Some good analysis on how the election campaign will be waged by the main political players in Ukraine is provided by an article in 'Kommentarii'. entitled "Tymoshenko cannot find grounds for war" - the main theme of the elections will be the fight for the orange electorate.
Here are the main points:
The "Our Ukraine - People Self-defence" [NUNS] campaign will include two central themes: the cancellation of the parliamentary immunity for VR deputies, and new presidential social initiatives which include proposals to increase pensions, improve grants for higher education students, for mothers of newly-born children, and improve allowances for serving soldiers. President Yushchenko's personal image will figure more prominently than in 2006 in these initiatives. Other benefits, e.g. an increase in the median wage by 2010 and so on will also be promised.
These election pledges were originally devised not by NU spin-doctors but have been part of BYuT's political program for years. Yulia Tymoshenko's bloc attempted to push the abolishment of deputies' immunity through the VR last year. She was the first to suggest an increase in the size of aid to mothers, and it has been BYuT that has harped on about dissolution of the VR for a over a year. Yushchenko pulled the plug on the VR only when orange deputies started to defect to the PoR ruling coalition and began to pose a real threat to his presidential powers. In other words, NUNS are stealing BYuT's 'best lines'.
Both BYuT and NUNS will attack PoR for failing to deliver on their main Spring 2006 VR election campaign - "An improvement in life already today ".
"Regionaly" have the simplest task in the forthcoming elections - they have only protect last year's electoral result to ensure victory. BYuT could make some progress in Kharkiv, where leading PoR politicans Dobkin and Kernes are losing popularity over local issues, and in Dnipropetrovsk, which is beginning to feel the heat from the expansion of Donetsk businesses. A danger to PoR is that their dissillusioned supported may not turn out on election day, but any significant swing to the orange parties is unlikely.
BYuT does not have much ammuntion to attack NUNS with. There is no analogy to the 2006 gas crisis which provided BYuT an easy target in the form of Yuriy Yekhnurov, and even most of Yushchenko's discredited "lyubi druzi" have left the stage. NUNS could possibly be attacked on their flirting with PoR on the formation of a grand coalition after the elections.
Tymoshenko has recently floated the idea of a referendum on the constitution to be held in parallel with the VR elections, [an idea first promulgated by Viktor Yushchenko], and 'agitbrigady' are already swinging into action on this.
Today the initiative in the "orange" sector has been seized Viktor Yushchenko, who has now left behind a period of political depression, increased his personal rating, and is re-inspired by the prospect of re-election as president in 2009.
The September VR [re]elections are now seen by Viktor Andriyevych as an important step to achieve his central objective - a second term in office. The President will attempt to position himself to cover two eventualities and to ensure that whether NUNS forms a coalition with BYuT, or with PoR after the elections, he will still be the central candidate in the next pesidential elections.
Tuesday, July 24, 2007
Sunday, July 22, 2007
Elections too close to call
Latest O.P. has PoR at 28,5%, BYuT at 20,3%, NU-NS 11,6%, and Communist Party of Ukraine 5,3%.
The tendency to vote for PoR and, especially, for the Communists grows with an increase in the age of respondents and with a decrease in their 'level of education'. BYuT is more popular with young people and women.
Such voting patterns would resulting a VR comprising PoR 195 mandates, BYuT 139, NU-NS 80, KPU 36; i.e. a PoR/KPU majority of 12. So bearing in mind the margins for error, the result is too close to call right now.
According to this poll, Volodymyr's Lytvyn's People's bloc, who received 2.44% of votes in March 2006, could conceivably scrape past the 3% barrier too, and it would be he who wields the balance of power.
LEvko thinks, realistically, only a grand coalition, or NUNS/PoR combo in the VR would be stable.
ps Tomorrow Azarov and Kolesnikov are having a meeting in Moscow with the leaders of the pro-Putin 'Yedinaya Rossiya' party. A little tip boys - nothing by mouth..no point taking chances..[only a joke..only a joke..]
The tendency to vote for PoR and, especially, for the Communists grows with an increase in the age of respondents and with a decrease in their 'level of education'. BYuT is more popular with young people and women.
Such voting patterns would resulting a VR comprising PoR 195 mandates, BYuT 139, NU-NS 80, KPU 36; i.e. a PoR/KPU majority of 12. So bearing in mind the margins for error, the result is too close to call right now.
According to this poll, Volodymyr's Lytvyn's People's bloc, who received 2.44% of votes in March 2006, could conceivably scrape past the 3% barrier too, and it would be he who wields the balance of power.
LEvko thinks, realistically, only a grand coalition, or NUNS/PoR combo in the VR would be stable.
ps Tomorrow Azarov and Kolesnikov are having a meeting in Moscow with the leaders of the pro-Putin 'Yedinaya Rossiya' party. A little tip boys - nothing by mouth..no point taking chances..[only a joke..only a joke..]
Saturday, July 21, 2007
BYuT's referendum proposals
A translation of questions that BYuT propose be asked of the Ukrainian electorate, in parallel with the VR elections on September 30th, can be read on the Ostrov site in English here.
The byut.com.ua site has them in Ukrainian here.
You decide if this is all a 'half-baked' idea or not..
Did they check this through with their possible political partners the pro-Yushchenko NU-NS?
BYuT better get some decent PR advisers - and pronto..
The byut.com.ua site has them in Ukrainian here.
You decide if this is all a 'half-baked' idea or not..
Did they check this through with their possible political partners the pro-Yushchenko NU-NS?
BYuT better get some decent PR advisers - and pronto..
Wobbly NUNS-BYuT coalition
This week the head of Presidential Secretariat, Viktor Baloha, stated that the newly created orange NU-NS bloc, [Our Ukraine and Yuriy Lutsenko's People Self-defence] and BYuT plan to form a democratic majority in sixth convocation of the Verkhnovna Rada.
The bloc's leaders are to publicly sign declarations on this next week.
There are still unanswered questions on the arrangement, which could be largely resolved to as follows: The two parties could make it clear that in the event that they together gain a majority of seats in the V.R, i.e. more that 226 seats, and if BYuT's share is the greater, then Tymoshenko will be PM and lead the government. If NUNS' share is the greater then, say, Viktor Baloha [or other nominee] will be PM. Anything else will be considered as weasel words by NUNS and cast doubt on their coalition - yet again. We shall see what happens next week. Baloha's statement suggests that if a democratic majority is not achieved, then either party is free to go its own way.
Yesterday Tymoshenko announced that a referendum on the Ukrainian constitution should be held in paralled to the 30th September VR elections. More on this in English on her own website.
Yushchenko, who intends to retain as much presidential power as possible, may well have views much different to those of Tymoshenko on these matters.
Tymoshenko proposes asking the electorate nine questions: she wants to know whether they support a presidential form of administration, "by means of which the President is elected by the entire nation", or a parliamentary form of administration - "according to which the presidency is abolished, the government is assigned by the VR, and the prime minister is head of state".
Clearly there has been no co-ordination on this referendum between the two orange partners, and it well may be just a p.r. stunt. The NUNS-BYuT coalition could finish up as a pantomime horse..
The bloc's leaders are to publicly sign declarations on this next week.
There are still unanswered questions on the arrangement, which could be largely resolved to as follows: The two parties could make it clear that in the event that they together gain a majority of seats in the V.R, i.e. more that 226 seats, and if BYuT's share is the greater, then Tymoshenko will be PM and lead the government. If NUNS' share is the greater then, say, Viktor Baloha [or other nominee] will be PM. Anything else will be considered as weasel words by NUNS and cast doubt on their coalition - yet again. We shall see what happens next week. Baloha's statement suggests that if a democratic majority is not achieved, then either party is free to go its own way.
Yesterday Tymoshenko announced that a referendum on the Ukrainian constitution should be held in paralled to the 30th September VR elections. More on this in English on her own website.
Yushchenko, who intends to retain as much presidential power as possible, may well have views much different to those of Tymoshenko on these matters.
Tymoshenko proposes asking the electorate nine questions: she wants to know whether they support a presidential form of administration, "by means of which the President is elected by the entire nation", or a parliamentary form of administration - "according to which the presidency is abolished, the government is assigned by the VR, and the prime minister is head of state".
Clearly there has been no co-ordination on this referendum between the two orange partners, and it well may be just a p.r. stunt. The NUNS-BYuT coalition could finish up as a pantomime horse..
Thursday, July 19, 2007
PoR men to visit 'older brother'
On 23rd July the first vice- premier and the minister of finances of Ukraine Mykola Azarov, and the deputy head of the PoR fraction in the V.R. Boris Kolesnikov will be in Moscow meeting the 'big knobs' of the solidly pro-Putin 'Yedinaya Rossiya' party which currently dominates the Russian state Duma.
The Y.R. website says topics for discussion at the joint consultations include inter-party collaboration, and inter-govermental relations between Russia and Ukraine. The consultations will "denote the principal positions of the leading political parties on the eve of the [Ukrainian] parliamentary elections."
PoR's site announces the meeting too, and [apologetically?] reminds readers that in August 2005 they and 'yedinorossy' signed an agreement on inter-party co-operation.
Azarov and Kolesnikov, who represent opposing wings in the party, have the weekend to prepare and ensure they will be 'singing from the same hymn sheet' during the meeting. Would such inter-party consultations take place in Kyiv on the eve of Russian parliamentary elections?
The Y.R. website says topics for discussion at the joint consultations include inter-party collaboration, and inter-govermental relations between Russia and Ukraine. The consultations will "denote the principal positions of the leading political parties on the eve of the [Ukrainian] parliamentary elections."
PoR's site announces the meeting too, and [apologetically?] reminds readers that in August 2005 they and 'yedinorossy' signed an agreement on inter-party co-operation.
Azarov and Kolesnikov, who represent opposing wings in the party, have the weekend to prepare and ensure they will be 'singing from the same hymn sheet' during the meeting. Would such inter-party consultations take place in Kyiv on the eve of Russian parliamentary elections?
Parties' preparations for elections far from complete
The orange mega-bloc- NUNS, which was recently formed by NSNU and Yuriy Lutsenko's People's Self-defence [NS] is to create a coalition with BYuT after the September 30th elections in the Verkhovna Rada. The two-sided agreement is being finalized, and will shortly be publicly signed by #1 on NUNS's list, Yuriy Lutsenko, and by Yulia Tymoshenko. According to Viktor Baloha, head of the president's secretariat, this may all be 'rubber-stamped' next week.
Haven't we been here before, last year? Will the agreement hold, even if it means NUNS going into opposition? Can Tymoshenko trust NUNS after last year's double-dealing? With Yushchenko's millionare 'dear friends' all but banished from NU, who is going to pay for the NUNS campaign?
And there is more detailed analysis on the internal opposition inside PoR from novosti.dn.ua here
The article speculates that PoR and Socialists are currently conducting their own private O.P's in preparation for 4th August when PoR, Socialists, and Communists are all, not coincidentally, staging their individual party conferences.
The Socialists, whose ratings have plummeted, may decide to fuse with PoR [if PoR accept them], or declare the elections illigitimate and not register candidates, or split into two groups, with one group only joining with PoR. The could run as an independent party too, of course.
The Communists have to decide whether to construct an alliance with PoR again too.
Even PoR have to formally decide whether to take part in the elections. Akhmetov, Kolesnikov, Bohatyryova and their supporters will go for elections, but Yanukovych, Kluyev and their guys could conceivably refuse to accept any decision, which would really set the cat amongst the pigeons.
All these matters should become clearer after the 4th.
Haven't we been here before, last year? Will the agreement hold, even if it means NUNS going into opposition? Can Tymoshenko trust NUNS after last year's double-dealing? With Yushchenko's millionare 'dear friends' all but banished from NU, who is going to pay for the NUNS campaign?
And there is more detailed analysis on the internal opposition inside PoR from novosti.dn.ua here
The article speculates that PoR and Socialists are currently conducting their own private O.P's in preparation for 4th August when PoR, Socialists, and Communists are all, not coincidentally, staging their individual party conferences.
The Socialists, whose ratings have plummeted, may decide to fuse with PoR [if PoR accept them], or declare the elections illigitimate and not register candidates, or split into two groups, with one group only joining with PoR. The could run as an independent party too, of course.
The Communists have to decide whether to construct an alliance with PoR again too.
Even PoR have to formally decide whether to take part in the elections. Akhmetov, Kolesnikov, Bohatyryova and their supporters will go for elections, but Yanukovych, Kluyev and their guys could conceivably refuse to accept any decision, which would really set the cat amongst the pigeons.
All these matters should become clearer after the 4th.
Wednesday, July 18, 2007
Tender Chamber of Ukraine
On July 12th, the honorary chairman of the Tender Chamber of Ukraine [TPU] and one of PoR's leading lights, Raisa Bohatyreva, resigned from her post. On the same day President Yushchenko issued an ukaz on increasing the effectiveness of state procurement of goods and services which the TPU is supposed to oversee.
The TPU's internet site posted a statement alleging that first vice-premier Mykola Azarov's attempt to take away overight of state purchasing etc. from the chamber was equivalent to crime. Allegedly, Bohatyreva threatened Azarov: "The parliamentary coalition appointed you in government, and it can sack you". Her resignation then appeared on the Region's site.
