The September 30th early parliamentary elections produced and inconclusive result, and no one party or bloc will dominate the Verkhovna Rada. There has been speculation that the newly-elected parliament may operate, in the short term, in a 'situational' mode - with blocs co-operating to vote through individual pieces of legislation according to their particular requirements.
Viktor Yanukovych, at a recent extraordinary congress of judges, complained that it has become impossible to begin judicial reform. He reported that annual expenditure for maintaining the judiciary keeps rising, but societies' confidence in the judicial authorities is not growing, and bureaucracy and corruption persists at the highest level.
During the congress, the head of the Supreme Court of Vasyl Onopenko proposed President Yushchenko submits a law as soon as possible 'on the Supreme Judiciary Council' to parliament, and heads the Council [i.e. gains greater control] himself.
An example of 'situational' co-operation in this matter is given in Ekonomicheskiye Izvestia in a piece entitled, "PoR and BYuT against the President and Oponenko," about possible co-operation between the two parties to pass legislation to decentralise the Ukrainian judicial system, against the wishes of both the Supreme Court and the President.
Rinat Akhmetov made conciliatory statements about BYuT last week. "The colour of the coalition is not important to me, the main thing is what it will do. If its work will be directed to the economic growth of the country - we are ready to co-operate. But if the coalition works according the principle "seize and divide up" then this will not be a democratic coalition, this will be a 1917 coalition."
When asked about what he thought of Tymoshenko as premier, he said, "What is my thought? Tymoshenko received the support of 31.5% of the voters. This means a large number of people trust this politician." And if a coalition is formed and Yuliya Tymoshenko becomes prime minister, "I will respect this."
The main political players: PoR and its two main sub-fractions, the President and his secretariat, NUNS and its argumentative constituents, BYuT, the Communists, and Lyvyn and his chums, are all jockeying to be best placed in the new administration and have maximum influence in the future development of the country. No-one is certain quite what to do for the best.
E.g. the pragmatists in PoR, who are undaunted by a spell in opposition, wanted Rayisa Bohatyryova elected VR vice-speaker in order to nevertheless maximize their influence in the VR. The romantics in PoR, who feel that retention of power is still realistic, were willing to sacrifice this post in favour of Communist Adam Martyniuk in order to maintain the Communists' support in a 'wide coalition'. Yanukovych may have even influenced Bohatyryova's withdrawal - he did not want this close ally of Rinat Akhmetov holding such an influential position.
Tuesday will be 'crunch-time' as VR deputies attempt to vote in Yuliya Tymoshenko for prime minister. If BYuT fails to persuade Lytyvyn and his chums to support them, Levko thinks it may be quite a while before the crackle of Yulka's electric tights and clack of her stiletto heels are heard in the KabMin offices again. Lytvyn's bloc failed to enter the VR in March last year - this time they are in again. The possibility of political 'big beast' Lytvyn getting into a position of influence in government again, must be a temptation.
Even though President Putin [as well as other observers] considers all this political toing and froing chaotic and undesirable, whatever happens, all sides are behaving quite responsibly right now and sticking to the rules.
Sunday, December 09, 2007
Thursday, December 06, 2007
Possible scenarios on the political front
Some good analysis in 'Gazeta po Kievski' today. I've loosely translated portions below:
The day after Yatsenyuk was elected VR speaker the victorious democratic coalition is not hurrying to celebrate its triumph, and "Regionaly" have not lost their swagger either. Both camps await the battle for the premiership - few have full confidence in Yulka T's success.
The election of Yatsenyuk showed that "Regiony" were absolutely not ready to this turn of events - they were sure that a couple of the votes required for a coalition would 'disappear'. On Tuesday the 'Regionaly' simply departed in all directions - some home, and some to the football - waiting out the night in order to gather in the morning in the "Zoryaniy" and decide what to do. It turned out they did not have any plan at all. By noon acting vice- premier Vladimir Rybak, member of the PoR fraction stated that they would work constructively in the Verkhovna Rada with Yatsenyuk as speaker.
No-one in PoR can give an meaningful comment as to where will the party go and what it will do right now. Will it block the work of the VR or will it propose a candidate for first vice- speaker as proposed to the opposition? But while 'Regionaly' decide whether they want one of their own as Yatsenyuk's, 'zam', Byutovtsy say they had already offered the position to communist Martynyuk [in exchange for votes in support of Yatsenyuk?] but they declined the offer. Similar offers were made to Lytyvn's bloc, but they declined the offer too.
Regionaly are adopting a wait and see attitude. They need to wait until the internal contradictions in the 'demkoalitsiya' causes it's breakdown into separate components, and then it should be possible to begin negotiations on a new configuration of the 'vlasti'.
According to a source into the Party of Regions, the confusion and disunity of actions seen recently amongst PoR members is the result of differences of interests inside the party itself. Yanukovych understands that no type of broad coalition will guarantee him the premiership - PoR's partners would accept any candidature, other than the leader of PoR.
Therefore the absence of a new government, combined with a workable VR led by a compliant speaker-Yasenyuk would be an optimum version. The premier's people hint this would suit the president and his secretariat also. At the same time, the wing of party led by Rinat Akhmetov is moving ever further from Yanukovych. Stability in government policy, and also therefore, in business is in their interests. For the presidential elections they need a candidate that will have a greater guarantee of success than in 2004, i.e. somone other than Viktor Yanukovych.
Yuliya in a win-win situation
The President, Akhmetov and Yanukovych are not interested in strengthening Tymoshenko - i.e. they have mutual interests in this matter. Therefore events could develop in three possible ways:
The first, and most probable is Tymoshenko becomes premier with the smallest possible advantage over her opponents. After this, the de-facto 'demkoalitsiya' will disappear, and parliament will begin to vote in a 'situational' regime. Complex problems start springing up for the government starting with a large increase in the price of gas, and a crisis in the state of infrastructures. After about a year Tymoshenko is sacked for her failures and for the worsening economic situation. This would not be a disaster for her because presidential elections would be close in any case.
The second, Tymoshenko is simply 'dumped' - the full BYuT-NUNS list simply fails to vote for her. It is no secret that such moods exist amongst some members of the bloc. Either negotiations continue with Tymoshenko, in order to obtain more concessions, or she goes into opposition, and the PM's post goes to a less controversial person. Yushchenko will then find himself in a difficult situation: a large part of NUNS may well go over to Yulka, and the dependence of the President on PoR increases significantly.
The third possibility is that Tymoshenko does not become premier, and Yanukovych remains as acting PM for the winter months. For Yushchenko and Akhmetov this in by no means the worst turn of events. Under Yanukovych's "suspended" KabMin the situational majority will pass the 2008 budget. The further weakening of Yanukovych, after blows on the "gas" and other fronts would be to the benefit of Akhmetov and Yushchenko. Yanukovych will lose more electoral support and by the Spring could be 'sent for a rest'. His chances to play a strong hand in the presidential elections would be greatly reduced too.
The day after Yatsenyuk was elected VR speaker the victorious democratic coalition is not hurrying to celebrate its triumph, and "Regionaly" have not lost their swagger either. Both camps await the battle for the premiership - few have full confidence in Yulka T's success.
The election of Yatsenyuk showed that "Regiony" were absolutely not ready to this turn of events - they were sure that a couple of the votes required for a coalition would 'disappear'. On Tuesday the 'Regionaly' simply departed in all directions - some home, and some to the football - waiting out the night in order to gather in the morning in the "Zoryaniy" and decide what to do. It turned out they did not have any plan at all. By noon acting vice- premier Vladimir Rybak, member of the PoR fraction stated that they would work constructively in the Verkhovna Rada with Yatsenyuk as speaker.
No-one in PoR can give an meaningful comment as to where will the party go and what it will do right now. Will it block the work of the VR or will it propose a candidate for first vice- speaker as proposed to the opposition? But while 'Regionaly' decide whether they want one of their own as Yatsenyuk's, 'zam', Byutovtsy say they had already offered the position to communist Martynyuk [in exchange for votes in support of Yatsenyuk?] but they declined the offer. Similar offers were made to Lytyvn's bloc, but they declined the offer too.
Regionaly are adopting a wait and see attitude. They need to wait until the internal contradictions in the 'demkoalitsiya' causes it's breakdown into separate components, and then it should be possible to begin negotiations on a new configuration of the 'vlasti'.
According to a source into the Party of Regions, the confusion and disunity of actions seen recently amongst PoR members is the result of differences of interests inside the party itself. Yanukovych understands that no type of broad coalition will guarantee him the premiership - PoR's partners would accept any candidature, other than the leader of PoR.
Therefore the absence of a new government, combined with a workable VR led by a compliant speaker-Yasenyuk would be an optimum version. The premier's people hint this would suit the president and his secretariat also. At the same time, the wing of party led by Rinat Akhmetov is moving ever further from Yanukovych. Stability in government policy, and also therefore, in business is in their interests. For the presidential elections they need a candidate that will have a greater guarantee of success than in 2004, i.e. somone other than Viktor Yanukovych.
Yuliya in a win-win situation
The President, Akhmetov and Yanukovych are not interested in strengthening Tymoshenko - i.e. they have mutual interests in this matter. Therefore events could develop in three possible ways:
The first, and most probable is Tymoshenko becomes premier with the smallest possible advantage over her opponents. After this, the de-facto 'demkoalitsiya' will disappear, and parliament will begin to vote in a 'situational' regime. Complex problems start springing up for the government starting with a large increase in the price of gas, and a crisis in the state of infrastructures. After about a year Tymoshenko is sacked for her failures and for the worsening economic situation. This would not be a disaster for her because presidential elections would be close in any case.
