes that the Government can and will address the meany issues that have been left out in Yushchenko's model for autocracy
And what where their comments about the proposed Yanukovich/Lavrynovych ammentdments? Its quite apparent to any intelligent being that the Yushchenko ammendments are much more readily acceptable than the Yanukovich ammendments. Yushchenko has worked to improve democracy in Ukraine, because he doesnt fit into your socialist mindset, doesnt make him a failure, at least not to democratically minded peoples.
On the Yanukovych proposed ammendments: Take special note of the last sentence, which tells the complete story in a nutshell:
28. In the light of the proposed amendments the existing semipresidential system would be transformed into a system with a dominant role of parliament. The mere fact of changing the system and passing from a more presidential to a more parliamentary system seems not unusual and may even be welcome. One can observe this situation in various countries, especially in those in transition. The role of the President, the scope of presidential competencies and specifically the relationship between President and government and the tensions arising on this ground led in many post-communist countries (but not only in such countries) to constitutional reforms. Frequently presidential powers were limited, as, for example, in the Polish case by the 1992 so-called Small Constitution and then in 1997 by the new Constitution.
29. In the case of the present draft, however, the situation is much more complex. The proposed amendments do not only change the semipresidential system into a parliamentary one, but they completely change the general rules establishing the structure of the democratic system. The powers of the President would in many cases be transferred to a structure called “coalition of Deputies’ factions in the Verkhovna Rada”. This can transform the Ukrainian state into a kind of a “party state”. A part of a state organ (the coalition of deputies’ factions) would play the role of a state organ (parliament). The normal role of the “coalition of factions” in a democratic system is to support the government and to play an important role inside the parliament. It should never become an independent structure in the system of separation of power, in addition to the organs of the state. In the communist period the political party was placed above the organs of the state. While it was certainly not the intention of the drafters to re-establish a similar system, one has to bear in mind that some reminiscences of the previous system remain. Questionable solutions should therefore be avoided.
30. To sum up, the draft seems problematic in many respects. The proposed electoral system seems questionable and ill-suited to conditions in Ukraine, power is too concentrated in the leadership of the strongest party or coalition, the role of the President is weakened to an excessive degree. The proposal to have judges elected by the people for a fixed term contradicts European standards. The Commission can, therefore, only welcome that, at the moment, the draft no longer seems to be seriously pursued in Ukraine.
Wow - guess someone REALLY does NOT like President Yushchenko not one bit.
An article recently published by Andreas Umland is worthy of note.
"As Ukraine's economic, social and political crisis sharpens, more and more Ukrainians may question the wisdom of conducting a costly presidential election when the Ukrainian state is almost bankrupt--if not on the brink of collapse."
...
Not only is the current Ukrainian dual power system deficient, but semi-presidential systems, at least in transition countries, are generally a bad choice"
...
Hard times are awaiting Europe's youngest and largest democracy, and one can only hope that the encouraging sanity and moderation that Kiev's elites have shown before will also prevail in the current situation
...
Ideally, Yanukovich and Tymoshenko will return to the negotiation table and reconsider the issue of the upcoming elections. Preserving the current semi-presidential system serves neither the short-term nor the long-term interests of Ukraine. Switching to a parliamentary republic would free Kiev’s political elite to focus its attention on numerous other pressing problems.
Pure, unadulterated, Socialist nonsense.
Western parliamentary systems evolved from monarchies under the pressure of changing domestic and external environments. Implementing such a system in a corrupt and chaotic environment of Eastern Europe would lead to a complete take over of a country by organized crime and business interests -- which Ukraine has been moving since the weakening of the presidential powers after the Orange Revolution. The history of the region clearly shows that any reforms can be accomplished only by a strong executive branch, led by a strong president. Look at Russia (although I in no way approve of what happened there, my point stands), and look at Bulgaria, for instance.
What nonsence. The USA is governed under a presiential system and there is as more crime in the USA then tehre is in European states. to claim that a parlaimentary system fuels corruption is false and wrong. Look at Polland and the bvatlic States. All are governed under a parliamentary system. England Scaninavia and most of Europe. Italy was considered the crime capital of the world.
The main issue opreventing Ukraine from enforcing the rule of law is the divisions of power. Presidnet versus parliament. Parliament is the legislative authority in all western democracies.
Had Ukraine adopted a Parliamentary system as other former Soviets States had done it would be better off today. The presidnetial system has failed Ukraine and Yushenko has been the main cause for division and instability preventing the government from implementing rule of law.
Ukraine must take collective responsibility for it's governance. Remove the president from the equation and you remove the conflict and division.
Yushchenko is the problem not the solution.
Would you support absolute power being in the hands of the president if Yanukovych was President? or is your assessment based on the individual you seek to support only?
A Parliamentary system is the only true democratic system. It's called representative democracy. look it up. Its not perfect but it is the best one available.
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