In it she states that she had become the subject of intrigues, that press reports were aimed at creating political conflicts within the PoR, but that questions of public procurement should be tackled in a transparent manner, through the tenders.
Even the presidential secretarial was rather taken aback. A spokesman said that her going would be difficult to come to terms with, and and would cause complications with fulfillment of the president's TPU ukaz.
Now, perhaps in an attempt to repair the damage, a posting has appeared on the official PoR website praising her work - she has set a record for the number of personal meetings conducted with ordinary citizens during the 3rd session of the 5th convocation of the VR - 26 persons in all [!?]
Bohatyreva herself has undergone an astonishing change of appearance and image for the better since last year, and will be a very important figure in PoR's election campaign.
The TPU is a little-known institution set up in 2005, to "ensure fuller transparency and openness in the realization of state purchases of goods and services." It is supposed to oversee the spending of over 100 billion hryven [about $20Bn], belonging to the state railroad, "Naftogaz", state highways of Ukraine, state coal company Ukraine", "Ukrtransnafta", "Ukrtransgaz" and so on. These enterprises, according to existing laws, must buy goods on the basis of tenders.
An example of the work the TPU do, from the Ukrainian News website:
The Ukrainian Tender Chamber says that the Kyiv city state administration violated the procedure for government purchases in the amount of UAH 960.3 million in April - December 2006 and January - June 2007. There are problems over faked tenders, tenders at overstated prices, monopoly collusions of participants, some or other tender victory guarantees for certain firms. This is all being done for the sake of kick-backs, bribe-taking, channeling taxpayers' money to shadow businesses,"
The TPU's internet site posted a statement alleging that first vice-premier Mykola Azarov's attempt to take away overight of state purchasing etc. from the chamber was equivalent to crime. Allegedly, Bohatyreva threatened Azarov: "The parliamentary coalition appointed you in government, and it can sack you". Her resignation then appeared on the Region's site.
In it she states that she had become the subject of intrigues, that press reports were aimed at creating political conflicts within the PoR, but that questions of public procurement should be tackled in a transparent manner, through the tenders.
Even the presidential secretarial was rather taken aback. A spokesman said that her going would be difficult to come to terms with, and and would cause complications with fulfillment of the president's TPU ukaz.
Now, perhaps in an attempt to repair the damage, a posting has appeared on the official PoR website praising her work - she has set a record for the number of personal meetings conducted with ordinary citizens during the 3rd session of the 5th convocation of the VR - 26 persons in all [!?]
Bohatyreva herself has undergone an astonishing change of appearance and image for the better since last year, and will be a very important figure in PoR's election campaign.
The TPU is a little-known institution set up in 2005, to "ensure fuller transparency and openness in the realization of state purchases of goods and services." It is supposed to oversee the spending of over 100 billion hryven [about $20Bn], belonging to the state railroad, "Naftogaz", state highways of Ukraine, state coal company Ukraine", "Ukrtransnafta", "Ukrtransgaz" and so on. These enterprises, according to existing laws, must buy goods on the basis of tenders.
An example of the work the TPU do, from the Ukrainian News website:
The Ukrainian Tender Chamber says that the Kyiv city state administration violated the procedure for government purchases in the amount of UAH 960.3 million in April - December 2006 and January - June 2007. There are problems over faked tenders, tenders at overstated prices, monopoly collusions of participants, some or other tender victory guarantees for certain firms. This is all being done for the sake of kick-backs, bribe-taking, channeling taxpayers' money to shadow businesses,"
Monday, July 16, 2007
PoR's internal divisions part 2
More from the 'Kommentarii' article on probs in PoR. For first part, see previous posting.
"Last year Viktor Fedorovych had a free hand in forming the KabMin. The only totally Akhmetov-loyal person selected to the KabMin at that time was Vasyl Dzarty. Many other positions were filled by ex-Kuchmistas like Dmytro Tabachnyk, Anatoliy Tolstoukhov, Oleksandr Lavrynovych, Mykhaylo Papiyev, Volodymyr Yatsuba, Oleksandr Kuz'muk and so on. Yanukovych also adopted Serhiy Levochkin from Volodymyr Lytvyn's team [as head of PM's secretariat]. He promised these guys not only a long career in structures of executive authority, but also good places in the PoR election list in the event of political 'complications'. Such a moment, caused by the dissolution of the Supreme Rada, has arrived, but now it is difficult for Viktor F. Yanukovych to deliver. These men now have three choices: to pay for their places, become financially dependent on Rinat A., or look elsewhere.
Another person who cannot sleep easy is Deputy PM Mykola Azarov. Akhmetov's associates consider him old-fashioned in outlook, and his policies are frequently misunderstood in 'New Donetsk'. There are plans therefore to replace Azarov with more "pro-European" financial 'specialist'. Azarov, feeling the heat, has found himself an ally - Oleksander Moroz. They both recently attempted to push through, at least partially, a new act on state purchases [and the State Tender Chamber], after the third Presidential ukaz on dissolution of the Supreme Rada, but their attempt failed. No other groups inside PoR represent a threat to Ahmetov. The 'old guard', even though they include Azarov, have already understood which way the wind is blowing, and have turned against Azarov too. An example of this is the unexpected criticism by Efim Zvyagilsky of Azarov's policies which affect Donetsk. The 'old boys' have now for a long time reconciled themselves to a back-seat role in the party, and will put up with any whims of the 'young turks' as long as they do not hinder the development of their own businesses. It is unlikely that Andriy Kluyev will provide Azarov with protection either.
According to some sources, Akhmetov's ideas have even found resonance with president Yushchenko, and they have recently began to meet suspiciously often. It may be that the billionaire is seriously deliberating onto whether to place a strategic bet on Viktor Andreyevych for a second presidential term. At present he has only two serious competitors for the 2009 elections - Yanukovych and Tymoshenko. If the first, with the help of Rinat, could be dumped already this year, only one problem - named Yulia Volodymyrivna will remain. And it may be possible to concentrate on this in the remaining years of the presidency."
LEvko thinks Yanukovych is the most popular politician in Ukraine, and PoR will stick with him to the elections..his fate will be decided by the result. But he must be feeling bad. Things were going well for him until April 2nd, and he would have justifiably felt confident of remaining in the PM's chair for another four years. Now, all this speculation about his future..
"Last year Viktor Fedorovych had a free hand in forming the KabMin. The only totally Akhmetov-loyal person selected to the KabMin at that time was Vasyl Dzarty. Many other positions were filled by ex-Kuchmistas like Dmytro Tabachnyk, Anatoliy Tolstoukhov, Oleksandr Lavrynovych, Mykhaylo Papiyev, Volodymyr Yatsuba, Oleksandr Kuz'muk and so on. Yanukovych also adopted Serhiy Levochkin from Volodymyr Lytvyn's team [as head of PM's secretariat]. He promised these guys not only a long career in structures of executive authority, but also good places in the PoR election list in the event of political 'complications'. Such a moment, caused by the dissolution of the Supreme Rada, has arrived, but now it is difficult for Viktor F. Yanukovych to deliver. These men now have three choices: to pay for their places, become financially dependent on Rinat A., or look elsewhere.
Another person who cannot sleep easy is Deputy PM Mykola Azarov. Akhmetov's associates consider him old-fashioned in outlook, and his policies are frequently misunderstood in 'New Donetsk'. There are plans therefore to replace Azarov with more "pro-European" financial 'specialist'. Azarov, feeling the heat, has found himself an ally - Oleksander Moroz. They both recently attempted to push through, at least partially, a new act on state purchases [and the State Tender Chamber], after the third Presidential ukaz on dissolution of the Supreme Rada, but their attempt failed. No other groups inside PoR represent a threat to Ahmetov. The 'old guard', even though they include Azarov, have already understood which way the wind is blowing, and have turned against Azarov too. An example of this is the unexpected criticism by Efim Zvyagilsky of Azarov's policies which affect Donetsk. The 'old boys' have now for a long time reconciled themselves to a back-seat role in the party, and will put up with any whims of the 'young turks' as long as they do not hinder the development of their own businesses. It is unlikely that Andriy Kluyev will provide Azarov with protection either.
According to some sources, Akhmetov's ideas have even found resonance with president Yushchenko, and they have recently began to meet suspiciously often. It may be that the billionaire is seriously deliberating onto whether to place a strategic bet on Viktor Andreyevych for a second presidential term. At present he has only two serious competitors for the 2009 elections - Yanukovych and Tymoshenko. If the first, with the help of Rinat, could be dumped already this year, only one problem - named Yulia Volodymyrivna will remain. And it may be possible to concentrate on this in the remaining years of the presidency."
LEvko thinks Yanukovych is the most popular politician in Ukraine, and PoR will stick with him to the elections..his fate will be decided by the result. But he must be feeling bad. Things were going well for him until April 2nd, and he would have justifiably felt confident of remaining in the PM's chair for another four years. Now, all this speculation about his future..
Sunday, July 15, 2007
PoR's internal divisions
More on the internal disputes in PoR in an article from the current 'Kommentarii' [a serious and polished politics and business weekly linked to Hayduk/Taruta]
"The lengthy inter-party discussion on what principles places on the PoR party list are to be distributed ended with the full and unconditional victory for the somewhat renewed doctrine of Akhmetov. The new situation promises Viktor Yanukovych, who had hoped to push into parliament a whole cohort of people loyal to himself, nothing good - at best the PM may be able to hang on to those positions which he held on the eve last year's elections - at worst today's mini-defeat may signal the end of Yanukovych as a politician [!]
It's true there is one further possibility for the head of the KabMin - he could detach himself from the guardianship of Rinat Leonidovich to swim free in the political sea.."
Akhmetov had demanded that those who want a good place on the list should pay a 'tariff' i.e. make a substantial financial contribution. Those incapable of doing this would be provided with 'credit' by him.
Apparently Yuriy Boyko [of Naftohaz Ukrainy etc.] promised to finance the entire PoR campaign in exchange for the election campaign manager's post, but rumour has it that Yanuk declined the minister for fuel and energy's offer, suspecting that Boyko was aiming for the PM's chair too. In the event it was Boris Kolesnikov, a close associate of Akhmetov's, who will be the PoR election campaign manager.
Is this all 'over the top'?
Maybe I'll post more tomorrow on this fascinating speculation..
"The lengthy inter-party discussion on what principles places on the PoR party list are to be distributed ended with the full and unconditional victory for the somewhat renewed doctrine of Akhmetov. The new situation promises Viktor Yanukovych, who had hoped to push into parliament a whole cohort of people loyal to himself, nothing good - at best the PM may be able to hang on to those positions which he held on the eve last year's elections - at worst today's mini-defeat may signal the end of Yanukovych as a politician [!]
It's true there is one further possibility for the head of the KabMin - he could detach himself from the guardianship of Rinat Leonidovich to swim free in the political sea.."
Akhmetov had demanded that those who want a good place on the list should pay a 'tariff' i.e. make a substantial financial contribution. Those incapable of doing this would be provided with 'credit' by him.
Apparently Yuriy Boyko [of Naftohaz Ukrainy etc.] promised to finance the entire PoR campaign in exchange for the election campaign manager's post, but rumour has it that Yanuk declined the minister for fuel and energy's offer, suspecting that Boyko was aiming for the PM's chair too. In the event it was Boris Kolesnikov, a close associate of Akhmetov's, who will be the PoR election campaign manager.
Is this all 'over the top'?
Maybe I'll post more tomorrow on this fascinating speculation..
Saturday, July 14, 2007
PoR - not a happy ship..
Since the orange revolution the orange coalition forces have shown themselves to be incapable of forming a sustainable and stable political entity, whilst their political opponents PoR have given the appearace of being far more politically disciplined.
Outwardly this still appears to be the case, but recently there have been ever-increasing speculation of fissures developing in PoR ranks too.
A recent article on the 'ord' site, by Andrey Lebedev, and reposted elsewhere sheds intriguing light on these splits.
As usual here are some loosely paraphrased portions:
Dead Donetski gangsters must be turning in their graves - an internal-party opposition has appeared. Until five years ago the fate of any opposition was a bullet and a thick layer of asphalt or concrete on top. But times change, and "dony" have changed too.
The conflict inside the party of regions is gathering force. On one side of the barricade is Boris Kolesnikov - new PoR election campaign leader, and on another - vice-premier Andriy Klyuev, who had been head of Yanuk's shadow election campaign in the 2004 presidential elections...
The psychological state of premier Yanukovych is now worse than the state of his knee - and party ratings have fell by 10 percent. [Ya has recently had extensive medical treatment for a knee problem in Spain].
The entire current crisis began, not from Viktor Yushchenko's 2nd April ukaz, but from the unsuccessful game of enticing opposition deputies in the VR, undertaken by the Klyuev brothers. Andriy Klyuev is a strategist smarter even that Viktor Medvedchuk, but the policy of buying up deputies for the PoR fraction from BYuT and "Our Ukraine" has backfired. The spectre of constitutional majority began to stalk the VR, forcing Yushchenko to dissolve parliament.