The second, Tymoshenko is simply 'dumped' - the full BYuT-NUNS list simply fails to vote for her. It is no secret that such moods exist amongst some members of the bloc. Either negotiations continue with Tymoshenko, in order to obtain more concessions, or she goes into opposition, and the PM's post goes to a less controversial person. Yushchenko will then find himself in a difficult situation: a large part of NUNS may well go over to Yulka, and the dependence of the President on PoR increases significantly.
The third possibility is that Tymoshenko does not become premier, and Yanukovych remains as acting PM for the winter months. For Yushchenko and Akhmetov this in by no means the worst turn of events. Under Yanukovych's "suspended" KabMin the situational majority will pass the 2008 budget. The further weakening of Yanukovych, after blows on the "gas" and other fronts would be to the benefit of Akhmetov and Yushchenko. Yanukovych will lose more electoral support and by the Spring could be 'sent for a rest'. His chances to play a strong hand in the presidential elections would be greatly reduced too.
Why VR speaker is so important
A really good explanation why the Verkhovna Rada speaker's position, to which 'wunderkind' Arseniy Yatsenyuk was elected Tuesday, is so important, is provided in 'Kyiv Weekly'.
Here's a portion:
If Yatsenyuk plays his cards right and gets ambitious, he could be in the running for the next presidential elections too..Who knows?
Here's a portion:
"The speaker is the person who decides when a certain bill that is favorable for a particular financial industrial group will be considered by the parliament, meaning now or never. When the talk is about re-distribution of segments of the market or privatization of strategically important assets (major industrial plants), time plays the key role without exaggeration.
In the current constitutional framework, the president does not necessarily need to have a 100% loyal government. In order to have control over the situation, the president only needs to have “his man” as the speaker of the house as this figure is key in ensuring that the president has an independent and confidential channel of talks between the branches of power. The president and his secretariat aim at distancing themselves from political games and intrigues, but still want to preserve their influence on the adoption of laws and the behavior of opposition and coalition allies. This is precisely why the position of the VR speaker by its status and authority is the best mechanism for protecting the president’s interests in the parliament...
If a “president-speaker” link is formed, the premier will become the technical executor of the political will of this dynamic duo. If the speaker coordinates his actions with the Presidential Administration, the head of government will be forced to coordinate every single step with the “boys on Bankova”.
If Yatsenyuk plays his cards right and gets ambitious, he could be in the running for the next presidential elections too..Who knows?
Tuesday, December 04, 2007
Tintin in VR
Earlier today, 33 year old Arseniy Yatseniuk was elected new Verkhovna Rada speaker by 227 deputies' votes of the new parliament. The democratic BYuT-NUNS coalition showed admirable discipline with their 100% turn-out in the secret ballot.
A PoR spokesman is quoted as having estimated Yatseniuk's chances of becoming speaker, "One thousand times less that of a meteorite landing on your head."
LEvko thinks that the remarkable solidarity displayed will cause some dismay amongst PoR deputies, but has also averted a possible internal crisis and split in NSNU. Had a couple or more voting deputies not turned up, or 'put their cross in the wrong box', and Yatseniuk's candidature failed to attain the required 226 votes, PoR and those in NSNU favouring a broad coalition would have probably put forward Ivan Plyushch's name for speaker, and maybe even demanded the removal of Viktor Baloha from the president's secretariat.
Whether similar solidarity can be maintained when deputies come to vote for Tymoshenko for PM, remains to be seen.
In March this year, Yatseniuk, a.k.a Kinder-surprise, was elected Ukraine's Foreign minister by 426 deputies, so maybe he will turn out to be a consolidating figure in the VR after all.
He has also served as Minister of Economics in the Yekhanurov government [when he was critical of the previous Tymoshenko government], as deputy chairman of the National Bank of Ukraine, and as deputy head of President Yushchenko's secretariat - so he's a smart cookie indeed.
But he still looks like Tintin [or Snowy]..
Sunday, December 02, 2007
New airplane for pressa
Obozrevatel and others report that President Yushchenko will soon be getting a 'new toy' - a brand-new Airbus A319 presidential airplane priced $40-$60 million, even though only about half that sum had been ear-marked for upgrading the president's flight.
Until now Yushchenko has been using an Ukrainian-built 2004 Antonov, registration UR-YVA, [Yushchenko Viktor Andriyevych - cheesy eh?] or one of two Illushins.
Oboz quite-rightly insists the pres. should exclusively promote and use home-built planes, which are as good any in the world. This is no way for the pres. to gain support in Kharkiv - home of Antonov aircraft, or Zaporizhzha where Motor Sich, one of the world's largest manufacturers of aircraft engines and turbines is located..
Just for comparison, I've clipped the following excerpts from Wikipedia's entry on 'Air transport of the Royal Family and executive of the United Kingdom'.
"Air transport for the Royal Family and executive of the United Kingdom is currently provided by No. 32 Squadron of the Royal Air Force (RAF); chartered civilian aircraft; and occasionally scheduled commercial flights, provided by the company British Airways.
No. 32 Squadron's executive transport role is secondary to its principal function of providing communications and logistical support for military operations.... Given the security concerns of chartering commercial aircraft and the fact that the aircraft are increasingly unsuitable to an executive transport role, the government plans to acquire two dedicated executive transports for the use of the Royal Family and executive ...Current travel options for the Royal Family and Ministers are aircraft of No. 32 Squadron, scheduled commercial flights and chartered aircraft.
Most air travel by cabinet and junior ministers is on scheduled commercial flights. Travel on 32 Squadron aircraft is recommended where it is more cost-effective than using commercial air transport, or where security considerations dictate that special flights should be used.
UK parliament's Intelligence and Security Committee has [recently] recommended two dedicated aircraft with secure, advanced communication equipment be provided for the use of the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for Defence...The new aircraft should include state of the art security systems [on account of the greatly increased risk of terrorist attack]. To reduce costs, the planes will not be purchased outright, but will be on permanent lease."
LEvko thinks the pres. should get his head out of the clouds and his feet back on the ground - and think more about Ukrainian aircraft engineers and designers. They will be around much longer than he will be as president..
p.s. Former British prime minister Tony Blair left office a few months ago. Under ministerial rules he is allowed to take home any gift he received, as PM, worth more than $280, if he paid the full market price from his own pocket. E.g. he kept a 12-piece tea and coffee set given by President Vladimir Putin, for which he paid $600, and paid $1000 for a fountain pen given to him by Chirac.
The rest of the 'crap' e.g 20 watches, including 16 given by Silvio Berlusconi, oriental rugs etc. are to be auctioned, and the proceeds donated to charity. The sale is expected to raise about $300,000.
Bit different than Ukraine eh?
Until now Yushchenko has been using an Ukrainian-built 2004 Antonov, registration UR-YVA, [Yushchenko Viktor Andriyevych - cheesy eh?] or one of two Illushins.
Oboz quite-rightly insists the pres. should exclusively promote and use home-built planes, which are as good any in the world. This is no way for the pres. to gain support in Kharkiv - home of Antonov aircraft, or Zaporizhzha where Motor Sich, one of the world's largest manufacturers of aircraft engines and turbines is located..
Just for comparison, I've clipped the following excerpts from Wikipedia's entry on 'Air transport of the Royal Family and executive of the United Kingdom'.
"Air transport for the Royal Family and executive of the United Kingdom is currently provided by No. 32 Squadron of the Royal Air Force (RAF); chartered civilian aircraft; and occasionally scheduled commercial flights, provided by the company British Airways.
No. 32 Squadron's executive transport role is secondary to its principal function of providing communications and logistical support for military operations.... Given the security concerns of chartering commercial aircraft and the fact that the aircraft are increasingly unsuitable to an executive transport role, the government plans to acquire two dedicated executive transports for the use of the Royal Family and executive ...Current travel options for the Royal Family and Ministers are aircraft of No. 32 Squadron, scheduled commercial flights and chartered aircraft.
Most air travel by cabinet and junior ministers is on scheduled commercial flights. Travel on 32 Squadron aircraft is recommended where it is more cost-effective than using commercial air transport, or where security considerations dictate that special flights should be used.
UK parliament's Intelligence and Security Committee has [recently] recommended two dedicated aircraft with secure, advanced communication equipment be provided for the use of the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for Defence...The new aircraft should include state of the art security systems [on account of the greatly increased risk of terrorist attack]. To reduce costs, the planes will not be purchased outright, but will be on permanent lease."
LEvko thinks the pres. should get his head out of the clouds and his feet back on the ground - and think more about Ukrainian aircraft engineers and designers. They will be around much longer than he will be as president..
p.s. Former British prime minister Tony Blair left office a few months ago. Under ministerial rules he is allowed to take home any gift he received, as PM, worth more than $280, if he paid the full market price from his own pocket. E.g. he kept a 12-piece tea and coffee set given by President Vladimir Putin, for which he paid $600, and paid $1000 for a fountain pen given to him by Chirac.
The rest of the 'crap' e.g 20 watches, including 16 given by Silvio Berlusconi, oriental rugs etc. are to be auctioned, and the proceeds donated to charity. The sale is expected to raise about $300,000.
Bit different than Ukraine eh?
Friday, November 30, 2007
BAB on Ukrainian politics, Putin, Russia
Today I've translated a brief, but most interesting, interview with Boris Berezovsky from today's 'Segodnya':
"Putin will be jailed by any of his successors
The refugee oligarch explains why Yushchenko fears Tymoshenko, and describes the anti-Putin attitude of the orthodox church.
-Why, in your opinion, cannot NUNS and BYUT form a coalition in the VR and appoint Yulia Tymoshenko Head of Government?
- The problem is, unfortunately, purely personal. It concerns the personal relations between Yushchenko and Tymoshenko. And it is these relations themselves, that unfortunately, are seriously harming the democratic process in Ukraine. But since alternatives to their union does not exist, in the final analysis, they will be able to find a compromise.