As the crisis developed a 'solution by force' was considered, Klyuev was given more authority than is normally granted to an vice- premier. The appointment of ex-chairman of SBU Vladimir Radchenko (a close friend of deputy Vladimir Sivkovich, who is in turn "vertically integrated" with Klyuev) as vice-PM responsible for co-ordinating the work of the 'power structures' was made, to facilitate the work of Andriy Petrovych Klyuev.
The hapless minister of internal affairs Vasiliy Tsushko rang the Kabmin each day and declared that everything was ready for him to act - whatever was required. But no-one gave any order for action. Radchenko simply kept stalling and Tsushko finally became ill from the stress and tension.
Klyuev had guaranteed Yanukovych that he would successfully persuade parliamentarians from BYuT and NSNU not resign their mandates, and thus preserve the VR's legitimacy. He failed, and Yanukovych went crazy because Klyuev hadn't delivered - Radchenko had accomplished nothing either.
Radchenko was sacked and replaced by General Aleksandr Kuz'muk, whose 'achievements' includes the rocket attack on a Russian passenger aircraft, and the stray runaway rocket which landed in Brovary, near Kyiv, [which killed three people]. But by then Yanukovych had agreed to the September elections, and Kolesnikov had become head of PoR's election campaign.
The position of Klyuev deteriorated, and Kolesknikov gained the support of his old business and political games partner, leader of the PoR VR fraction, Raisa Bohatyreva. There are rumors that she and Klyuev had 'fallen out' after he had refused her request to 'place' her twins boys into good positions in business, and into the VR. He told her that a town council rada position for one of them would be all she could have. So Kolesnikov now has Bohatyreva's total support.
Klyuev understands what is going on and does not intend to go quietly. He has assembled around him an inner-party opposition dissatisfied with early elections. The argument used by Klyuev's recruiters, is that we gave all for the party, and now corrupt strangers, e.g. Kinakh and company have appeared on our lists, as well as other deserters from other fractions. Because of them we have been driven away from parliament. After the official formation of PoR's election lists, they will become even more agitated.
Boris Viktorovych K., a close friend of Rinat Akmetov, has passed through an interesting metamorphosis from criminalized Donetsk business, to an [almost] good-natured politician. E.g as a result of training by American PR guys, he recently gave a long inteview in the [normally pro-Yushchenko] "Zerkalo Nedyeli". Kolesnikov does not hide that it was he who persuaded Yanukovych to go to the elections.
However, statistics indicate that Boris K. may have erred. According to classified information, 'Regionaly' have conducted a secret O.P. survey which, to their horror, revealed that at best they can count on 25% of the vote; and at worst - hardly 20%. This especially shocked Yanukovych's environment (Prutnik, Herman, Prigodskiy, etc.), because it poses a serious threat to the tail-end of the first hundred on PoR's election list.
The only man who could as act as an arbiter between those who are for elections, and those who are against, is Rinat Akhmetov, but he may be inclined to the follow Roman Abramovich into the Western oligarchic world.
Summing up, the future may bring the withdrawal of Akhmetov, the advance of Kolesnikov, the fall of Klyuyev's star, and a drop in the ratings of 'Regions' by 10%. Further forecasts on the course of events can only be made if [or whether] the special session of Supreme Rada takes place or not. Oleksandr Moroz is working on an insidious plan to prevent elections taking place, on the introduction of changes in constitution, and on liquidation of the post of the President in its present form. Those worried by the drop in popularity of the 'white and blues' want to participate in the disruption of elections, but thus far they have not been allowed to do so. This could provoke a rebellion against the supporters of elections, including Kolesnikov, and lead to the fast disintegration of party.
And today Party of Regions leader in the Verkhovna Rada, Raisa Bohatyryova, who is considered to be close to Akhmetov, resigned as the honorary president of the Tender Chamber.
Some commentators consider this to be the product of anti-Akhmetov moves made by Mykola Azarov, and a victory in the battle for control of bugetary flows spent on state purchases. It may disturb the financial schemes of some of Azarov's colleagues in PoR, the key to which was the Tender Chamber, locking them firmly under the control of ministries and government departments. Now all the 'adminresurs' of PoR has been concentrated exclusively in the hands of Azarov - and this is an additional ace for Yanukovych in his negotiations with Akhmetov in the formation of the candidate list for the September VR elections.
Yesterday the the chairman of the Tender Chamber administration Vladimir Laba practically accused the government of an attempt to skim off 100 million hryven for the early elections. It is unlikely that such statements could have been made without Bohatyryova's approval, so its possible that she may have been 'invited' to resign by Yanukovych himself. Credence is added to this because Yanukovych was due to return from medical treatment in Spain on Friday, but in the event he came a day earlier. The article says Akhmetov himself may be making a pitch for the PM's job. From 'Gazeta po Kievski'
Bohatyryova, one of PoR's best media performers, has posted a rather unclear explanation for her resignation on the offical PoR website.
LEvko thinks PoR is not a happy ship right now.
Outwardly this still appears to be the case, but recently there have been ever-increasing speculation of fissures developing in PoR ranks too.
A recent article on the 'ord' site, by Andrey Lebedev, and reposted elsewhere sheds intriguing light on these splits.
As usual here are some loosely paraphrased portions:
Dead Donetski gangsters must be turning in their graves - an internal-party opposition has appeared. Until five years ago the fate of any opposition was a bullet and a thick layer of asphalt or concrete on top. But times change, and "dony" have changed too.
The conflict inside the party of regions is gathering force. On one side of the barricade is Boris Kolesnikov - new PoR election campaign leader, and on another - vice-premier Andriy Klyuev, who had been head of Yanuk's shadow election campaign in the 2004 presidential elections...
The psychological state of premier Yanukovych is now worse than the state of his knee - and party ratings have fell by 10 percent. [Ya has recently had extensive medical treatment for a knee problem in Spain].
The entire current crisis began, not from Viktor Yushchenko's 2nd April ukaz, but from the unsuccessful game of enticing opposition deputies in the VR, undertaken by the Klyuev brothers. Andriy Klyuev is a strategist smarter even that Viktor Medvedchuk, but the policy of buying up deputies for the PoR fraction from BYuT and "Our Ukraine" has backfired. The spectre of constitutional majority began to stalk the VR, forcing Yushchenko to dissolve parliament.
As the crisis developed a 'solution by force' was considered, Klyuev was given more authority than is normally granted to an vice- premier. The appointment of ex-chairman of SBU Vladimir Radchenko (a close friend of deputy Vladimir Sivkovich, who is in turn "vertically integrated" with Klyuev) as vice-PM responsible for co-ordinating the work of the 'power structures' was made, to facilitate the work of Andriy Petrovych Klyuev.
The hapless minister of internal affairs Vasiliy Tsushko rang the Kabmin each day and declared that everything was ready for him to act - whatever was required. But no-one gave any order for action. Radchenko simply kept stalling and Tsushko finally became ill from the stress and tension.
Klyuev had guaranteed Yanukovych that he would successfully persuade parliamentarians from BYuT and NSNU not resign their mandates, and thus preserve the VR's legitimacy. He failed, and Yanukovych went crazy because Klyuev hadn't delivered - Radchenko had accomplished nothing either.
Radchenko was sacked and replaced by General Aleksandr Kuz'muk, whose 'achievements' includes the rocket attack on a Russian passenger aircraft, and the stray runaway rocket which landed in Brovary, near Kyiv, [which killed three people]. But by then Yanukovych had agreed to the September elections, and Kolesnikov had become head of PoR's election campaign.
The position of Klyuev deteriorated, and Kolesknikov gained the support of his old business and political games partner, leader of the PoR VR fraction, Raisa Bohatyreva. There are rumors that she and Klyuev had 'fallen out' after he had refused her request to 'place' her twins boys into good positions in business, and into the VR. He told her that a town council rada position for one of them would be all she could have. So Kolesnikov now has Bohatyreva's total support.
Klyuev understands what is going on and does not intend to go quietly. He has assembled around him an inner-party opposition dissatisfied with early elections. The argument used by Klyuev's recruiters, is that we gave all for the party, and now corrupt strangers, e.g. Kinakh and company have appeared on our lists, as well as other deserters from other fractions. Because of them we have been driven away from parliament. After the official formation of PoR's election lists, they will become even more agitated.
Boris Viktorovych K., a close friend of Rinat Akmetov, has passed through an interesting metamorphosis from criminalized Donetsk business, to an [almost] good-natured politician. E.g as a result of training by American PR guys, he recently gave a long inteview in the [normally pro-Yushchenko] "Zerkalo Nedyeli". Kolesnikov does not hide that it was he who persuaded Yanukovych to go to the elections.
However, statistics indicate that Boris K. may have erred. According to classified information, 'Regionaly' have conducted a secret O.P. survey which, to their horror, revealed that at best they can count on 25% of the vote; and at worst - hardly 20%. This especially shocked Yanukovych's environment (Prutnik, Herman, Prigodskiy, etc.), because it poses a serious threat to the tail-end of the first hundred on PoR's election list.
The only man who could as act as an arbiter between those who are for elections, and those who are against, is Rinat Akhmetov, but he may be inclined to the follow Roman Abramovich into the Western oligarchic world.
Summing up, the future may bring the withdrawal of Akhmetov, the advance of Kolesnikov, the fall of Klyuyev's star, and a drop in the ratings of 'Regions' by 10%. Further forecasts on the course of events can only be made if [or whether] the special session of Supreme Rada takes place or not. Oleksandr Moroz is working on an insidious plan to prevent elections taking place, on the introduction of changes in constitution, and on liquidation of the post of the President in its present form. Those worried by the drop in popularity of the 'white and blues' want to participate in the disruption of elections, but thus far they have not been allowed to do so. This could provoke a rebellion against the supporters of elections, including Kolesnikov, and lead to the fast disintegration of party.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
And today Party of Regions leader in the Verkhovna Rada, Raisa Bohatyryova, who is considered to be close to Akhmetov, resigned as the honorary president of the Tender Chamber.
Some commentators consider this to be the product of anti-Akhmetov moves made by Mykola Azarov, and a victory in the battle for control of bugetary flows spent on state purchases. It may disturb the financial schemes of some of Azarov's colleagues in PoR, the key to which was the Tender Chamber, locking them firmly under the control of ministries and government departments. Now all the 'adminresurs' of PoR has been concentrated exclusively in the hands of Azarov - and this is an additional ace for Yanukovych in his negotiations with Akhmetov in the formation of the candidate list for the September VR elections.
Yesterday the the chairman of the Tender Chamber administration Vladimir Laba practically accused the government of an attempt to skim off 100 million hryven for the early elections. It is unlikely that such statements could have been made without Bohatyryova's approval, so its possible that she may have been 'invited' to resign by Yanukovych himself. Credence is added to this because Yanukovych was due to return from medical treatment in Spain on Friday, but in the event he came a day earlier. The article says Akhmetov himself may be making a pitch for the PM's job. From 'Gazeta po Kievski'
Bohatyryova, one of PoR's best media performers, has posted a rather unclear explanation for her resignation on the offical PoR website.
LEvko thinks PoR is not a happy ship right now.
Thursday, July 12, 2007
An interesting O.P.
Latest O.P. in today's 'Korespondent' has PoR at 26.2%, BYuT at 23.1% and the newly formed pro-presidential NU-NS 'megabloc at 13%. LEvko thinks this OP should be accompanied with a 'health warning'. Nevertheless, if others come in at anything like this, it may explain why Rinat Akhmetov is not putting all of his eggs in one basket, and perhaps indicates Yushchenko's wavering may be harming the cause of the 'NUNSivtsi'.
The Communists would obtain 2.7% of votes cast and fail to overcome the 3% threshold; remaining parties would receive even less votes that the Commies. Rather worryingly for PoR, according to the poll, a majority of the 'undecided's' are wavering between BYuT and NUNS. But as they say, 'one swallow doesn't make a summer'...
The pro-orange 5th TV channel has a straw poll which invites its website visitors to register who they think will be the next PM of Ukraine. At the last count Viktor Fyodorovich receives 80 votes, Yulka 422, Moroz 3, Rinat Akmetov 23, others 81 - not scientific, but interesting nevertheless - where are Lutsenko, Kyrylenko, Yekhanurov and other NUNSivtsi? Are they really so unattractive? [As a neutral observer, LEvko did not vote. Come on you PoR supporters, where are you?]
After the brouhaha several months ago, affairs at the Consitutional Court have slipped off the media radar, but today, no doubt after a lot of behind the scenes negotiation, a new CC chairman has been appointed by the court itself. An earlier attempt on 22nd June failed.
I've loosely paraphrased the following from 'Gazeta po Kiyevski':
"The election of the head of the CC was surrounded by a halo of secrecy..while some politicians said the the selection procedure for the leader of the CC should be transparent and candidatures openly discussed, voting was strictly formal. Agreements took place outside of the court's walls...As with all appointments, choosing the head of the CC became a subject of compromise between the [governing] coalition and the president.
The man elected to chair the CC was Andriy Stryzhak, who had been appointed onto the CC on the Congress of Judge's quota. [In accordance with the constitution, the VR, the president, and the Congress of Judges, each appoint 6 CC judges to the 18-chair CC]
He comes from the Transcarpathia oblast and is linked to the once-powerful SDPU(o). His name has appeared on the 'black-lists' of PORA and he has been accused of misusing authority and his official (state) position but nothing big has ever 'stuck'.