- Why does Yushchenko so oppose Timoshenko's premiership?
- He is quite simply scared of her. He fears that she will become the real political leader of the country. He really fears that Tymoshenko will formally realize her leadership and will become the next President.
And will Tymoshenko be President?
- If she puts forward her candidature, then she will become President, beating both Yushchenko, and Yanukovych. Incidentally I do not envisage a strategic future for Yanukovych. The Party of Regions could split into two halves. The 'sovok' part will go with Yanukovych, while the 'biznesovaya" part with Rinat Akhmetov. He needs to somehow legalize himself in the West. And the FSB [Russian Federation Security Services] will not help him, if they begin apply pressure on him.
- Let's switch to the situation in Russia. What is Putin trying to attain? What will happen to him after selections?
- Putin is searching for ways of retaining power - [his own] personal and centralized [power]. Right now he thinks that he will enter the Duma, and then will return and be elected for a third presidential term. Someone will have a brief spell as President after him, they will then leave, and Putin will return again. In any case, this is what he wants.
- So who can be this short-term President of Russia? Zubkov, Sergey Ivanov, Medvedev?
- [It will be] the man who Putin will trust to head the country for the intermediate period. But no-one will carry out their obligations to him, if they becomes President. Neither Zubkov nor Ivanov nor any Medvedev. Putin will lose power to him in any event. And as soon as he loses it, then in the final account he will find himself on the defendant's bench [in the dock].
- Ivanov, Zubkov or Medvedev him will put him there?
- Yes. Any of its successors. Because they will want to disassociate themselves from the crimes of Putin. The regime will mover a little to the side of liberalization, but, in essence, it will remain before.
- But who will then overthrow this regime? Kasparov, Nemtsov, the Communists?
- The most likely, undoubtedly, Kasparov. Nemtsov has also changed for the better, but SPS, and Yabloko, and Communists - these are not real opposition. The real opposition are in the underground. I do not want to name concrete names in order not to help FSB, but I'm talking about groups of influence which are located in business-circles, the power structures, and in the orthodox church.
- Now about Georgia. Your friend and partner Patarkatsishvili - one of the leaders of opposition against President Saakashvili...
- With your permission, I'd rather not comment of Georgian matters."
Berezovksy is enemy #1 for Putin - Aleksandr Livinenko's poisoning and dreadful death last year may have been the result of his closeness to Berezovsky. The popular Rinatov-owned 'Segodya', is clearly not afraid of providing Berezovsky column inches on their pages. Nor, it seems, are they afraid to air Berezovsky's speculation on the future of PoR..
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
So, a BYuT-NUNS coalition of 227 was assembled today. LEvko thinks it rather resembles one of the circus pyramids formed by tiers of wobbly gymnasts standing on top of one anothers' shoulders...how long before it collapses? Maybe the guys at the top will be able to cling onto the lights and scenery above the stage when it does.. Or will some of Lytvyn's people step in at the last moment?
Anyway, they did it..the photos have been taken to prove it..
"Putin will be jailed by any of his successors
The refugee oligarch explains why Yushchenko fears Tymoshenko, and describes the anti-Putin attitude of the orthodox church.
-Why, in your opinion, cannot NUNS and BYUT form a coalition in the VR and appoint Yulia Tymoshenko Head of Government?
- The problem is, unfortunately, purely personal. It concerns the personal relations between Yushchenko and Tymoshenko. And it is these relations themselves, that unfortunately, are seriously harming the democratic process in Ukraine. But since alternatives to their union does not exist, in the final analysis, they will be able to find a compromise.
- Why does Yushchenko so oppose Timoshenko's premiership?
- He is quite simply scared of her. He fears that she will become the real political leader of the country. He really fears that Tymoshenko will formally realize her leadership and will become the next President.
And will Tymoshenko be President?
- If she puts forward her candidature, then she will become President, beating both Yushchenko, and Yanukovych. Incidentally I do not envisage a strategic future for Yanukovych. The Party of Regions could split into two halves. The 'sovok' part will go with Yanukovych, while the 'biznesovaya" part with Rinat Akhmetov. He needs to somehow legalize himself in the West. And the FSB [Russian Federation Security Services] will not help him, if they begin apply pressure on him.
- Let's switch to the situation in Russia. What is Putin trying to attain? What will happen to him after selections?
- Putin is searching for ways of retaining power - [his own] personal and centralized [power]. Right now he thinks that he will enter the Duma, and then will return and be elected for a third presidential term. Someone will have a brief spell as President after him, they will then leave, and Putin will return again. In any case, this is what he wants.
- So who can be this short-term President of Russia? Zubkov, Sergey Ivanov, Medvedev?
- [It will be] the man who Putin will trust to head the country for the intermediate period. But no-one will carry out their obligations to him, if they becomes President. Neither Zubkov nor Ivanov nor any Medvedev. Putin will lose power to him in any event. And as soon as he loses it, then in the final account he will find himself on the defendant's bench [in the dock].
- Ivanov, Zubkov or Medvedev him will put him there?
- Yes. Any of its successors. Because they will want to disassociate themselves from the crimes of Putin. The regime will mover a little to the side of liberalization, but, in essence, it will remain before.
- But who will then overthrow this regime? Kasparov, Nemtsov, the Communists?
- The most likely, undoubtedly, Kasparov. Nemtsov has also changed for the better, but SPS, and Yabloko, and Communists - these are not real opposition. The real opposition are in the underground. I do not want to name concrete names in order not to help FSB, but I'm talking about groups of influence which are located in business-circles, the power structures, and in the orthodox church.
- Now about Georgia. Your friend and partner Patarkatsishvili - one of the leaders of opposition against President Saakashvili...
- With your permission, I'd rather not comment of Georgian matters."
Berezovksy is enemy #1 for Putin - Aleksandr Livinenko's poisoning and dreadful death last year may have been the result of his closeness to Berezovsky. The popular Rinatov-owned 'Segodya', is clearly not afraid of providing Berezovsky column inches on their pages. Nor, it seems, are they afraid to air Berezovsky's speculation on the future of PoR..
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
So, a BYuT-NUNS coalition of 227 was assembled today. LEvko thinks it rather resembles one of the circus pyramids formed by tiers of wobbly gymnasts standing on top of one anothers' shoulders...how long before it collapses? Maybe the guys at the top will be able to cling onto the lights and scenery above the stage when it does.. Or will some of Lytvyn's people step in at the last moment?
Anyway, they did it..the photos have been taken to prove it..
Wednesday, November 28, 2007
Corrupt Putin
Check out this article from Anders Aslund on the myth of Putin.
'Moscow Times' articles go to 'subscribers only' status quite quickly, so don't delay.
"If these numbers [in the article] contain any truth, Putin would be the most corrupt political leader in world history...Abundant oil revenues have made it possible for Putin to avoid difficult reforms and to allow his inner circle to indulge in some of the worst corruption the world has ever seen."
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Excellent update on current state of play in Ukraine here
Events it seems, are following the usual well-rehearsed script..
Oles Doniy, a NUNS VR deputy explains at a press conference what's going on.
"At the same time, [Doniy] believes that an informal coalition between the Secretariat and the Party of Regions has been already created.
"I can state that an informal coalition between the Secretariat and the Party of Regions is taking shape," he said.
Doniy is sure that the aim of the NUNS - PR coalition is to not let Tymoshenko gain strength before the presidential elections.
In this situation, Doniy continued, the aim of the Party of Regions is to elect the Verkhovna Rada chairman from among its candidates and keep the post of acting prime minister for Party of Regions leader Viktor Yanukovych."
The Party of Regions and some members of the Our Ukraine People's Self-Defense Bloc, who favor the broad coalition, have enough votes to elect Yurii Yekhanurov, Ivan Pliusch or Mykola Onyschuk as parliament speaker."
Others say that if Kyrylenko withdraws his bid to be VR speaker, and NUNS propose a compromise figure, then an orange coalition would become more likely.
We'll see tomorrow..
'Moscow Times' articles go to 'subscribers only' status quite quickly, so don't delay.
"If these numbers [in the article] contain any truth, Putin would be the most corrupt political leader in world history...Abundant oil revenues have made it possible for Putin to avoid difficult reforms and to allow his inner circle to indulge in some of the worst corruption the world has ever seen."
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Excellent update on current state of play in Ukraine here
Events it seems, are following the usual well-rehearsed script..
Oles Doniy, a NUNS VR deputy explains at a press conference what's going on.
"At the same time, [Doniy] believes that an informal coalition between the Secretariat and the Party of Regions has been already created.
"I can state that an informal coalition between the Secretariat and the Party of Regions is taking shape," he said.
Doniy is sure that the aim of the NUNS - PR coalition is to not let Tymoshenko gain strength before the presidential elections.
In this situation, Doniy continued, the aim of the Party of Regions is to elect the Verkhovna Rada chairman from among its candidates and keep the post of acting prime minister for Party of Regions leader Viktor Yanukovych."
The Party of Regions and some members of the Our Ukraine People's Self-Defense Bloc, who favor the broad coalition, have enough votes to elect Yurii Yekhanurov, Ivan Pliusch or Mykola Onyschuk as parliament speaker."
Others say that if Kyrylenko withdraws his bid to be VR speaker, and NUNS propose a compromise figure, then an orange coalition would become more likely.
We'll see tomorrow..
Tuesday, November 27, 2007
Holodomor remembrance ceremonies in Eastern Ukraine
The desire to honour the memory of ancestors who suffered and died in the Holodomor is strong in the Eastern, predominantly Russian speaking parts of the country too.
Parts of an article from today's popular 'Donbass' newspaper:
"Memorial candles for victims of the regime
Hundreds of thousands of candles in the squares, the cemeteries of Donetsk and in the windows of its inhabitants over the weekend blazed grief for those innocently slain by the Holodomor.
The leaders of the region and city, the representatives of the political parties, public organizations, clergy, cossacks and young people took part in the 'Light a candle' campaign, which took place in a peaceful, and calm manner, without any political confrontation. Participants with lighted candles passed along the central street to the Taras Shevchenko memorial...
Artemovsk - Heavenly kingdom for them all
As the rays of the sun set on the central cemetery of Artemovsk a mass of people assembled to honor the memory of their innocent compatriots who died in 1932-33.
The hands of young people, holding lighted candles involuntarily began to tremble, and old men wiped away a tear when 80-year old Ivan Fedorovich Drogiv retold to the gathering his experiences during the Holodomor. His was a large peasant family who lived in the Slobozhanshchina region... [a summary of Drogiv's narrative follows]
The ceremony was opened by the city chief Aleksey Rev; and then the obladministratsiya deputy Kim Berestovoi reported to the gathering on the work accomplished in the city and the region to perpetuate the memory of compatriots who were innocently killed by the hands of Bolshevik regime...
To the sounds of a sorrowful melody, lighted candles were placed at the foot of memorial to the victims of the Holodomor. Together with them was placed an additional symbol of terrible tragedy - a sheaf of wheat with the tight ears. It stood on the black granite framed by the flickering flames..."
How famine embraced practically all villages in Dontechyna is described in another article in 'Donbass' entitled 'War against the people'. It even includes this facimile copy of a Chicago newspaper....
And this from Ukranews:
"Dnipropetrovsk region installed on November 23 a five-meter stele in memory to the 1932 - 1933 Great Famine (Holodomor) victims near the village of Pereschepyne on the border with Kharkiv region.
Ukrainian News learned this from a report of the press service of the regional state administration.
The stele [?] has a form of a fractured scale with an iron cross placed in its center, the report reads.
«The memorial sign was put up at the cost of the local public, including businessmen,» the report says.
Dnipropetrovsk region has 83 monuments to the Holodomor victims."
Parts of an article from today's popular 'Donbass' newspaper:
"Memorial candles for victims of the regime
Hundreds of thousands of candles in the squares, the cemeteries of Donetsk and in the windows of its inhabitants over the weekend blazed grief for those innocently slain by the Holodomor.
The leaders of the region and city, the representatives of the political parties, public organizations, clergy, cossacks and young people took part in the 'Light a candle' campaign, which took place in a peaceful, and calm manner, without any political confrontation. Participants with lighted candles passed along the central street to the Taras Shevchenko memorial...
Artemovsk - Heavenly kingdom for them all
As the rays of the sun set on the central cemetery of Artemovsk a mass of people assembled to honor the memory of their innocent compatriots who died in 1932-33.
The hands of young people, holding lighted candles involuntarily began to tremble, and old men wiped away a tear when 80-year old Ivan Fedorovich Drogiv retold to the gathering his experiences during the Holodomor. His was a large peasant family who lived in the Slobozhanshchina region... [a summary of Drogiv's narrative follows]
The ceremony was opened by the city chief Aleksey Rev; and then the obladministratsiya deputy Kim Berestovoi reported to the gathering on the work accomplished in the city and the region to perpetuate the memory of compatriots who were innocently killed by the hands of Bolshevik regime...
To the sounds of a sorrowful melody, lighted candles were placed at the foot of memorial to the victims of the Holodomor. Together with them was placed an additional symbol of terrible tragedy - a sheaf of wheat with the tight ears. It stood on the black granite framed by the flickering flames..."
How famine embraced practically all villages in Dontechyna is described in another article in 'Donbass' entitled 'War against the people'. It even includes this facimile copy of a Chicago newspaper....
And this from Ukranews:
"Dnipropetrovsk region installed on November 23 a five-meter stele in memory to the 1932 - 1933 Great Famine (Holodomor) victims near the village of Pereschepyne on the border with Kharkiv region.
Ukrainian News learned this from a report of the press service of the regional state administration.
The stele [?] has a form of a fractured scale with an iron cross placed in its center, the report reads.
«The memorial sign was put up at the cost of the local public, including businessmen,» the report says.
Dnipropetrovsk region has 83 monuments to the Holodomor victims."
Sunday, November 25, 2007
Confronting evil
Yesterday President Yushchenko delivered speech [in English here] at the ceremony in Mykhaylivsky Square, Kyiv, commemorating the 75th Anniversary of the Holodomor. It's powerful stuff.
A excerpt [which I've tidied up] below:
"Evil advanced against us. Its name - genocide. A deliberate, planned and embodied attempt to suppress the nation.
Its organiser and executor - the totalitarian communist regime. They were the main killers. This degenerate gang had no mercy for any peoples, every subjected nation was filled with rivers of blood.
In our land, Stalin in accordance with a deliberate plan, chose to victimize Ukrainian peasantry because they were the core, the basis, the support of nation.
'Without a peasants' army, there is not, and there cannot be a powerful national movement. The national question in its essence is a question of the peasantry'. These words of Stalin provide the answer to the question: why did millions of Ukrainians die?"
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Mark Franchetti [of the 'Sunday Times'] gained unprecedented access to former KGB agent Andrei Lugovoi, the prime suspect in the poisoning in London of former FSB officer Alexandr Litvinenko, for the totally absorbing, and somewhat disturbing, BBC 'thisworld' program entitled: 'Britain's most wanted'.
An absolute 5* 'must-see' for anyone interested in contemporary Russia..
Watch it here . Don't miss it.
Has his self-exposure in this programme made Lugovoi appear, in the eyes of a viewer, more, or less guilty of the charges confronting him?
A excerpt [which I've tidied up] below:
"Evil advanced against us. Its name - genocide. A deliberate, planned and embodied attempt to suppress the nation.
Its organiser and executor - the totalitarian communist regime. They were the main killers. This degenerate gang had no mercy for any peoples, every subjected nation was filled with rivers of blood.
In our land, Stalin in accordance with a deliberate plan, chose to victimize Ukrainian peasantry because they were the core, the basis, the support of nation.
'Without a peasants' army, there is not, and there cannot be a powerful national movement. The national question in its essence is a question of the peasantry'. These words of Stalin provide the answer to the question: why did millions of Ukrainians die?"
----------------------------------------------------------------
Mark Franchetti [of the 'Sunday Times'] gained unprecedented access to former KGB agent Andrei Lugovoi, the prime suspect in the poisoning in London of former FSB officer Alexandr Litvinenko, for the totally absorbing, and somewhat disturbing, BBC 'thisworld' program entitled: 'Britain's most wanted'.
An absolute 5* 'must-see' for anyone interested in contemporary Russia..
Watch it here . Don't miss it.
Has his self-exposure in this programme made Lugovoi appear, in the eyes of a viewer, more, or less guilty of the charges confronting him?
Saturday, November 24, 2007
Going nowhere fast
The first sitting of the newly-elected Ukrainian Parliament, the Verhkovna Rada, took place today, and a recess promptly declared until next Thursday.
BYuT leader Yulia Tymoshenko's response, in an interview with journalists today:
"They need time in order to continue to bribe deputies. They want to win a few days.."
She called the ajournment: "an absolute infringement of the reglament [procedural regulations]", and declared that her fraction will attend the VR on Tuesday. She expects NUNS to do the same, hoping that the total number attending will be an orange 'full house' of 228 - sufficient to pass resolutions.
"The president told me yesterday that there is no alternative to a democratic coalition, and that he will support Kyrylenko for VR speaker," said Tymoshenko. Everyone knows that the president is always true to his word in everything he says to Yulka, so that's all right then.. [no snickering at the back..]
And when will we see any solid evidence of bribes being offered?
There are reports that 8 NUNS deputies have not signed an agreement on democratic coalition.
If they were to form their own coalition, PoR [175]-Communists [27]-Lytyvn bloc [20], could only muster 222 votes maximum in total between them. Add 8 renegades from NUNS, maybe a handful from BYuT, and this still does not provide, in Ukrainian terms, a workable majority in a 450 seat VR. The presence of Communists in this coalition would be a big problem for anyone else thinking of joining them..and Lytvyn is well aware of what happened to Moroz and the Socialists after they teamed up with PoR last year in the VR, so will be most cautious about any such arrangement. He may well prefer to remain non-aligned for the time being.
This is all going nowhere fast. Privately, the current Yanukovych-led cabinet, and the President, will not be too unhappy about that right now..
BYuT leader Yulia Tymoshenko's response, in an interview with journalists today:
"They need time in order to continue to bribe deputies. They want to win a few days.."
She called the ajournment: "an absolute infringement of the reglament [procedural regulations]", and declared that her fraction will attend the VR on Tuesday. She expects NUNS to do the same, hoping that the total number attending will be an orange 'full house' of 228 - sufficient to pass resolutions.
"The president told me yesterday that there is no alternative to a democratic coalition, and that he will support Kyrylenko for VR speaker," said Tymoshenko. Everyone knows that the president is always true to his word in everything he says to Yulka, so that's all right then.. [no snickering at the back..]
And when will we see any solid evidence of bribes being offered?
There are reports that 8 NUNS deputies have not signed an agreement on democratic coalition.
If they were to form their own coalition, PoR [175]-Communists [27]-Lytyvn bloc [20], could only muster 222 votes maximum in total between them. Add 8 renegades from NUNS, maybe a handful from BYuT, and this still does not provide, in Ukrainian terms, a workable majority in a 450 seat VR. The presence of Communists in this coalition would be a big problem for anyone else thinking of joining them..and Lytvyn is well aware of what happened to Moroz and the Socialists after they teamed up with PoR last year in the VR, so will be most cautious about any such arrangement. He may well prefer to remain non-aligned for the time being.