Observers consider the appointment a compromise made in an attempt to give the CC a semblance of dignity after the 'stink around Stanik' scandal, and other recent scandals involving CC judges. The agreement to promote Strizhak is strictly temporary - the CC will not be making any decisions before the September 30th VR elections, and after this 'cadre rotations' are likely.
The Communists would obtain 2.7% of votes cast and fail to overcome the 3% threshold; remaining parties would receive even less votes that the Commies. Rather worryingly for PoR, according to the poll, a majority of the 'undecided's' are wavering between BYuT and NUNS. But as they say, 'one swallow doesn't make a summer'...
The pro-orange 5th TV channel has a straw poll which invites its website visitors to register who they think will be the next PM of Ukraine. At the last count Viktor Fyodorovich receives 80 votes, Yulka 422, Moroz 3, Rinat Akmetov 23, others 81 - not scientific, but interesting nevertheless - where are Lutsenko, Kyrylenko, Yekhanurov and other NUNSivtsi? Are they really so unattractive? [As a neutral observer, LEvko did not vote. Come on you PoR supporters, where are you?]
-------------------------------------------------------------
After the brouhaha several months ago, affairs at the Consitutional Court have slipped off the media radar, but today, no doubt after a lot of behind the scenes negotiation, a new CC chairman has been appointed by the court itself. An earlier attempt on 22nd June failed.
I've loosely paraphrased the following from 'Gazeta po Kiyevski':
"The election of the head of the CC was surrounded by a halo of secrecy..while some politicians said the the selection procedure for the leader of the CC should be transparent and candidatures openly discussed, voting was strictly formal. Agreements took place outside of the court's walls...As with all appointments, choosing the head of the CC became a subject of compromise between the [governing] coalition and the president.
The man elected to chair the CC was Andriy Stryzhak, who had been appointed onto the CC on the Congress of Judge's quota. [In accordance with the constitution, the VR, the president, and the Congress of Judges, each appoint 6 CC judges to the 18-chair CC]
He comes from the Transcarpathia oblast and is linked to the once-powerful SDPU(o). His name has appeared on the 'black-lists' of PORA and he has been accused of misusing authority and his official (state) position but nothing big has ever 'stuck'.
Observers consider the appointment a compromise made in an attempt to give the CC a semblance of dignity after the 'stink around Stanik' scandal, and other recent scandals involving CC judges. The agreement to promote Strizhak is strictly temporary - the CC will not be making any decisions before the September 30th VR elections, and after this 'cadre rotations' are likely.
Monday, July 09, 2007
Yanuk AWOL
President Yushenko today hosted a meeting with Polish president Lech Kaczinski at his presidential Carpathian mountain residence 'Synyohora'. The main topic of conversation was the Euro 2012 football tournament being jointly staged by Ukraine and Poland. Several ministers and ambassadors from both sides were present.
Meanwhile prime minister Yanukovych is still in Barcelona on a follow-up visit after a recent knee operation. He missed the sizeable 75th anniversary celebrations of the Donetsk oblast over the weekend- even though, as Ukraine's most popular politician, he enjoys such public occasions. He has even stayed away for his birthday today. His son Viktor jnr. will visit him in Barcelona.
Also taking part at the 'Synyohora' meeting was Rinat Akhmetov, who arrived in his own private jet... and with Fyodorovich out of the country..
Meanwhile prime minister Yanukovych is still in Barcelona on a follow-up visit after a recent knee operation. He missed the sizeable 75th anniversary celebrations of the Donetsk oblast over the weekend- even though, as Ukraine's most popular politician, he enjoys such public occasions. He has even stayed away for his birthday today. His son Viktor jnr. will visit him in Barcelona.
Also taking part at the 'Synyohora' meeting was Rinat Akhmetov, who arrived in his own private jet... and with Fyodorovich out of the country..
Saturday, July 07, 2007
Major conflict of interest revealed
Investigative journalism is playing an increasingly significant role in Ukrainian politics. For example, it was primarily the media that recently revealed the massive assets inexplicably accumulated by several Constitutional Court judges.
Today's 'Ukrayinska Pravda' run a story exposing energy minister Yuriy Boyko's links with Dmytro Firtash, owner of 45% of the monopolist imported gas supplier RosUkrEnergo.
A summary from 'Ukrainian Journal' below:
Energy minister in bed with gas supplier
Journal Staff Report
KIEV, July 5 - Yuriy Boyko, the energy and fuel minister, was named a beneficiary of RosUkrEnergo, a controversial gas trader, among other assets worth billions of U.S. dollars, legal papers obtained by a newspaper showed Thursday.
Boyko, who has been long alleged by opposition politicians of having links to RosUkrEnergo, Ukraine's monopoly natural gas supplier, had always denied having any interests in the company.
But the letter of attorney, obtained by Ukrayinska Pravda, shows Dmytro Firtash, a key shareholder in RosUkrEnergo, at least once has legally authorized Boyko "to manage and dispose of all assets" that he had owned.
Firtash, who last month consolidated all his assets under a new holding, Group DF (GDF), declined to comment. GDF's companies posted $4.6 billion in consolidated annual revenues as of Dec. 31, 2006.
Boyko, through his spokesman, on Thursday confirmed the letter of attorney had existed. The spokesman said the letter was aimed at helping Firtash to handle divorce with his wife.
Boyko's emerged link to RosUkrEnergo may shed light on the ownership of the company, which has been repeatedly investigated by authorities in the U.S. and the E.U. for its alleged link to organized crime and tax evasion. RosUkrEnergo denied the allegations.
The revelations are likely to put mounting pressure on Boyko to step down as opposition leaders on Friday will probably call for his immediate resignation, political commentators said.
Boyko, who was appointed to the post in August 2006 by Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych, is the key negotiator with Russia on Ukraine's natural gas supplies. Boyko persistently defended RosUkrEnergo as Ukraine's only reliable source of natural gas.
The letter of attorney was granted by Firtash to Boyko on Dec. 13, 2005, and was valid through July 1, 2006, according to a photocopy of the paper published by the newspaper.
"Such letter of attorney really exists," Kostiantyn Borodin, Boyko's spokesman, told the newspaper. "It has been issued exceptionally because Boyko, at Dmytro Firtash's request, had been representing him in the divorce with Maria Firtash. It was exactly for this role that the power of attorney has been issued in the name of Boyko to dispose of all assets of Dmytro Firtash."
The revelations also underscore the close personal relationship between Boyko and Firtash that may well explain Boyko's attempts to defend RosUkrEnergo as the only gas supplier to Ukraine.
Dmytro Firtash has reportedly settled his divorce with Maria in January 2006. Maria, who now lives in Israel, has apparently received a $36 million settlement, according to the divorce agreement, Ukrayinska Pravda reported.
However, the divorce dispute resumed earlier this year when Maria had demanded 50% of Dmytro Firtash's assets. She claims that Dmytro Firtash only in April 2006, four months after the divorce had been settled, had disclosed that he also owns a 45% stake in RosUkrEnergo.
RosUkrEnergo, 50% of which is now owned by Gazprom, Russia's gas monopoly, has been for two years refusing to disclose its true beneficiaries since the summer of 2004 when it had been created.
Today's 'Ukrayinska Pravda' run a story exposing energy minister Yuriy Boyko's links with Dmytro Firtash, owner of 45% of the monopolist imported gas supplier RosUkrEnergo.
A summary from 'Ukrainian Journal' below:
Energy minister in bed with gas supplier
Journal Staff Report
KIEV, July 5 - Yuriy Boyko, the energy and fuel minister, was named a beneficiary of RosUkrEnergo, a controversial gas trader, among other assets worth billions of U.S. dollars, legal papers obtained by a newspaper showed Thursday.
Boyko, who has been long alleged by opposition politicians of having links to RosUkrEnergo, Ukraine's monopoly natural gas supplier, had always denied having any interests in the company.
But the letter of attorney, obtained by Ukrayinska Pravda, shows Dmytro Firtash, a key shareholder in RosUkrEnergo, at least once has legally authorized Boyko "to manage and dispose of all assets" that he had owned.
Firtash, who last month consolidated all his assets under a new holding, Group DF (GDF), declined to comment. GDF's companies posted $4.6 billion in consolidated annual revenues as of Dec. 31, 2006.
Boyko, through his spokesman, on Thursday confirmed the letter of attorney had existed. The spokesman said the letter was aimed at helping Firtash to handle divorce with his wife.
Boyko's emerged link to RosUkrEnergo may shed light on the ownership of the company, which has been repeatedly investigated by authorities in the U.S. and the E.U. for its alleged link to organized crime and tax evasion. RosUkrEnergo denied the allegations.
The revelations are likely to put mounting pressure on Boyko to step down as opposition leaders on Friday will probably call for his immediate resignation, political commentators said.
Boyko, who was appointed to the post in August 2006 by Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych, is the key negotiator with Russia on Ukraine's natural gas supplies. Boyko persistently defended RosUkrEnergo as Ukraine's only reliable source of natural gas.
The letter of attorney was granted by Firtash to Boyko on Dec. 13, 2005, and was valid through July 1, 2006, according to a photocopy of the paper published by the newspaper.
"Such letter of attorney really exists," Kostiantyn Borodin, Boyko's spokesman, told the newspaper. "It has been issued exceptionally because Boyko, at Dmytro Firtash's request, had been representing him in the divorce with Maria Firtash. It was exactly for this role that the power of attorney has been issued in the name of Boyko to dispose of all assets of Dmytro Firtash."
The revelations also underscore the close personal relationship between Boyko and Firtash that may well explain Boyko's attempts to defend RosUkrEnergo as the only gas supplier to Ukraine.
Dmytro Firtash has reportedly settled his divorce with Maria in January 2006. Maria, who now lives in Israel, has apparently received a $36 million settlement, according to the divorce agreement, Ukrayinska Pravda reported.
However, the divorce dispute resumed earlier this year when Maria had demanded 50% of Dmytro Firtash's assets. She claims that Dmytro Firtash only in April 2006, four months after the divorce had been settled, had disclosed that he also owns a 45% stake in RosUkrEnergo.
RosUkrEnergo, 50% of which is now owned by Gazprom, Russia's gas monopoly, has been for two years refusing to disclose its true beneficiaries since the summer of 2004 when it had been created.
LEvko thinks PoR would probably like to ditch Boyko [who is not Donetskiy] before the elections, but this would not reflect too well on the current Yanukovych government..and he most likely has influential friends 'up North'..
Friday, July 06, 2007
NUNS chasing Yulka
Today an orange VR election 'mega-bloc' was formed. Details in English here.
Akhmetov's 'Segodnya' newspaper christen the new bloc "Nasha Ukraina-Narodna Samooborona", or 'NUNSivtsi' for short. 'Segodnya' considers that the primary task the new bloc has set itself is to overtake BYuT as the largest orange bloc in the new VR. In their words: "To prove to everyone that Viktor Yushchenko is now a stronger leader than Yulia Tymoshenko, and can claim victory in the presidential elections."
However, even with the popular Yuriy Lutsenko 'on board', the article claims it will be difficult for NUNS to become the second-largest political bloc.
Lutsenko has declared that the new bloc would only co-operate in coalition with BYuT in the new VR; but 'Segodnya' quotes a politolog who, when asked if this could be a problem, replies: "If we analyse inconsistencies in his behaviour, first he declared that he would not work in the Yanukovych government [after the 2006 VR elections], but then asked to remain in the government, so the question answers itself." Anyhow, the true leader of NUNS is Yushchenko himself, and he would most likely give an NUNS-PoR coalition his blessing.
LEvko thinks that the big businessmen who are 'payrolling' their favoured parties' election campaigns will be feeling disgruntled. The money sunk into the respective campaigns will have to be clawed back after the elections, so problems of corruption and misuse of power will continue whoever forms the next government..
ps. The pres. is visiting Donetsk Friday. I'm sure his 2003 visit, when he was 'run out of town', will pass through his mind..
Akhmetov's 'Segodnya' newspaper christen the new bloc "Nasha Ukraina-Narodna Samooborona", or 'NUNSivtsi' for short. 'Segodnya' considers that the primary task the new bloc has set itself is to overtake BYuT as the largest orange bloc in the new VR. In their words: "To prove to everyone that Viktor Yushchenko is now a stronger leader than Yulia Tymoshenko, and can claim victory in the presidential elections."
However, even with the popular Yuriy Lutsenko 'on board', the article claims it will be difficult for NUNS to become the second-largest political bloc.
Lutsenko has declared that the new bloc would only co-operate in coalition with BYuT in the new VR; but 'Segodnya' quotes a politolog who, when asked if this could be a problem, replies: "If we analyse inconsistencies in his behaviour, first he declared that he would not work in the Yanukovych government [after the 2006 VR elections], but then asked to remain in the government, so the question answers itself." Anyhow, the true leader of NUNS is Yushchenko himself, and he would most likely give an NUNS-PoR coalition his blessing.