This is all going nowhere fast. Privately, the current Yanukovych-led cabinet, and the President, will not be too unhappy about that right now..
Thursday, November 22, 2007
Why Ukraine's problems are a cause for optimism
Excerpts below from an article in RFE/RL entitled "Colored Revolutions: High Hopes And Broken Promises"
"Some consider the Ukrainian east-west divide to the be a source of internal weakness. But others, such as Georgian political commentator Bakur Kvashilava, argue that it holds the benefit of laying the groundwork for the establishment of democratic principles and procedures.
"Such regional disagreements complicate governance of a country, of course," Kvashilava says. "But long-term, as history and other examples teach us, if two opposing sides can agree on one fundamental issue -- that Ukraine must be integral and undivided, for instance -- then chances are they will also agree on a second fundamental issue, that the only correct path for coming to power is the democratic one -- elections, referendums."
There has been a clear effort to solve all political crises -- no matter how acute -- through negotiation and accommodation in post-Orange Revolution Ukraine. For Kvashilava, this indicates that democratic procedures are finally taking root in the country's political culture, creating a telling contrast with Georgia.
"In Georgia, as the recent events demonstrated, it was absolutely legitimate and acceptable for the population, as well as some representatives of the opposition, to call for the president's resignation, [the opposition's] assumption of power, 'saving the people' and so on," Kvashilava says. "The majority of protesters applauded these slogans -- and this indicates that democracy, as the only way of life, in Georgia has not been established as firmly as in Ukraine."
Ukraine's regional and linguistic diversity has also served as a basis for less radical shifts in foreign policy. While in Georgia most political forces -- and certainly the one in power -- are openly pro-Western and have expressed the desire to distance Georgia from Russia's influence, Ukrainian politicians have been more restrained and cautious.
"The checks and balances that exist in Ukraine, because of various divisions within the country, meant the Ukrainian government, while it was always very keen on close relationship with NATO, was never able to go flat out and seek NATO membership, or the initial Membership Action Plan," Redman of the Economist Intelligence Unit explains. "Whereas Saakashvili has had a very free hand in Georgia, and was able to do that. So he was more out-and-out pro-Western, pro-NATO, than the Ukrainians ever managed."
But that approach has come back to bite Georgia in another sense, as it served to strain further its already deteriorating relationship with Russia and has fueled aggressive rhetoric by Russian politicians who can't afford to show the same hostility to Ukraine, lest they risk alienating Russian-speaking Ukrainians."
LEvko's observation is that Russian politicians have already alienated many Russian-speaking Ukrainians over several years now, and continue to do so by their overbearing attitude. Ukrainian politicians and businessmen will not be cowed by those from the north. They know them too well - know all their games - they all used to pi** into the same pot in the days of the Union.
Ukraine and Russia are now much different countries - and the blue water between them is widening..
"Some consider the Ukrainian east-west divide to the be a source of internal weakness. But others, such as Georgian political commentator Bakur Kvashilava, argue that it holds the benefit of laying the groundwork for the establishment of democratic principles and procedures.
"Such regional disagreements complicate governance of a country, of course," Kvashilava says. "But long-term, as history and other examples teach us, if two opposing sides can agree on one fundamental issue -- that Ukraine must be integral and undivided, for instance -- then chances are they will also agree on a second fundamental issue, that the only correct path for coming to power is the democratic one -- elections, referendums."
There has been a clear effort to solve all political crises -- no matter how acute -- through negotiation and accommodation in post-Orange Revolution Ukraine. For Kvashilava, this indicates that democratic procedures are finally taking root in the country's political culture, creating a telling contrast with Georgia.
"In Georgia, as the recent events demonstrated, it was absolutely legitimate and acceptable for the population, as well as some representatives of the opposition, to call for the president's resignation, [the opposition's] assumption of power, 'saving the people' and so on," Kvashilava says. "The majority of protesters applauded these slogans -- and this indicates that democracy, as the only way of life, in Georgia has not been established as firmly as in Ukraine."
Ukraine's regional and linguistic diversity has also served as a basis for less radical shifts in foreign policy. While in Georgia most political forces -- and certainly the one in power -- are openly pro-Western and have expressed the desire to distance Georgia from Russia's influence, Ukrainian politicians have been more restrained and cautious.
"The checks and balances that exist in Ukraine, because of various divisions within the country, meant the Ukrainian government, while it was always very keen on close relationship with NATO, was never able to go flat out and seek NATO membership, or the initial Membership Action Plan," Redman of the Economist Intelligence Unit explains. "Whereas Saakashvili has had a very free hand in Georgia, and was able to do that. So he was more out-and-out pro-Western, pro-NATO, than the Ukrainians ever managed."
But that approach has come back to bite Georgia in another sense, as it served to strain further its already deteriorating relationship with Russia and has fueled aggressive rhetoric by Russian politicians who can't afford to show the same hostility to Ukraine, lest they risk alienating Russian-speaking Ukrainians."
LEvko's observation is that Russian politicians have already alienated many Russian-speaking Ukrainians over several years now, and continue to do so by their overbearing attitude. Ukrainian politicians and businessmen will not be cowed by those from the north. They know them too well - know all their games - they all used to pi** into the same pot in the days of the Union.
Ukraine and Russia are now much different countries - and the blue water between them is widening..
Tuesday, November 20, 2007
Ukrainians' views on Holodomor
Today the popular Russian-language 'Segodnya' newspaper carries the following story:
"Increasingly more Ukrainians recognize the Holodomor as genocide.
The overwhelming majority of Ukrainians in all regions are convinced that the Holodomor [famine] of 1932-1933 was caused by the actions of the authorities.
Here are some portions from the article:
An opinion poll reveals, this point of view is supported by 72,4% of citizens questioned by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology.
In the last year the percentage of those questioned who consider the Holodomor of the 30's being caused by the authorities at that time, has increased in the Ukraine from 65 to 72% - in the eastern part of the country- from 46 to 57%, in the center - from 73 to 82%, in the south - from 59 to 65% and the west - from 80 to 85%.
Only 12% consider that Holodomor of 1932-33 was caused mainly by natural circumstances.
Almost two thirds (63,2%) of those questioned fully or partially support the acknowledgement by the Supreme Rada that the Holodomor was an act of genocide against the Ukrainian people, 11,9% wavered with their answer, and 2,9% know nothing about it.
The acknowledgement of the Holodomor as genocide was supported by the supporters of the main political forces as follows: 93% of NUNS supporters, 84% of BYUT's supporters, 75% Lytvyna bloc supporters, 43% - Party of Regions. Amongst Communists - 50% do not support the acknowledgement of Holodomor as genocide, but 41% do.
It is remarkable that in comparison with the results of similar questioning carried out exactly year ago, during November 2006, the number of supporters who support the acknowledgement of the Holodomor as genocide has increased from 60,9 to 63,2%.
2041 respondents aged 18 and upward throughout the entire territory of Ukraine were questioned . The statistical error in the sample does not exceed 3,5%."
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Also from 'Segodnya', this:
"Russia is concealing from Ukraine what was onboard the sunken vessels
The Ukrainian side has not yet had any reply from the Russian Federation about the quantitative and qualitative characteristics of the cargoes being carried by the sunken Russian vessels in the Kerch strait, or any details of the vessels' proprietors.
The ministry of the environment notes that the absence of information is hindering the evaluation of damage sustained by the surrounding environment."
Lots more detail on the pollution caused by Russian vessels here.
Ukrainian minister of transport and communications, Mykola Rudkovsky, claimed several days ago that the captains of the Russian vessels which sunk during the storm did not adhere to warnings and recommendations provided by Ukrainian coastguards and so bear full responsibility for the ecological damage caused.
Ukrainian-flagged ships in the area did act on recommendations given by the port authorities in Kerch, and as a result, there are no sunken Ukrainian vessels
European Union officials are already actively involved in clean-up operations.
The Russian side is behaving in a stereotypically cavalier fashion toward its closest neighbour yet again. What is it with these guys?
"Increasingly more Ukrainians recognize the Holodomor as genocide.
The overwhelming majority of Ukrainians in all regions are convinced that the Holodomor [famine] of 1932-1933 was caused by the actions of the authorities.
Here are some portions from the article:
An opinion poll reveals, this point of view is supported by 72,4% of citizens questioned by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology.
In the last year the percentage of those questioned who consider the Holodomor of the 30's being caused by the authorities at that time, has increased in the Ukraine from 65 to 72% - in the eastern part of the country- from 46 to 57%, in the center - from 73 to 82%, in the south - from 59 to 65% and the west - from 80 to 85%.
Only 12% consider that Holodomor of 1932-33 was caused mainly by natural circumstances.
Almost two thirds (63,2%) of those questioned fully or partially support the acknowledgement by the Supreme Rada that the Holodomor was an act of genocide against the Ukrainian people, 11,9% wavered with their answer, and 2,9% know nothing about it.
The acknowledgement of the Holodomor as genocide was supported by the supporters of the main political forces as follows: 93% of NUNS supporters, 84% of BYUT's supporters, 75% Lytvyna bloc supporters, 43% - Party of Regions. Amongst Communists - 50% do not support the acknowledgement of Holodomor as genocide, but 41% do.
It is remarkable that in comparison with the results of similar questioning carried out exactly year ago, during November 2006, the number of supporters who support the acknowledgement of the Holodomor as genocide has increased from 60,9 to 63,2%.
2041 respondents aged 18 and upward throughout the entire territory of Ukraine were questioned . The statistical error in the sample does not exceed 3,5%."
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Also from 'Segodnya', this:
"Russia is concealing from Ukraine what was onboard the sunken vessels
The Ukrainian side has not yet had any reply from the Russian Federation about the quantitative and qualitative characteristics of the cargoes being carried by the sunken Russian vessels in the Kerch strait, or any details of the vessels' proprietors.
The ministry of the environment notes that the absence of information is hindering the evaluation of damage sustained by the surrounding environment."
Lots more detail on the pollution caused by Russian vessels here.
Ukrainian minister of transport and communications, Mykola Rudkovsky, claimed several days ago that the captains of the Russian vessels which sunk during the storm did not adhere to warnings and recommendations provided by Ukrainian coastguards and so bear full responsibility for the ecological damage caused.
Ukrainian-flagged ships in the area did act on recommendations given by the port authorities in Kerch, and as a result, there are no sunken Ukrainian vessels
European Union officials are already actively involved in clean-up operations.
The Russian side is behaving in a stereotypically cavalier fashion toward its closest neighbour yet again. What is it with these guys?
Segodnya on Zasyadko disaster
Today's big-selling 'Segodnya', owned by Rinat Akhmetov, pulls no punches in its reporting on the Zasyadko mine disaster in Donetsk. Its lead story is "Widow of miner says: 'They killed my husband for 2000 hryven', after Zasyadko mining disaster
Yesterday's catastrophe on the Zasyadko mine could be the worst in Ukraine's entire history. Who is guilty? Natural forces [stikhiya] again?
Below are portions of the article:
Wives spoke directly and to the point, and cursed the mine's management. "My husband in a month earns only 2000 hryven. Lord, do not bring it about, but if they killed him for this money, then I will bite Zvyagil'sky myself, even if only his leg (Zvyagilsky is the honorary President of Zasydko mine). I will bite him. I swear, I could not kill him - his guards would not allow it, but I could bite him!" said miner's wife Natalie Piskun.
In the opinion of prime minister Viktor Yanukovich, who arrived at the place of the tragedy, most likely its cause was the sudden release of methane: "All this again shows that the man is powerless in the face of such natural forces [stikhiya]. This occurs all over the world." ....
Donetsk miners told us, often the explosions of methane occur because sensors which detect the level of methane, are deliberately 'de-tuned' in order to understate the level of dangerous gas. "While the methane content is higher than standard, coal cannot be extracted. It is necessary to wait until the work site is ventilated, but this means that less coal will be dug, on which wages depend, and the main thing is revenue for the owner of mine," explained a former electrician from the mine Vladislav K. The Zasyad'ko mine employees do not blame the board of directors directly, but they assert that "recommendations" usually come from middle managers.
According to Vladislav, he repeatedly encountered the practice of the "introduction of corrections" into the work of sensors. Most frequently instruments that measure methane are simply placed on the ground where there is less harmful gas, and if this does not help they they are disconnected. Sometimes a sweater is simply hung over the instrument.
Those who do not want to do this kind of thing are quickly dealt with. "Once a section chief asked me, why is the coal cutting combine not working? I answered, that the gas situation does not make it possible to conduct work. After several days they transferred me to another section where they pay two times less. My place was taken, it seems, by a more compliant fitter." According to the miner, several months after this, an explosion took place in his former section, killing 20 of its friends.
Another miner says new equipment is now installed in the mine, and the measurement data is fed to the surface dispatcher, but if it is desired, it is possible "to correct" the data there.
The 'Segodnya' article does temper these statements a little, suggesting that the explosion may indeed have been caused by and unexpected release of methane.
The edition even ran most of BYuT's statement on the tragedy which says priority number one should be safety of working in mines. Normally Segodnya is disparaging in its comments about BYuT.
Yesterday's catastrophe on the Zasyadko mine could be the worst in Ukraine's entire history. Who is guilty? Natural forces [stikhiya] again?
Below are portions of the article:
Wives spoke directly and to the point, and cursed the mine's management. "My husband in a month earns only 2000 hryven. Lord, do not bring it about, but if they killed him for this money, then I will bite Zvyagil'sky myself, even if only his leg (Zvyagilsky is the honorary President of Zasydko mine). I will bite him. I swear, I could not kill him - his guards would not allow it, but I could bite him!" said miner's wife Natalie Piskun.
In the opinion of prime minister Viktor Yanukovich, who arrived at the place of the tragedy, most likely its cause was the sudden release of methane: "All this again shows that the man is powerless in the face of such natural forces [stikhiya]. This occurs all over the world." ....
Donetsk miners told us, often the explosions of methane occur because sensors which detect the level of methane, are deliberately 'de-tuned' in order to understate the level of dangerous gas. "While the methane content is higher than standard, coal cannot be extracted. It is necessary to wait until the work site is ventilated, but this means that less coal will be dug, on which wages depend, and the main thing is revenue for the owner of mine," explained a former electrician from the mine Vladislav K. The Zasyad'ko mine employees do not blame the board of directors directly, but they assert that "recommendations" usually come from middle managers.
According to Vladislav, he repeatedly encountered the practice of the "introduction of corrections" into the work of sensors. Most frequently instruments that measure methane are simply placed on the ground where there is less harmful gas, and if this does not help they they are disconnected. Sometimes a sweater is simply hung over the instrument.
Those who do not want to do this kind of thing are quickly dealt with. "Once a section chief asked me, why is the coal cutting combine not working? I answered, that the gas situation does not make it possible to conduct work. After several days they transferred me to another section where they pay two times less. My place was taken, it seems, by a more compliant fitter." According to the miner, several months after this, an explosion took place in his former section, killing 20 of its friends.
Another miner says new equipment is now installed in the mine, and the measurement data is fed to the surface dispatcher, but if it is desired, it is possible "to correct" the data there.
The 'Segodnya' article does temper these statements a little, suggesting that the explosion may indeed have been caused by and unexpected release of methane.
The edition even ran most of BYuT's statement on the tragedy which says priority number one should be safety of working in mines. Normally Segodnya is disparaging in its comments about BYuT.
Monday, November 19, 2007
A terrible price to pay
Yanuk's shallow, inadequate comments on visiting the Zasyadko mine in Donbas today, where a terrible mining disaster has occured: "I think not one mine in the world is safeguarded from similar events. All accidents which take place in mines, are linked with the conducting of mining works; and natural disaster [stikhiya] spares no-one, it is merciless...This accident yet again reminded us that man is powerless against natural disaster [stikhiya]." [Same quotes appear in Akhmetov's 'Segodnya']
The mine has witnessed many disasters in recent years:
May 1999 - 50 deaths
August 2001 - 55 deaths
June 2002 - 20 deaths
September 2006 - 13 deaths
November 2007 - 63 deaths and many more unaccounted for at time of writing..
It it is difficult to image what it is like to earn a living in such a death-trap where fatalities occur with such gut-wrenching regularity - a mine is not a battlefield or a war zone. The poor miners of Donbas deserve better..
Also at the site are presidential secretariat head Baloha, and national security and defence council secretary Ivan Plyushch. How long will Ukrainian miners put up with these unworthy leaders who are more interested in feathering their own nests than improving the lot of the working man?
'Ostrov' points out that several years ago a road in Donetsk was named in honour of the Zasyadko mine boss Yukhym Zvyahilsky, a former acting prime minister of Ukraine, and now PoR VR deputy. How ironic that this is the road that leads to the cemetery where dead miners are normally buried..
The mine has witnessed many disasters in recent years:
May 1999 - 50 deaths
August 2001 - 55 deaths
June 2002 - 20 deaths
September 2006 - 13 deaths
November 2007 - 63 deaths and many more unaccounted for at time of writing..
It it is difficult to image what it is like to earn a living in such a death-trap where fatalities occur with such gut-wrenching regularity - a mine is not a battlefield or a war zone. The poor miners of Donbas deserve better..
Also at the site are presidential secretariat head Baloha, and national security and defence council secretary Ivan Plyushch. How long will Ukrainian miners put up with these unworthy leaders who are more interested in feathering their own nests than improving the lot of the working man?
'Ostrov' points out that several years ago a road in Donetsk was named in honour of the Zasyadko mine boss Yukhym Zvyahilsky, a former acting prime minister of Ukraine, and now PoR VR deputy. How ironic that this is the road that leads to the cemetery where dead miners are normally buried..
Saturday, November 17, 2007
Russians misbehaving again
Today Russia's national soccer team lost a crucial Euro 2008 qualifying game against Israel. Had they won, England would have been all but eliminated. Following what some English newspapers are calling a 'Miracle in the Holy Land', England now need only to draw against Croatia at home to reach the finals.. simultaneously eliminating Russia.
More wry amusement from the London 'Times' on this topic here and here
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Much more sinister: today the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent a note to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation demanding a swift investigation and bringing to justice members of the Eurasian Union of Youth who allegedly trashed a Holodomor exhibition in Moscow earlier today.
These are the same guys who also allegedly trashed Ukrainian national symbols on Ukraine's highest mountain, Hoverla, and conducted a cyber attack on President Yushchenko's website recently.
More wry amusement from the London 'Times' on this topic here and here
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Much more sinister: today the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent a note to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation demanding a swift investigation and bringing to justice members of the Eurasian Union of Youth who allegedly trashed a Holodomor exhibition in Moscow earlier today.
These are the same guys who also allegedly trashed Ukrainian national symbols on Ukraine's highest mountain, Hoverla, and conducted a cyber attack on President Yushchenko's website recently.
Even worse in Russia
Excerpt from a story in today's 'FT':
"Europe’s main election monitoring group said on Friday it was scrapping plans to deploy observers to Russia’s forthcoming parliamentary elections in a decision that could cast doubt on the integrity of the poll.