LEvko thinks that the big businessmen who are 'payrolling' their favoured parties' election campaigns will be feeling disgruntled. The money sunk into the respective campaigns will have to be clawed back after the elections, so problems of corruption and misuse of power will continue whoever forms the next government..
ps. The pres. is visiting Donetsk Friday. I'm sure his 2003 visit, when he was 'run out of town', will pass through his mind..
Thursday, July 05, 2007
Akhmetov skips pres's bash
Viktor Yushchenko today met some of Ukraine's most important 'big name' businessmen and oligarchs.
The themes under discussion at the encounter were to be tax reform, preparation of new tax laws, observance of property rights, and the disturbing increase of corporate raiding.
'Donbass' newspaper considers that the meeting, weeks before the September VR elections, may have been called by Yushchenko to try and secure the support of these oligarchs, be it financial, or in the media, as many of these guys have media and television interests.
Ukrainian politologists have long discussed formation of a so-called broad PoR-NSNU coalition after election, which would suit business-elites from both camps, and also the President.
Unfortunately Rinat Akhmetov, Ukraine's richest oligarch, and PoR's biggest financial sponsor, did not attend. He had previously informed the President's secretariat that his workload was to heavy at the beginning of July to permit this. Some commentators say he may have been embarrassed by Yushenko's gushing praise for helping solve the political crisis following Yushenko's dismissal of the VR.
'Donbass' speculates that Akhmetov may prefer to solve problems in a tight circle rather than in larger company. On Friday the president is to attend the 75th anniversary celebrations of the Donbass region, so a Yushchenko-Akhmetov meeting could take place on the latter's 'home turf' at that time. I wonder if it will?
The themes under discussion at the encounter were to be tax reform, preparation of new tax laws, observance of property rights, and the disturbing increase of corporate raiding.
'Donbass' newspaper considers that the meeting, weeks before the September VR elections, may have been called by Yushchenko to try and secure the support of these oligarchs, be it financial, or in the media, as many of these guys have media and television interests.
Ukrainian politologists have long discussed formation of a so-called broad PoR-NSNU coalition after election, which would suit business-elites from both camps, and also the President.
Unfortunately Rinat Akhmetov, Ukraine's richest oligarch, and PoR's biggest financial sponsor, did not attend. He had previously informed the President's secretariat that his workload was to heavy at the beginning of July to permit this. Some commentators say he may have been embarrassed by Yushenko's gushing praise for helping solve the political crisis following Yushenko's dismissal of the VR.
'Donbass' speculates that Akhmetov may prefer to solve problems in a tight circle rather than in larger company. On Friday the president is to attend the 75th anniversary celebrations of the Donbass region, so a Yushchenko-Akhmetov meeting could take place on the latter's 'home turf' at that time. I wonder if it will?
Tuesday, July 03, 2007
Push-overs?
"Democracy is certainly weak in Russia, but society has become stronger. People start businesses, worship, travel abroad and live without fear of the state. The other dynamic at work in Russia is the urge to be a superpower again, and that tendency is most likely to be manifest in relation to Ukraine. For that reason Ukraine is right now the most important country in Europe." From today's 'Moscow Times'
"The Ukrainian transit system--pipelines and vast storage sites--handles an overwhelming share of Russian gas supplies to Europe, at an average annual throughput of some 120 billion cubic meters (the system’s design capacity being some 150 billion cubic meters). It also constitutes Ukraine’s most valuable economic asset by far, its worth being estimated at $ 10 billion to $ 13 billion by European experts." From Institute for Advanced Strategic & Political Studies Washington, D.C.
"Putin stated in his annual news conference on February 1st 2007 that Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko and the government of Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych favored sharing control of Ukraine's transit pipelines through a consortium or similar deal with Russia, in return for Ukrainian "access" to oil and gas extraction projects on Russian territory. Presenting this idea as a Ukrainian proposal, Putin disclosed that it would figure on the agenda of Yushchenko's upcoming visit to Russia. Putin omitted to say that one extractive project under consideration for this deal, in Russia's Astrakhan oblast, has Dmytro Firtash as its main owner. Firtash fronts as the main shareholder in the purportedly Ukrainian half of Gazprom's offshoot RosUkrEnergo.
Putin's apparently calculated bean-spilling proved premature and forced Kyiv's proponents of this deal on the defensive politically. [On February 6th 2007] a Tymoshenko-initiated bill garnered 430 votes, with none opposed, in the 450-seat Verkhovna Rada.
The law bans any deals that would involve the sale, transfer, merger, joint venture, concession, lease, putting up as collateral, the joint or trust management, mortgaging, and any change in the status of ownership or control of Ukraine's gas transport system and other Naftohaz assets. It also stipulates that Naftohaz may not be declared bankrupt -- an ultimate safeguard against Russian debt-collection through asset-takeover." From Vladimir Socor.
Are Ukrainians going to be push-overs?
"The Ukrainian transit system--pipelines and vast storage sites--handles an overwhelming share of Russian gas supplies to Europe, at an average annual throughput of some 120 billion cubic meters (the system’s design capacity being some 150 billion cubic meters). It also constitutes Ukraine’s most valuable economic asset by far, its worth being estimated at $ 10 billion to $ 13 billion by European experts." From Institute for Advanced Strategic & Political Studies Washington, D.C.
"Putin stated in his annual news conference on February 1st 2007 that Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko and the government of Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych favored sharing control of Ukraine's transit pipelines through a consortium or similar deal with Russia, in return for Ukrainian "access" to oil and gas extraction projects on Russian territory. Presenting this idea as a Ukrainian proposal, Putin disclosed that it would figure on the agenda of Yushchenko's upcoming visit to Russia. Putin omitted to say that one extractive project under consideration for this deal, in Russia's Astrakhan oblast, has Dmytro Firtash as its main owner. Firtash fronts as the main shareholder in the purportedly Ukrainian half of Gazprom's offshoot RosUkrEnergo.
Putin's apparently calculated bean-spilling proved premature and forced Kyiv's proponents of this deal on the defensive politically. [On February 6th 2007] a Tymoshenko-initiated bill garnered 430 votes, with none opposed, in the 450-seat Verkhovna Rada.
The law bans any deals that would involve the sale, transfer, merger, joint venture, concession, lease, putting up as collateral, the joint or trust management, mortgaging, and any change in the status of ownership or control of Ukraine's gas transport system and other Naftohaz assets. It also stipulates that Naftohaz may not be declared bankrupt -- an ultimate safeguard against Russian debt-collection through asset-takeover." From Vladimir Socor.
Are Ukrainians going to be push-overs?
Sunday, July 01, 2007
Never say never..
The current "Stolichniye Novosti" runs an interview with NSNU party leader Vyacheslav Kyrylenko.
He is asked: "Recently there has been much talk of a broad coalition in the new parliament.. the participation of "Our Ukraine" and the "Party of Regions" [in this broad coalition] is not excluded. What is your attitude to to this idea?
He responds: "My position has not changed. I will be against the creation of a broad coalition in any event. And if this does happen, then I shall not be the leader of the party. I will never agree on a coalition with Party of Regions.
"But such position will split the country again..."
"In the country there is no split. In different regions there are different visions of development of Ukraine. And if we come in the Supreme Rada with these different visions, it does not mean at all, that we should be united there."
Kyrylenko is a tricky position - he knows that president Yushchenko may well be contemplating a coalition with PoR, if PoR do not gain an absolute majority in the September 30th elections.
Last August, months after the March 2006 VR elections, and after much 'toing and froing', it was the president who turned to Yanukovych rather that Tymoshenko to form a government; and lately there has been much talk of behind-the-scenes deals between Yushchenko and the top-bananas at PoR to solve the current political crisis. But if NSNU declare that a coalition with PoR is possible, much their electorate will switch to Tymoshenko's BYuT.
A western politician's answer would have been more non committal:, "We are working hard for, and are confident of a victory for the democratic forces. A coalition is not envisaged by my party at the moment - let's wait and see what the elections produce," or would have contained similar platitudes.
If Yushchenko does push NSNU into a coalition with PoR [a possibility Kyrylenko implicitly acknowledges in his reply] and Kyrylenko quits, how many of his party will go with him?
He is asked: "Recently there has been much talk of a broad coalition in the new parliament.. the participation of "Our Ukraine" and the "Party of Regions" [in this broad coalition] is not excluded. What is your attitude to to this idea?
He responds: "My position has not changed. I will be against the creation of a broad coalition in any event. And if this does happen, then I shall not be the leader of the party. I will never agree on a coalition with Party of Regions.
"But such position will split the country again..."
"In the country there is no split. In different regions there are different visions of development of Ukraine. And if we come in the Supreme Rada with these different visions, it does not mean at all, that we should be united there."
Kyrylenko is a tricky position - he knows that president Yushchenko may well be contemplating a coalition with PoR, if PoR do not gain an absolute majority in the September 30th elections.
Last August, months after the March 2006 VR elections, and after much 'toing and froing', it was the president who turned to Yanukovych rather that Tymoshenko to form a government; and lately there has been much talk of behind-the-scenes deals between Yushchenko and the top-bananas at PoR to solve the current political crisis. But if NSNU declare that a coalition with PoR is possible, much their electorate will switch to Tymoshenko's BYuT.
A western politician's answer would have been more non committal:, "We are working hard for, and are confident of a victory for the democratic forces. A coalition is not envisaged by my party at the moment - let's wait and see what the elections produce," or would have contained similar platitudes.
If Yushchenko does push NSNU into a coalition with PoR [a possibility Kyrylenko implicitly acknowledges in his reply] and Kyrylenko quits, how many of his party will go with him?
Friday, June 29, 2007
Politics - a rough trade..
So NU led by Vyacheslav Kyrylenko have formed a election bloc with Yuriy Lutsenko's National Self-Defence 'party'. Yuliya Tymoshenko has given this union her blessing, but has again emphasized that BYuT will be campaigning separately.
Yushchenko 'pulled the plug' on the Verkhovna Rada in April, four years before the next VR elections were due, because power was haemorrhaging from the presidency, yet most O.P.'s indicate the newly elected parliament's composition will be little different to that which was elected in March last year - PoR will undoubtedly be the largest bloc, and events since the OR suggest that any BYuT/NU coalition would not be durable, if it could be assembled. BYuT and NU will again be fighting over the same electorate - one party's loss will be the other party's gain.
Whether the president's forthright actions since April 2nd have contributed to democratic consolidation is debatable. Ukrainian politics over the years is replete with betrayal and treachery, and there is no reason to believe this state of affairs will not continue in the newly elected VR.
Sonya Koshkina, in a provocative article in the BYuT-leaning 'Obozrevatel' claims that Yushchenko is preparing to 'shaft' some of his orange assciates, in particular Tymoshenko, as part of a plan to win a second presidential term of office in 2009.
I've loosely translated portions:
The formation of a democratic mega-bloc has fizzled out, as could have been predicted, in many respects because Yushchenko himself has personally taken over manual control of the process. He has done this in order to simultaneously neutralize both Lutsenko and Tymoshenko - two of his main opponents in the 2009 presidential elections. Once this is accomplished, then he can tackle Yanukovych.
Current NU leader Vyacheslav Kirilenko is not a crowd-pulling political heavyweight so Yushchenko has bowed to former socialist Yuriy Lutsenko's demands and promised many of his National Self-defence people top jobs in any NU government, in exchange for his joining forces with NU. In this way the popular Lutsenko may be kept in check. The smaller right-wing parties in NU will probably be dumped.
However, Lutsenko's appearance in the orange bloc reduces the chances of a broad coalition being formed, and could even threaten the elections themselves, according to some PoR party workers.
Sonya Koshkina claims that Viktor Yanukovych agreed to take part in early elections only because the president had promised him that NU and "Regionaly" would form a broad ruling coalition after the elections. They also secretly mutally agreed to 'knobble' Tymoshenko.
About a week befor Ivan Plyushch's appointment as National Security and Defence Council secretary he contacted that old political fixer, the Donetskiyite Yefim Zvyagilskiy. These two senior statesmen outlined a plan between themselves to overcome the crisis by forming a broad coalition, and this meant combined action against Tymoshenko. They then met head of the pres's secretariat Viktor Baloha, and further plotting took place - the president being well aware of what was going on. Subsequently Rinat Akhmetov and Raisa Bohatyryova met Yushchenko, who later praised Akhmetov for his assistance in solving the political crisis.
Mutual dislike of Tymoshenko is the only factor that Yu and Ya share - both have presidential ambitions, so both need to remove Tymoshenko from their path. According to Koshkina, they are both planning a dirty election campaign, which could even involve the SBU security services, to discredit Tymoshenko.
The Oboz article ends with a link to an audio file recording of an eavesdropped telephone conversation, allegedly between Yushchenko and Tymoshenko, in which he bawls her out for an interview she supposed to have given to the BBC in which she is critical of him. Her responses are of bewilderment. [This may well have been 'placed' in the media by Tymoshenko's camp.]
O.K, this all could be speculation and 'provokatsiya', but politics in Ukraine is a rough trade..and the elections are a long way off..
Yushchenko 'pulled the plug' on the Verkhovna Rada in April, four years before the next VR elections were due, because power was haemorrhaging from the presidency, yet most O.P.'s indicate the newly elected parliament's composition will be little different to that which was elected in March last year - PoR will undoubtedly be the largest bloc, and events since the OR suggest that any BYuT/NU coalition would not be durable, if it could be assembled. BYuT and NU will again be fighting over the same electorate - one party's loss will be the other party's gain.