The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe claimed Moscow had imposed “unprecedented restrictions” on its activities. Russia had slashed the number of observers it would admit to the December 2 election and then repeatedly delayed issuing visas for OSCE monitors.
The move marks a new low in diplomatic relations between Russia and the west, following clashes over energy, the expansion of Nato into the former Soviet Union and US plans for missile defence bases. The west accuses Russian president Vladimir Putin of suppressing democracy while the Kremlin claims the west seeks to interfere in Russia’s internal affairs."
Check out the OSCE site for more.
And from another story in today's 'FT':
"The public prosecutions’ office in the British Virgin Islands has told the US government it has “overwhelming evidence” that Leonid Reiman, Russian telecommunications minister, is the “true beneficial owner” of a fund that owns a large part of Russia’s telecoms industry.
In a letter to the US justice department, Terrence F. Williams, the BVI’s director of public prosecution, said BVI investigators had prepared preliminary charges against Jeffrey Galmond, a close associate of Mr Reiman.
The letter alleges he concealed the minister’s role as the beneficial owner of Ipoc, a Bermuda-based fund that owns a chunk of Russia’s telecoms industry, including Megafon, the mobile operator.
The disclosure looked set to deal a fresh blow to Mr Reiman, an ally of Vladimir Putin, the Russian president. Mr Reiman has repeatedly denied allegations he secretly amassed billions of dollars of assets in the telecom sector with the help of Mr Galmond, his Danish lawyer, who has claimed in court testimony he was the beneficial owner of Ipoc."
What's Vova's cut?
"Europe’s main election monitoring group said on Friday it was scrapping plans to deploy observers to Russia’s forthcoming parliamentary elections in a decision that could cast doubt on the integrity of the poll.
The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe claimed Moscow had imposed “unprecedented restrictions” on its activities. Russia had slashed the number of observers it would admit to the December 2 election and then repeatedly delayed issuing visas for OSCE monitors.
The move marks a new low in diplomatic relations between Russia and the west, following clashes over energy, the expansion of Nato into the former Soviet Union and US plans for missile defence bases. The west accuses Russian president Vladimir Putin of suppressing democracy while the Kremlin claims the west seeks to interfere in Russia’s internal affairs."
Check out the OSCE site for more.
And from another story in today's 'FT':
"The public prosecutions’ office in the British Virgin Islands has told the US government it has “overwhelming evidence” that Leonid Reiman, Russian telecommunications minister, is the “true beneficial owner” of a fund that owns a large part of Russia’s telecoms industry.
In a letter to the US justice department, Terrence F. Williams, the BVI’s director of public prosecution, said BVI investigators had prepared preliminary charges against Jeffrey Galmond, a close associate of Mr Reiman.
The letter alleges he concealed the minister’s role as the beneficial owner of Ipoc, a Bermuda-based fund that owns a chunk of Russia’s telecoms industry, including Megafon, the mobile operator.
The disclosure looked set to deal a fresh blow to Mr Reiman, an ally of Vladimir Putin, the Russian president. Mr Reiman has repeatedly denied allegations he secretly amassed billions of dollars of assets in the telecom sector with the help of Mr Galmond, his Danish lawyer, who has claimed in court testimony he was the beneficial owner of Ipoc."
What's Vova's cut?
Political unaccountability, part 2
So Serhiy Kivalov has received a honorary diploma from the head of the Central Election Commission for his "weighty input into securing the realization of Ukrainian citizens’ constitutional voting rights, and on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the CEC's foundation.”
Most readers of this posting will need no introduction to this character, and will, I'm sure, will be totally 'gob-smacked' by this astonishing, odious, almost unbelievable granting of this diploma. To make matters even worse, it was granted and signed by the current CEC chairman Volodymyr Shapoval, who entered the CEC as part of Yushchenko's quota.
Some argue that the rulings of the CEC are nothing to do with the president, and because no-one was ever charged or found guilty of falsifying the 2004 presidential elections, Kivalov must be considered pure and above reproach.
However, the Supreme court did rule that during the presidential elections in 2004 the CEC and its chairman at that time, Kivalov, did not fulfill their legal functions properly, and their decisions were made not in accordance with the law - hence the re-run second round of voting.
It is left to Yuliya Tymoshenko, not for the first time, to uphold the tattered remains of the honour of Ukrainian politicians, in a statement issued on the Batkivshchyna site.
She points out that this award encourages officials to cheat any future elections, and reduces the likelyhood these elections being fair. She appeals to the chairman of the CEC to withdraw the diploma granted to Kivalov, and warns that she will not remain silent while awaiting the formation of a democratic coalition in parliament.
Most readers of this posting will need no introduction to this character, and will, I'm sure, will be totally 'gob-smacked' by this astonishing, odious, almost unbelievable granting of this diploma. To make matters even worse, it was granted and signed by the current CEC chairman Volodymyr Shapoval, who entered the CEC as part of Yushchenko's quota.
Some argue that the rulings of the CEC are nothing to do with the president, and because no-one was ever charged or found guilty of falsifying the 2004 presidential elections, Kivalov must be considered pure and above reproach.
However, the Supreme court did rule that during the presidential elections in 2004 the CEC and its chairman at that time, Kivalov, did not fulfill their legal functions properly, and their decisions were made not in accordance with the law - hence the re-run second round of voting.
It is left to Yuliya Tymoshenko, not for the first time, to uphold the tattered remains of the honour of Ukrainian politicians, in a statement issued on the Batkivshchyna site.
She points out that this award encourages officials to cheat any future elections, and reduces the likelyhood these elections being fair. She appeals to the chairman of the CEC to withdraw the diploma granted to Kivalov, and warns that she will not remain silent while awaiting the formation of a democratic coalition in parliament.
Thursday, November 15, 2007
System of political unaccountability
An article on the current political situation in Ukraine in latest 'Kyiv Post' includes this:
"In the long term, it’s the Ukrainian nation and its people that suffer from the current political deadlock, lack of unaccountability and disrespect for the rule of law...Politicians created a system in which a small circle of politicians divide power among each other and a system of political unaccountability thrives.."
Co-incidentally, an illustration of this system is provided in a piece in today's 'Ukrainska Pravda' entitled: "From the life of the nomenklatura elites: the property of Ivan Plyushch", which describes how Plyushch - a former VR speaker, and currently National Security and Defence Council secretary close to the president and his secretariat, just two days before the 30th September VR elections, asked the president to help him obtain permission from the Cabinet of Ministers to transfer ownership and build a house on a plot of land owned by the Ukrainian state.
The dacha in which Plyushch resides right now, in what the British call 'grace-and-favour' accommodation, is located on this plot in the elite Pushcha Vodytsya suburb of Kyiv.
On 1st October president Yushchenko writes to PM Yanukovych to sort the matter out, and Yanuk promptly does this, even though, strictly speaking, the president no longer has the authority to forward such directives to the KabMin. By October 3rd Yanuk instructs minister Azarov to grant approval, and by the 5th, the ministry of Justice has also rubber-stamped a positive decision. The speed with which everything was resolved, by Ukrainian standards was truly miraculous.
Of course this has nothing to do with the fact that Plyushch is one of the main proponents in the NUNS camp of a wide VR coalition with PoR, in which he would be one of the favourites for the VR speaker's chair..
"In the long term, it’s the Ukrainian nation and its people that suffer from the current political deadlock, lack of unaccountability and disrespect for the rule of law...Politicians created a system in which a small circle of politicians divide power among each other and a system of political unaccountability thrives.."
Co-incidentally, an illustration of this system is provided in a piece in today's 'Ukrainska Pravda' entitled: "From the life of the nomenklatura elites: the property of Ivan Plyushch", which describes how Plyushch - a former VR speaker, and currently National Security and Defence Council secretary close to the president and his secretariat, just two days before the 30th September VR elections, asked the president to help him obtain permission from the Cabinet of Ministers to transfer ownership and build a house on a plot of land owned by the Ukrainian state.
The dacha in which Plyushch resides right now, in what the British call 'grace-and-favour' accommodation, is located on this plot in the elite Pushcha Vodytsya suburb of Kyiv.
On 1st October president Yushchenko writes to PM Yanukovych to sort the matter out, and Yanuk promptly does this, even though, strictly speaking, the president no longer has the authority to forward such directives to the KabMin. By October 3rd Yanuk instructs minister Azarov to grant approval, and by the 5th, the ministry of Justice has also rubber-stamped a positive decision. The speed with which everything was resolved, by Ukrainian standards was truly miraculous.
Of course this has nothing to do with the fact that Plyushch is one of the main proponents in the NUNS camp of a wide VR coalition with PoR, in which he would be one of the favourites for the VR speaker's chair..
Wednesday, November 14, 2007
Speculation speculation..
Some interesting speculation from the excellent Mustafa Nayem and Serhiy Leshchenko in 'Ukrainska Pravda'. They propose three possible scenarios on how matters could develop in the creation [or otherwise] of a ruling coalition in the VR.
I've paraphrased some bits:
Almost one-and-a-half months have passed since the elections. In this time in Poland, even though voting took place three weeks later, the new parliament has already began work, inter-party negotiations have taken place, and a new prime minister chosen...
Yushchenko dissolved parliament on 2nd April. Now in October it's becoming clear that the only person who is in no hurry to 'get the show on the road' is Viktor Yushchenko himself. The parliament is dissolved, the status of the cabinet of ministers can be regarded as 'semi-legal', and the all-important Constitutional Court discredited...
Against this background the President remains only legitimate institution of authority in the country. But the Party of Regions, against whom this war was begun, are willing to go along with the situation, grasping for the chance to temain in the authority, even in the role of 'acting government'.