Whether the president's forthright actions since April 2nd have contributed to democratic consolidation is debatable. Ukrainian politics over the years is replete with betrayal and treachery, and there is no reason to believe this state of affairs will not continue in the newly elected VR.
Sonya Koshkina, in a provocative article in the BYuT-leaning 'Obozrevatel' claims that Yushchenko is preparing to 'shaft' some of his orange assciates, in particular Tymoshenko, as part of a plan to win a second presidential term of office in 2009.
I've loosely translated portions:
The formation of a democratic mega-bloc has fizzled out, as could have been predicted, in many respects because Yushchenko himself has personally taken over manual control of the process. He has done this in order to simultaneously neutralize both Lutsenko and Tymoshenko - two of his main opponents in the 2009 presidential elections. Once this is accomplished, then he can tackle Yanukovych.
Current NU leader Vyacheslav Kirilenko is not a crowd-pulling political heavyweight so Yushchenko has bowed to former socialist Yuriy Lutsenko's demands and promised many of his National Self-defence people top jobs in any NU government, in exchange for his joining forces with NU. In this way the popular Lutsenko may be kept in check. The smaller right-wing parties in NU will probably be dumped.
However, Lutsenko's appearance in the orange bloc reduces the chances of a broad coalition being formed, and could even threaten the elections themselves, according to some PoR party workers.
Sonya Koshkina claims that Viktor Yanukovych agreed to take part in early elections only because the president had promised him that NU and "Regionaly" would form a broad ruling coalition after the elections. They also secretly mutally agreed to 'knobble' Tymoshenko.
About a week befor Ivan Plyushch's appointment as National Security and Defence Council secretary he contacted that old political fixer, the Donetskiyite Yefim Zvyagilskiy. These two senior statesmen outlined a plan between themselves to overcome the crisis by forming a broad coalition, and this meant combined action against Tymoshenko. They then met head of the pres's secretariat Viktor Baloha, and further plotting took place - the president being well aware of what was going on. Subsequently Rinat Akhmetov and Raisa Bohatyryova met Yushchenko, who later praised Akhmetov for his assistance in solving the political crisis.
Mutual dislike of Tymoshenko is the only factor that Yu and Ya share - both have presidential ambitions, so both need to remove Tymoshenko from their path. According to Koshkina, they are both planning a dirty election campaign, which could even involve the SBU security services, to discredit Tymoshenko.
The Oboz article ends with a link to an audio file recording of an eavesdropped telephone conversation, allegedly between Yushchenko and Tymoshenko, in which he bawls her out for an interview she supposed to have given to the BBC in which she is critical of him. Her responses are of bewilderment. [This may well have been 'placed' in the media by Tymoshenko's camp.]
O.K, this all could be speculation and 'provokatsiya', but politics in Ukraine is a rough trade..and the elections are a long way off..
Wednesday, June 27, 2007
Luhanskteplovoz sold illegally
A law court of Kiev has partially satisfied a legal action submitted by joint stock company "Dniprovagonmash" and ruled that the sale of 76% of the shares of "Luhanskteplovoz " to the Russian buyer "Bryansk Machine Building Plant" was illegitimate. Furthermore they considered that the shares should be returned to the Ukraine State Property Fund.
The court also ruled that "Dniprovagonmash" should have been permitted to take part in the tender competition. Mysteriously, only two Russian companies, which are affiliated to one another, were allowed to take part - Bryansk Machine Building Plant's bid of $58.5 million proving to be successful.
Independent investment assessors had valued the packet of shares on offer, together with a controlling premium, at around $100 million.
"Dniprovagonmash" is linked to some of the richest Ukrainian businessmen, Dnipropetrovskiites Serhiy Tyhypko, Ihor Kolomoysky, and Gennadiy Boholyubov.
Will the State Property Fund's leader, Socialist Valentyna Semenyuk be sacked? Will the court's ruling be challenged/ignored?
The court also ruled that "Dniprovagonmash" should have been permitted to take part in the tender competition. Mysteriously, only two Russian companies, which are affiliated to one another, were allowed to take part - Bryansk Machine Building Plant's bid of $58.5 million proving to be successful.
Independent investment assessors had valued the packet of shares on offer, together with a controlling premium, at around $100 million.
"Dniprovagonmash" is linked to some of the richest Ukrainian businessmen, Dnipropetrovskiites Serhiy Tyhypko, Ihor Kolomoysky, and Gennadiy Boholyubov.
Will the State Property Fund's leader, Socialist Valentyna Semenyuk be sacked? Will the court's ruling be challenged/ignored?
Tuesday, June 26, 2007
'North Stream', 'South Stream' but not 'Ukraine stream'
Russia and Italy have signed a memorandum of understanding to build a gas pipeline between their countries - the so-called ''South Stream'', which, if constructed, will significantly increase Russia’s options to play consumer countries, transit countries, and various national energy champions in Europe against each other. 'South Stream' includes a hugely expensive 900 km link under the Black sea to Bulgaria.
The 'South Stream' would reduce Ukraine's leverage on Russian exports of gas to Europe, a major portion of which are currently piped through Ukraine.
The 'South Stream' would reduce Ukraine's leverage on Russian exports of gas to Europe, a major portion of which are currently piped through Ukraine.
An article in today's 'Gazeta po Kiyevski' entitled 'Gas pincers' suggests that the memorandum of understanding may be a ploy by the Kremlin to gain more control over Ukraine's gas transit system and to obtain a higher price for their gas to be negotiated this autumn.
I've paraphrased portions below:
On 23rd June the Italian gas monopolist ENI and Russian "Gazprom" signed a memorandum on the building of major gas pipeline under the Black sea. Naturally there was not a word about participation of Ukraine in this project. Moscow is trying to scare us with the familiar thesis: if you do not want to give up your gas transport system, then we will bypass your country. However, in the opinion of experts, the Kremlin's threats are more words than real actions, and are intended to thoroughly frighten Ukrainians so that they become more compliant.
"This is an important and very promising project, which will contribute to an improvement in the energy situation in Europe as a whole," according to Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin.
Despite the fact that it is intended a substantial part of the pipeline will pass through their territory, the Bulgarian's didn't know too much about it, apparently because of the rush to publicly flaunt this grand new project. Only on the next day, 24th June, did Putin promise to discuss the idea of "'South Stream' with the Bulgarian President.
This is the second gas pipe Russia intends to construct in order to bypass Ukraine. The first - "North Stream", is to be laid along the bottom of Baltic sea to Germany. The Kremlin is systematically removing from our country the status of main gas transit route into Europe as revenge for our unwillingness to share our own gas transit system with them. Belorussia, which is second in significance to us as as a gas transit power, has practically handed over its entire oil pipeline system to "Gazprom".
Frankly, the Kremlin's projects by no means coincide with their statements about common economic interests and the "Ukrainian partner being a reliable transit country". Reading between the lines, Russian officials constantly hint that any joint projects with Ukraine are possible only in exchange for participation in a common gas transit system.
The article then refers to the National Security and Defence Council meeting which took place on 15th June, about which I posted recently.
It was expected that the President Viktor Yushchenko would give the government a 'roasting' for their carefree attitude to the diversification of sources of fuel, for the monopolistic status of "RosUkrEnergo", for hindering the utilization of the "Odessa-Brody" oil pipeline, and for the totally incomprehensible attitude of 'MinTopEnergo', headed by Mr. Yuriy Boyko in negotiations with "Gazprom" on the future price of gas. It is completely incomprehensible how they are negotiating and on what conditions. However, as usual, the NSDC session took place very quietly and peacefully. No decisions and no disciplinary measures were adopted. Only Boyko was scolded a litte, just for the sake of appearances.
There is some good news. In spite of the Kremlin's 'big talking', the ''South Stream'' gas pipeline will hardly be successfully built in the near future - there are many serious technical and financial problems. The same may be true of the Baltic "North Stream", which could be blocked by Poland and Estonia into revenge for the Kremlin's "energy blackjack".
At the moment this is all intended to frighten Ukraine in advance of the autumn negotiations. Everyone knows Gazprom intends to raise gas prices significantly in 2008, and it's possible that the "'South Stream'" will be used by the Kremlin to increase pressure. If they succeed will depend on the response our politicians.
The article is followed by a brief comment by Mikhail Gonchar, director of analytical programs of the NOMOS centre:
- The discussions [on 'South Stream'] are about feasibility. The project will be expensive and complicated. Firstly there's the complicated task of laying the pipelines under the Black sea, then building powerful compressor stations on the Russian shore, necessary to drive gas more than 900 km.
Secondly, at the moment there is no agreement on the participation in the project of Bulgaria. It took more than 13 years to sort out the building of the Burgas-Aleksandrupolis oil pipeline with Bulgaria.
Furthermore, by using a similar pseudo-project, Moscow wants to pressurise Turkey into accelerating construction of a second 'Blue Stream gas pipe" [which also passes under the Black sea].
LEvko thinks 'North Stream' makes some sense because it directly connects supplier Russia with consumer Germany. ''South Stream'' assumes Bulgaria will be a more reliable transit country that Ukraine, but can this assumption be made?
Sunday, June 24, 2007
'Rainbows' and energy security
The National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine website, [wittily entitled http://www.rainbow.gov.ua/ after 'Rada Narodnoyi Bezpeky i Oborony Ukrainy'] posts the following sobering 12 page document entitled:
Information notes [dovidka] for meeting of National Security and Defence Council meeting to be held on 15.06.2007: "On the state of progress of execution of NSDC resolutions on questions of energy security."
I've roughly translated just a few portions:
"2. Main threats in the energy security sphere.
2.1 Particular alarm is aroused by the negative tendencies in the internal gas market. From 2006, Ukraine has only one supplier-importer of natural gas -RosUkrEnerho, which has also become the monopolistic supplier of gas to Ukrainian enterprises (via UkrHazEnergo joint venture).
The main threat to Ukraine in the medium term in the context of energy security remains the lack of guarantee of supply of natural gas at acceptable price for 2008 and subsequent years.
...there is a real threat to the energy security of Ukraine caused by the high degree of monopolisation, and the corresponding unacceptably high risks of price diktat by the monopolist supplier; and also by the absence of guarantee of long-term supply of gas at acceptable prices.
As a result, because of potential debt dependence, a threat of loss of assets [to pay for these debts] has arisen. [These include] transit pipelines, gas distribution networks, and gas storage reservoirs, as well as consumers' assets - industrial enterprises and so on.
..UkrHazEnerho has monopolist levers of influence on the industry sector of the economy of Ukraine: according to the security service of Ukraine, the UkrHazEnerho could be used by one of the co-owners of its mother company RosUkrEnergo, D.Firtash, to increase his presence in the chemical engineering branch of Ukrainian industry....
The information laid out above provide grounds to declare that in the gas sector of the fuel-energy complex, systematic threats to the energy security of the state are growing."
There's a lot more worrying stuff too, e.g. about hindrances to the introduction of market principles in the coal industry, and lack of competition in the sphere of export of electric energy.
At that NSDC meeting itself, government representatives, Minister of fuel and energy Yuriy Boyko and vice-premier Andriy Klyuyev, claimed that the problems were exaggerated, and that there is nothing to worry about.
As I posted, previously, some of those present rushed through the NSDC meeting because they were attending Elton John's bash in Kyiv, later that day.
LEvko thinks there is a sense of unreality in all of this - of sleepwalking to disaster. Who is going to address these problems?
p.s. Good analysis on this in last last week's 'Dzerkalo Tyzhnya' in English here.
Here's their conclusion: "...it is evident that the problem will remain unsolved without the consolidated efforts of all political forces around a clear and well-calculated strategy of energy security. As long as the top positions in this country are occupied by people that are personally interested in companies like RUE, Ukraine will be getting bogged down deeper and deeper in the slough of someone else’s interests."
Information notes [dovidka] for meeting of National Security and Defence Council meeting to be held on 15.06.2007: "On the state of progress of execution of NSDC resolutions on questions of energy security."
I've roughly translated just a few portions:
"2. Main threats in the energy security sphere.
2.1 Particular alarm is aroused by the negative tendencies in the internal gas market. From 2006, Ukraine has only one supplier-importer of natural gas -RosUkrEnerho, which has also become the monopolistic supplier of gas to Ukrainian enterprises (via UkrHazEnergo joint venture).
The main threat to Ukraine in the medium term in the context of energy security remains the lack of guarantee of supply of natural gas at acceptable price for 2008 and subsequent years.
...there is a real threat to the energy security of Ukraine caused by the high degree of monopolisation, and the corresponding unacceptably high risks of price diktat by the monopolist supplier; and also by the absence of guarantee of long-term supply of gas at acceptable prices.
As a result, because of potential debt dependence, a threat of loss of assets [to pay for these debts] has arisen. [These include] transit pipelines, gas distribution networks, and gas storage reservoirs, as well as consumers' assets - industrial enterprises and so on.
..UkrHazEnerho has monopolist levers of influence on the industry sector of the economy of Ukraine: according to the security service of Ukraine, the UkrHazEnerho could be used by one of the co-owners of its mother company RosUkrEnergo, D.Firtash, to increase his presence in the chemical engineering branch of Ukrainian industry....
The information laid out above provide grounds to declare that in the gas sector of the fuel-energy complex, systematic threats to the energy security of the state are growing."
There's a lot more worrying stuff too, e.g. about hindrances to the introduction of market principles in the coal industry, and lack of competition in the sphere of export of electric energy.
At that NSDC meeting itself, government representatives, Minister of fuel and energy Yuriy Boyko and vice-premier Andriy Klyuyev, claimed that the problems were exaggerated, and that there is nothing to worry about.
As I posted, previously, some of those present rushed through the NSDC meeting because they were attending Elton John's bash in Kyiv, later that day.
LEvko thinks there is a sense of unreality in all of this - of sleepwalking to disaster. Who is going to address these problems?
p.s. Good analysis on this in last last week's 'Dzerkalo Tyzhnya' in English here.
Here's their conclusion: "...it is evident that the problem will remain unsolved without the consolidated efforts of all political forces around a clear and well-calculated strategy of energy security. As long as the top positions in this country are occupied by people that are personally interested in companies like RUE, Ukraine will be getting bogged down deeper and deeper in the slough of someone else’s interests."
Saturday, June 23, 2007
Firtash's woman-trouble
Today's 'FT' runs an interesting story [see below] about monopolist gas trader RosUkrEnergo, and the problems being encountered by its Ukrainian owner, Dmytro Firtash, in the divorce courts.
The case, which involves his his former wife Maria Mykhailivna Firtash, could affect ownership rights over his multibillion-dollar commercial empire.
When the pair were divorced two years ago, it is unlikely that the courts would have been aware of Firtash's 45% share of the shadowy Swiss-registered RUE, so she may have a case. Even president Yushchenko famously claimed ignorance of RUE's Ukrainian owners.
I have posted previously about Maria Firtash's step-son Serhiy Kalynovsky and his involvement in the fatal May 30th car smash mentioned in the 'FT' story, and the subsequent attempt to spirit him out of the country by 'plane dressed a a girl. He had previously pledged in court not to leave Kyiv.
A couple of days ago Serhiy Kalynovsky was found guilty of causing the 'accident', and fined 34 hryven [about $7] for speeding.
In May 2005 Serhiy Kalynovsky and his brother Oleksandr badly beat up a DAI [road cop] inspector who was giving them a parking ticket. Even though the cop sustained quite serious head injuries, the case against the two brothers was dropped.
Nice to have rich and powerful parents who can fix things..
p.s. The full 'F.T.' story below - just in case it goes to 'subscribers only'
Divorce casts cloud over tycoon’s billions
Ukrainian businessman Dmytro Firtash is embroiled in a bitter divorce that could affect ownership rights over his multibillion-dollar commercial empire, including a company controlling natural gas supplies to Ukraine and the European Union.
Mr Firtash this week hoped to boost the transparency of his portfolio of holdings, announcing that key assets, including Swiss-registered gas trader RosUkrEnergo, which he owns in partnership with Russia’s Gazprom, had been consolidated under a new holding, Group DF (GDF).
But a divorce dispute with his ex-wife, Maria Firtash, has cast a shadow over the consolidation plans. It also raised doubts about Mr Firtash’s ability to hold on to majority interests in the lucrative gas trade, in television channels in Ukraine, and in property and chemical companies scattered across former Soviet states.
In a statement on Friday, Mr Firtash announced the formation of the Vienna-based GDF under which he has consolidated most of his assets.
Robert Shetler-Jones, GDF’s British chief executive, said: “The formation of GDF reflects the group’s desire to have a clearer, more unified structure for its business interests, one that is transparent, and which will provide a platform for access to competitive financing terms to support the group’s ambitious business expansion.” Having been earlier owned by a complicated web of offshore companies, GDF’s companies posted $4.6bn in consolidated revenues as of December 31 2006.
The prime asset of the 42-year-old businessman is a 45 per cent interest in RosUkrEnergo. The trading and distribution company controls the supply of Russian and central Asian gas to Ukraine, and further to European markets. Hungarian gas trader EMFESZ and a Vienna-based chemical holding, Ostchem, were also brought into GDF.
“This is the first step” towards possible IPOs, Mr Shetler-Jones said, adding that individual companies could be ready for a listing on a major European market within two years.
But a family feud could challenge Mr Firtash’s bold plans.
In a Financial Times interview, Maria Firtash said she would seek a 50 per cent interest in the businesses, or equal compensation, through litigation. She claims to have played a major role in setting up the businesses.
Ms Firtash, who is 51, was in her mid-30s when she met Mr Firtash in the early 1990s and nearly a decade older than Mr Firtash. She said they initially worked together in what was largely her business. Later she promoted Mr Firtash to commercial director of her business and married him in 1996, she said.
“Later I gave him legal rights over many of these businesses. I had licences and traded in gas. We traded in foot products, traded in many things. This was our joint work,” she said.
The mother of two has challenged a divorce settlement that she signed almost two years ago. The package is said to be valued at tens of millions of dollars.
She claims not to have received full compensation and argues that the settlement was not legally sound to begin with.
The former couple have clashed in Ukrainian courts. On May 11, Kiev’s Pechersky district court ruled the divorce settlement agreement non-binding. Mr Firtash is expected to appeal. Ms Firtash pledged to fight to the highest jurisdiction to gain control over half of the assets.
“I will file lawsuits in all countries,” she said.
Ms Firtash has experienced rough times as of late. Last month one of her sons and a stepson to Mr Firtash, 21-year old Serhiy Kalynovsky, was injured in a car accident. His fiancé and an interior ministry officer were killed. Serhiy, who lost control of a BMW that crashed into the officer’s car, has been charged with manslaughter. [? - LEvko]
The mother and her other son, 23-year-old Oleksandr Kalynovsky, have accused Ukrainian officials of dragging their feet in the investigation of the accident.
Mr Shetler-Jones refrained from discussing the marital dispute in detail but said: “This could be a press campaign to focus attention on their situation or to refocus troubles facing their son.”
The case, which involves his his former wife Maria Mykhailivna Firtash, could affect ownership rights over his multibillion-dollar commercial empire.
When the pair were divorced two years ago, it is unlikely that the courts would have been aware of Firtash's 45% share of the shadowy Swiss-registered RUE, so she may have a case. Even president Yushchenko famously claimed ignorance of RUE's Ukrainian owners.
I have posted previously about Maria Firtash's step-son Serhiy Kalynovsky and his involvement in the fatal May 30th car smash mentioned in the 'FT' story, and the subsequent attempt to spirit him out of the country by 'plane dressed a a girl. He had previously pledged in court not to leave Kyiv.
A couple of days ago Serhiy Kalynovsky was found guilty of causing the 'accident', and fined 34 hryven [about $7] for speeding.
In May 2005 Serhiy Kalynovsky and his brother Oleksandr badly beat up a DAI [road cop] inspector who was giving them a parking ticket. Even though the cop sustained quite serious head injuries, the case against the two brothers was dropped.
Nice to have rich and powerful parents who can fix things..
p.s. The full 'F.T.' story below - just in case it goes to 'subscribers only'
Divorce casts cloud over tycoon’s billions
Ukrainian businessman Dmytro Firtash is embroiled in a bitter divorce that could affect ownership rights over his multibillion-dollar commercial empire, including a company controlling natural gas supplies to Ukraine and the European Union.
Mr Firtash this week hoped to boost the transparency of his portfolio of holdings, announcing that key assets, including Swiss-registered gas trader RosUkrEnergo, which he owns in partnership with Russia’s Gazprom, had been consolidated under a new holding, Group DF (GDF).
But a divorce dispute with his ex-wife, Maria Firtash, has cast a shadow over the consolidation plans. It also raised doubts about Mr Firtash’s ability to hold on to majority interests in the lucrative gas trade, in television channels in Ukraine, and in property and chemical companies scattered across former Soviet states.
In a statement on Friday, Mr Firtash announced the formation of the Vienna-based GDF under which he has consolidated most of his assets.
Robert Shetler-Jones, GDF’s British chief executive, said: “The formation of GDF reflects the group’s desire to have a clearer, more unified structure for its business interests, one that is transparent, and which will provide a platform for access to competitive financing terms to support the group’s ambitious business expansion.” Having been earlier owned by a complicated web of offshore companies, GDF’s companies posted $4.6bn in consolidated revenues as of December 31 2006.
The prime asset of the 42-year-old businessman is a 45 per cent interest in RosUkrEnergo. The trading and distribution company controls the supply of Russian and central Asian gas to Ukraine, and further to European markets. Hungarian gas trader EMFESZ and a Vienna-based chemical holding, Ostchem, were also brought into GDF.
“This is the first step” towards possible IPOs, Mr Shetler-Jones said, adding that individual companies could be ready for a listing on a major European market within two years.
But a family feud could challenge Mr Firtash’s bold plans.
In a Financial Times interview, Maria Firtash said she would seek a 50 per cent interest in the businesses, or equal compensation, through litigation. She claims to have played a major role in setting up the businesses.
Ms Firtash, who is 51, was in her mid-30s when she met Mr Firtash in the early 1990s and nearly a decade older than Mr Firtash. She said they initially worked together in what was largely her business. Later she promoted Mr Firtash to commercial director of her business and married him in 1996, she said.
“Later I gave him legal rights over many of these businesses. I had licences and traded in gas. We traded in foot products, traded in many things. This was our joint work,” she said.
The mother of two has challenged a divorce settlement that she signed almost two years ago. The package is said to be valued at tens of millions of dollars.
She claims not to have received full compensation and argues that the settlement was not legally sound to begin with.
The former couple have clashed in Ukrainian courts. On May 11, Kiev’s Pechersky district court ruled the divorce settlement agreement non-binding. Mr Firtash is expected to appeal. Ms Firtash pledged to fight to the highest jurisdiction to gain control over half of the assets.
“I will file lawsuits in all countries,” she said.
Ms Firtash has experienced rough times as of late. Last month one of her sons and a stepson to Mr Firtash, 21-year old Serhiy Kalynovsky, was injured in a car accident. His fiancé and an interior ministry officer were killed. Serhiy, who lost control of a BMW that crashed into the officer’s car, has been charged with manslaughter. [? - LEvko]
The mother and her other son, 23-year-old Oleksandr Kalynovsky, have accused Ukrainian officials of dragging their feet in the investigation of the accident.
Mr Shetler-Jones refrained from discussing the marital dispute in detail but said: “This could be a press campaign to focus attention on their situation or to refocus troubles facing their son.”
Friday, June 22, 2007
Latest O.P.
Latest O.P. from 'Segodnya'
Yellow is June, green is May.
Only 28% of Ukrainians think that the early elections will solve the current political crisis. The majority think otherwise.
These numbers explain why there is much behind-the-scenes talk of an PoR-NU coalition - the only one which would provide some stability.
Thursday, June 21, 2007
A tantalizing offer..
There is continued speculation of rifts in PoR between Viktor Yanukovych and 'king of Donbas' Rinat Akhmetov; and that after the VR elections a PoR-NU coalition could be formed with, possibly, Akhmetov-loyalist Boris Kolesnikov heading the cabinet of ministers.
'Ukrainska Pravda' says that Akhmetov wants to earmark at least 50% of the PoR party list for his men in the September VR elections. The writer thinks Yanukovych will be appointed at best, Donetsk oblast governor, and suggests that Akhmetov and the president have done a deal: "The president will close his eyes to any falsifications in the east of the country in favour of PoR, and in return PoR observers will take no attention of hundreds of thousands of western Ukrainians working abroad 'casting their vote' during the elections."
One of BYuT's top men, Mykola Tomenko, when asked in an interview with UNIAN about forming coalitions says: "I will voice two reservations with respect to "Our Ukraine". There is [NU leader] Vyacheslav Kirilenko, whose position is very close to our's, but there are Ivan Plyushch and Yuriy Yekhanurov, who have always remained supporters of a wide coalition with Party of Regions... so the possibility of wide coalition with the participation of NU remains. Therefore I consider clear guarantees should be given not so much to the political forces, as to the voters."
"If someone, somewhere, beyond Kyiv is conducting negotiations with the beneficial and effective manager Rinat Akhmetov, then, obviously, certain questions spring up about other coalition creation scenarios involving participation of NU, but without BYuT.
Opponents of Viktor Yushchenko say that his team are working so as to allow neither Yulia Tymoshenko nor Viktor Yanukovich to become premier. Other scenarios suit them, because then the road for the current president will be clear for the next presidential elections."
Akhmetov wants more of 'his people' in the VR and in the cabinet, and wants his man as PM in a PoR-NU coalition government in the event that PoR do not achieve an absolute majority. Is he offering Yushchenko an unopposed run in the 2009 presidential campaign in exchange?
LEvko thinks this is a tantalizing offer..
'Ukrainska Pravda' says that Akhmetov wants to earmark at least 50% of the PoR party list for his men in the September VR elections. The writer thinks Yanukovych will be appointed at best, Donetsk oblast governor, and suggests that Akhmetov and the president have done a deal: "The president will close his eyes to any falsifications in the east of the country in favour of PoR, and in return PoR observers will take no attention of hundreds of thousands of western Ukrainians working abroad 'casting their vote' during the elections."