Presidential Scenario
The vote in the newly-elected VR to elect a speaker could well fall through [Vyacheslav Kirilenko is the favoured candidate from BYuT/NUNS, but there are deputies in NUNS who will not vote for him], and parliament [with the help of PoR] could select a figure acceptable to PoR e.g Ivan Plyushch or Volodymyr Lytvyn.
Logically the next stage would be to create a broad coalition. However, for this to occur NUNS would need to sort out certain internal procedures - i.e. to make a decision at the level of the individual fractions that make up NUNS. It's reasonable to assume that out of the 72 future NUNS deputies less than half would vote for a wide coalition or "shirka". To do so would expose themselves to accusations by Yulia Tymoshenko of betrayal.
In the absence of a coalition the cabinet of ministers headed by Yanukovich would continue to fulfill its duties.
The President would for sure insist on the resignation some of the more unpleasant ministers e.g. Nestor Shufrich and Mykola Rudkovskiy, and insist his own man was appointed minister of internal affairs position, but Yanukovich could probably accede to these demands.
The threat of the "oranges" reuniting would provide the President complete support of the Party of Regions and, possibly, even the Communist party. As a result, Yushchenko would remain the only fully authorised institution of authority in the country.
Meanwhile Yulia Tymoshenko is increasing her co-operation with Yuriy Lutsenko and Vyacheslav Kirilenko.
In the event that Tymoshenko's bid to become prime minister fails, the leader of BYuT will do that which voters have expected since September 2005 [when she was sacked from the PM's position by Yushchenko] - commence a campaign of attack against Viktor Yushchenko and call for early presidential elections.
I've paraphrased some bits:
Almost one-and-a-half months have passed since the elections. In this time in Poland, even though voting took place three weeks later, the new parliament has already began work, inter-party negotiations have taken place, and a new prime minister chosen...
Yushchenko dissolved parliament on 2nd April. Now in October it's becoming clear that the only person who is in no hurry to 'get the show on the road' is Viktor Yushchenko himself. The parliament is dissolved, the status of the cabinet of ministers can be regarded as 'semi-legal', and the all-important Constitutional Court discredited...
Against this background the President remains only legitimate institution of authority in the country. But the Party of Regions, against whom this war was begun, are willing to go along with the situation, grasping for the chance to temain in the authority, even in the role of 'acting government'.
Presidential Scenario
The vote in the newly-elected VR to elect a speaker could well fall through [Vyacheslav Kirilenko is the favoured candidate from BYuT/NUNS, but there are deputies in NUNS who will not vote for him], and parliament [with the help of PoR] could select a figure acceptable to PoR e.g Ivan Plyushch or Volodymyr Lytvyn.
Logically the next stage would be to create a broad coalition. However, for this to occur NUNS would need to sort out certain internal procedures - i.e. to make a decision at the level of the individual fractions that make up NUNS. It's reasonable to assume that out of the 72 future NUNS deputies less than half would vote for a wide coalition or "shirka". To do so would expose themselves to accusations by Yulia Tymoshenko of betrayal.
In the absence of a coalition the cabinet of ministers headed by Yanukovich would continue to fulfill its duties.
The President would for sure insist on the resignation some of the more unpleasant ministers e.g. Nestor Shufrich and Mykola Rudkovskiy, and insist his own man was appointed minister of internal affairs position, but Yanukovich could probably accede to these demands.
The threat of the "oranges" reuniting would provide the President complete support of the Party of Regions and, possibly, even the Communist party. As a result, Yushchenko would remain the only fully authorised institution of authority in the country.
Meanwhile Yulia Tymoshenko is increasing her co-operation with Yuriy Lutsenko and Vyacheslav Kirilenko.
In the event that Tymoshenko's bid to become prime minister fails, the leader of BYuT will do that which voters have expected since September 2005 [when she was sacked from the PM's position by Yushchenko] - commence a campaign of attack against Viktor Yushchenko and call for early presidential elections.
Sunday, November 11, 2007
Ever-shifting loyalties
Alliances of convenience and subsequent betrayals are a characteristic of contemporary Ukrainian politics. Meanwhile, behind-the-scenes deals are continuing to be thrashed out in an attempt to assemble a workable coalition in the newly-elected Verkhovna Rada.
Tymoshenko knows better than anyone that her plan to lead an orange coalition could be scuttled by just a handful of turncoat NUNS or BYuT deputies - those who would prefer a grand coalition with PoR. According to an article in 'Gazeta po Kiyevski', she has been busy trying to gain support of the 20 Lytyvyn bloc deputies for a while now, in order to achieve her aim and become PM again.
Although she has been unusually quiet, signs are her attempts have a reasonable chance of success. Hints of a possible arrangement between Lytvyn and Tymoshenko became public toward the end of last week.
Lytvyn declared that if Tymoshenko includes the basic pre-election pledges of his bloc: a moratorium on the sale of land, and a minimum wage in the program of government, then he would support her premiership. The price to be paid would be a number of posts for his bloc in Tymoshenko's government, and the vice- speaker's chair for Lytvyn himself. [The speakers chair itself would not be available as this has been 'bagsied' [called dibs] by NUNS, in their coalition agreement with BYuT.]
According to 'Gazeta po Kiyevski', Lytvyn will support Tymoshenko, but will not formally enter the "orange" coalition. He would rather take up a pragmatic 'pick and mix' neutral position.
The negotiations between Tymoshenko and Lytvyn have messed up the plans of head of the presidential secretariat Viktor Baloga in particular, and Lytvyn will now be under great pressure from PoR and some elements in NUNS to change his mind.
Meanwhile this week's 'Kommentarii' writes of a calculated warming of friendship between Yushchenko and Yanukovych, which may be of mutual benefit. [Something of which I've posted recently.]
Yushchenko continues to leave the door open for a possible broad coalition, so a working relationship with Yanukovych needs to be maintained, particularly as the 'bottom may drop out' of any BYuT-NUNS-Lytvyn bloc coalition.
Yushchenko has successfully strengthened his own position since dissolving the VR in April, taking advantage of a window of opportunity whilst Yanukovych is acting PM, but Tymoshenko not yet heading the Kabmin. He has strengthened his control over the sylovyk sectors, and rotated oblast governors, which he could hardly do with Tymoshenko as PM - Yanukovych has not protested. He has personally overseen gas affairs with Russia, with Yanuk's co-operation, so enlarging his own, new, more 'hands-on' personal image.
PM Yanukovych retains some hope of hanging on to his post in a grand parliamentary coalition. And if coalition-building in the VR drags out to a fruitless stalemate, he could continue as acting PM - retaining the loyalty to the President - a situation which could well suit the [more dynamic] president too.
For this reason Yanukovych has avoided conflict, and, on the contrary, has adopted a constructive attitude ready for broad compromises.
Even if he is thrust into opposition, a reasonably well-developed working relationship with the president means that some influence would be retained by Yanukovych - this could bring important dividends in the near future.
Cordial relations with the president could even ensure that Yanuk's significant newly-acquired properties and assets would be protected from Tymoshenko-led authorities.
Tymoshenko knows better than anyone that her plan to lead an orange coalition could be scuttled by just a handful of turncoat NUNS or BYuT deputies - those who would prefer a grand coalition with PoR. According to an article in 'Gazeta po Kiyevski', she has been busy trying to gain support of the 20 Lytyvyn bloc deputies for a while now, in order to achieve her aim and become PM again.
Although she has been unusually quiet, signs are her attempts have a reasonable chance of success. Hints of a possible arrangement between Lytvyn and Tymoshenko became public toward the end of last week.
Lytvyn declared that if Tymoshenko includes the basic pre-election pledges of his bloc: a moratorium on the sale of land, and a minimum wage in the program of government, then he would support her premiership. The price to be paid would be a number of posts for his bloc in Tymoshenko's government, and the vice- speaker's chair for Lytvyn himself. [The speakers chair itself would not be available as this has been 'bagsied' [called dibs] by NUNS, in their coalition agreement with BYuT.]
According to 'Gazeta po Kiyevski', Lytvyn will support Tymoshenko, but will not formally enter the "orange" coalition. He would rather take up a pragmatic 'pick and mix' neutral position.
The negotiations between Tymoshenko and Lytvyn have messed up the plans of head of the presidential secretariat Viktor Baloga in particular, and Lytvyn will now be under great pressure from PoR and some elements in NUNS to change his mind.
Meanwhile this week's 'Kommentarii' writes of a calculated warming of friendship between Yushchenko and Yanukovych, which may be of mutual benefit. [Something of which I've posted recently.]
Yushchenko continues to leave the door open for a possible broad coalition, so a working relationship with Yanukovych needs to be maintained, particularly as the 'bottom may drop out' of any BYuT-NUNS-Lytvyn bloc coalition.
Yushchenko has successfully strengthened his own position since dissolving the VR in April, taking advantage of a window of opportunity whilst Yanukovych is acting PM, but Tymoshenko not yet heading the Kabmin. He has strengthened his control over the sylovyk sectors, and rotated oblast governors, which he could hardly do with Tymoshenko as PM - Yanukovych has not protested. He has personally overseen gas affairs with Russia, with Yanuk's co-operation, so enlarging his own, new, more 'hands-on' personal image.
PM Yanukovych retains some hope of hanging on to his post in a grand parliamentary coalition. And if coalition-building in the VR drags out to a fruitless stalemate, he could continue as acting PM - retaining the loyalty to the President - a situation which could well suit the [more dynamic] president too.
For this reason Yanukovych has avoided conflict, and, on the contrary, has adopted a constructive attitude ready for broad compromises.
Even if he is thrust into opposition, a reasonably well-developed working relationship with the president means that some influence would be retained by Yanukovych - this could bring important dividends in the near future.
Cordial relations with the president could even ensure that Yanuk's significant newly-acquired properties and assets would be protected from Tymoshenko-led authorities.
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