One of BYuT's top men, Mykola Tomenko, when asked in an interview with UNIAN about forming coalitions says: "I will voice two reservations with respect to "Our Ukraine". There is [NU leader] Vyacheslav Kirilenko, whose position is very close to our's, but there are Ivan Plyushch and Yuriy Yekhanurov, who have always remained supporters of a wide coalition with Party of Regions... so the possibility of wide coalition with the participation of NU remains. Therefore I consider clear guarantees should be given not so much to the political forces, as to the voters."
"If someone, somewhere, beyond Kyiv is conducting negotiations with the beneficial and effective manager Rinat Akhmetov, then, obviously, certain questions spring up about other coalition creation scenarios involving participation of NU, but without BYuT.
Opponents of Viktor Yushchenko say that his team are working so as to allow neither Yulia Tymoshenko nor Viktor Yanukovich to become premier. Other scenarios suit them, because then the road for the current president will be clear for the next presidential elections."
Akhmetov wants more of 'his people' in the VR and in the cabinet, and wants his man as PM in a PoR-NU coalition government in the event that PoR do not achieve an absolute majority. Is he offering Yushchenko an unopposed run in the 2009 presidential campaign in exchange?
LEvko thinks this is a tantalizing offer..
Tuesday, June 19, 2007
GUAM heads meet in Baku
The second summit of the Organization for democracy and economic development - GUAM [Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan Moldova] is taking place in Baku today and tomorrow. The Ukrainian delegation is headed by the President Yushchenko; the Polish president Lech Kaczynski is present too. Also attending are presidents Aliyev and Saakashvili, as well as Moldovan PM prime minister Vasil Tarlev.
One of the topics being discussed is the Odessa-Brody oil pipeline and its possible extension to Plock.
GUAM was set up partly to reduce energy dependence on Russia, so all of this sounds quite promising. But egghead James Sherr provides a more sober picture of Ukraine's position in an interview in 'Glavred'.
When asked why Ukraine has not become the regional leader e.g. in GUAM, he replies:
"... the main political forces in Ukraine are divided in terms of those directions, which actually are significant - NATO, Russia and energy policy and security. Only a few months ago it seemed that GUAM could become a point of resistance on the question of energy safety - in particular concerning the reduction of energy dependence on Russia. But how can Ukraine lead these efforts, if its ministry of power is doing all it can to increase this dependence? If Ukraine itself does not know what she wants and where she is going, how an she be the leader of something?" - asks Sherr.
The National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine discussed the unsatisfactory state of national energy security last Friday, but minister for fuel and energy Yuriy Boyko, and deputy prime minister Andriy Klyuyev, seemed to have managed to avoid sustaining major damage. Some say the NSDC meeting was cut short because the president and others wanted to rush off to meet Elton John at Viktor Pinchuk's art gallery later that day..
p.s. Experts suggest that Kazakhstan could join GUAM at some time. Makes for an interesting word puzzle - gukam? gmuka? gumak?
One of the topics being discussed is the Odessa-Brody oil pipeline and its possible extension to Plock.
GUAM was set up partly to reduce energy dependence on Russia, so all of this sounds quite promising. But egghead James Sherr provides a more sober picture of Ukraine's position in an interview in 'Glavred'.
When asked why Ukraine has not become the regional leader e.g. in GUAM, he replies:
"... the main political forces in Ukraine are divided in terms of those directions, which actually are significant - NATO, Russia and energy policy and security. Only a few months ago it seemed that GUAM could become a point of resistance on the question of energy safety - in particular concerning the reduction of energy dependence on Russia. But how can Ukraine lead these efforts, if its ministry of power is doing all it can to increase this dependence? If Ukraine itself does not know what she wants and where she is going, how an she be the leader of something?" - asks Sherr.
The National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine discussed the unsatisfactory state of national energy security last Friday, but minister for fuel and energy Yuriy Boyko, and deputy prime minister Andriy Klyuyev, seemed to have managed to avoid sustaining major damage. Some say the NSDC meeting was cut short because the president and others wanted to rush off to meet Elton John at Viktor Pinchuk's art gallery later that day..
p.s. Experts suggest that Kazakhstan could join GUAM at some time. Makes for an interesting word puzzle - gukam? gmuka? gumak?
Sunday, June 17, 2007
Noble causes and dirty money
"..one thing has become apparent: either politics is one big bluff, or high society life is one big hypocrisy..Where else can today's president, Viktor Yushchenko be seen embracing his enemy Leonid Kuchma?" - from an article in 'Tabloid' which includes several [illicitly taken] photographs of the bash at Viktor Pinchuk's art gallery during this weekend's visit by Elton John to Kyiv.
The blonde with the big teeth and gold-chain dress-straps in the photos is Olena Franchuk - Leonid Kuchma's daughter and Viktor Pinchuk's wife.
How Franchuk and Pinchuk made easy millions from Kyivstar, the largest mobile phone operator in Ukraine, with well over 20 million subscribers, can be read here. CEO of Kyivstar was Yuriy Tumanov - Kuchma's brother-in-law.
p.s. "...you’re open to do something for people affected by HIV/AIDS. It is not necessary to be rich and earn a fortune to change someone’s life for better. To open your heart is enough. If you want to help people with HIV/AIDS, you can make your contribution by transferring money donation to the account of Elena Franchuk ANTIAIDS Foundation. We will make sure that every coin received from outside reach those in need." [From Elena Franchuk anti-aids foundation website]
The blonde with the big teeth and gold-chain dress-straps in the photos is Olena Franchuk - Leonid Kuchma's daughter and Viktor Pinchuk's wife.
How Franchuk and Pinchuk made easy millions from Kyivstar, the largest mobile phone operator in Ukraine, with well over 20 million subscribers, can be read here. CEO of Kyivstar was Yuriy Tumanov - Kuchma's brother-in-law.
p.s. "...you’re open to do something for people affected by HIV/AIDS. It is not necessary to be rich and earn a fortune to change someone’s life for better. To open your heart is enough. If you want to help people with HIV/AIDS, you can make your contribution by transferring money donation to the account of Elena Franchuk ANTIAIDS Foundation. We will make sure that every coin received from outside reach those in need." [From Elena Franchuk anti-aids foundation website]
Saturday, June 16, 2007
Elton and the creeps
On Saturday Sir Elton John is staging a concert on the Maydan in Kyiv, but today president Yushchenko and his wife opened an exhibition of photographs from Sir Elton's private collection which being shown at the Pinchuk Art Centre.
Sir Elton thanked Viktor Pinchuk's wife - ex-pres Kuchma's daughter Olena Franchuk for her anti-AIDS charity work. The bash was attended by BYuT deputy Yevhen Hubskiy, NU's Petro Poroshenko, and Industrial Union of Donbas boss Serhiy Taruta.
Also 'brown-nosing' were Kuchma himself, ex-PM Yuriy Yekhanurov, transport minister Mykola Rudkovsky and minister for emergencies Nestor Shufrych. Some photos here - looks as if Andy Yush was there too.
Yesterday US ambassador in Ukraine William Taylor visited the Donbas region, and was interviewed by journalists of "Donbass" newspaper. He had visited a mine in which Ukrainian and US specialists were working together to improve safety.
He praises Ukraine's high economic growth rate, but says that the early VR elections are slowing down foreign investments. He claimed that Yanukovych made a good impression and helped to improve the image of Ukraine in the eyes of American people during his recent visit. Yuliya Tymoshenko's visit proved to be successful too, and he hoped that soon other Ukrainian politicians and statesmen would visit the USA, although this is unlikely before the elections take place, "because we would not wish the impression to be created, that the US Government is interfering in the Ukrainian election campaign."
Sir Elton thanked Viktor Pinchuk's wife - ex-pres Kuchma's daughter Olena Franchuk for her anti-AIDS charity work. The bash was attended by BYuT deputy Yevhen Hubskiy, NU's Petro Poroshenko, and Industrial Union of Donbas boss Serhiy Taruta.
Also 'brown-nosing' were Kuchma himself, ex-PM Yuriy Yekhanurov, transport minister Mykola Rudkovsky and minister for emergencies Nestor Shufrych. Some photos here - looks as if Andy Yush was there too.
Yesterday US ambassador in Ukraine William Taylor visited the Donbas region, and was interviewed by journalists of "Donbass" newspaper. He had visited a mine in which Ukrainian and US specialists were working together to improve safety.
He praises Ukraine's high economic growth rate, but says that the early VR elections are slowing down foreign investments. He claimed that Yanukovych made a good impression and helped to improve the image of Ukraine in the eyes of American people during his recent visit. Yuliya Tymoshenko's visit proved to be successful too, and he hoped that soon other Ukrainian politicians and statesmen would visit the USA, although this is unlikely before the elections take place, "because we would not wish the impression to be created, that the US Government is interfering in the Ukrainian election campaign."
Friday, June 15, 2007
Rift in PoR?
PoR have had to respond to president Yushchenko praising Rinat Akhmetov for helping regulate the current political crisis. There had been signs that Akhmetov and his closest PoR associated eg Boris Kolesnikov were more favourably disposed to holding early VR elections that Viktor Yanukovych.
The first deputy leader of the PoR VR faction Vasyl Kiselyov today declared that he considers President Yushchenko's lauding of Rinat Akhmetov to be 'incorrect' and 'tactless'.
Kiselyov, when asked to comment whether it had been Akhmetov that was negotiating with the president about of early elections replied: "Akhmetov and Yanukovich are as one. He and Yanukovych maintain one line."
An article in 'Glavred' suggests that a friendship may indeed be developing between Akhmetov and president Yushchenko, causing a rift between Akhmetov and Yanukovych, who was not as keen on early VR elections as Akhmetov.
Early elections were in no way part of Yanukvych's plans - he had expected to be head of government for years to come.
Glavred suggests that Yanukovych and Akhmetov have a different strategic vision for PoR in the new parliament. Yanukovych wants to recreate the present configuration of the recent ruling majority the VR, while Akhmetov is convinced that for political stabilization in Ukraine it is necessary to negotiate with the President and his party, possibly, even giving his supporters several key posts in the government.
Today the pre-election campaign of "Regiony" is at its initial stages. The central selection of party nominees will most likely be led by Boris Kolesnikov. There could well be changes to their existing list of deputies - some of Anatoliy Kinakh's party, as well as Socialist Vladimir Boyko, head of Mariupol metallurgical combine im.Il'icha, and some of their supporters could be included.
The first deputy leader of the PoR VR faction Vasyl Kiselyov today declared that he considers President Yushchenko's lauding of Rinat Akhmetov to be 'incorrect' and 'tactless'.
Kiselyov, when asked to comment whether it had been Akhmetov that was negotiating with the president about of early elections replied: "Akhmetov and Yanukovich are as one. He and Yanukovych maintain one line."
An article in 'Glavred' suggests that a friendship may indeed be developing between Akhmetov and president Yushchenko, causing a rift between Akhmetov and Yanukovych, who was not as keen on early VR elections as Akhmetov.
Early elections were in no way part of Yanukvych's plans - he had expected to be head of government for years to come.
Glavred suggests that Yanukovych and Akhmetov have a different strategic vision for PoR in the new parliament. Yanukovych wants to recreate the present configuration of the recent ruling majority the VR, while Akhmetov is convinced that for political stabilization in Ukraine it is necessary to negotiate with the President and his party, possibly, even giving his supporters several key posts in the government.
Today the pre-election campaign of "Regiony" is at its initial stages. The central selection of party nominees will most likely be led by Boris Kolesnikov. There could well be changes to their existing list of deputies - some of Anatoliy Kinakh's party, as well as Socialist Vladimir Boyko, head of Mariupol metallurgical combine im.Il'icha, and some of their supporters could be included.
Thursday, June 14, 2007
RUE and the NSDC
Ukrainska Pravda today publish portions of leaked briefing material and draft resolutions that are supposedly to be presented at tomorrow's National Security and Defence Council meeting. Having formally dealt with the current political crisis with the government, Yushchenko is seems, will now tackle economic politics, in particular its most painful aspect - shortcomings in energy security.
Yanukovych will now have to defend RosUkrEnergo from the president, who, it seems is relishing firm and forthright action more and more.
The 33 pages of material read "like a political thriller", according to UP. Particular attention is paid to Naftogaz and RUE, and to their off-spring UkrGazEnergo.
At the beginning of 2006, when RUE became monopolist supplier of Turkmen and Russian gas in Ukraine, Yushchenko claimed he did not know who its Ukrainian owners were, and even consulted Vladimir Putin on this matter.
UP claim most of the stuff was prepared when Vitaliy Hayduk was still secretary of the NSDC.
LEvko says this could be a big story..and there have been straws in the wind..
RUE's and other middlemen's skimming off of funds is obviously detrimental to Ukrainian consumers, and to large Financial Industrial Groups in particular - its time the parasites were made redundant. It remains to be seen what political capital will be gained by political rivals during the oncoming VR election campaign from this affair.
Yanukovych will now have to defend RosUkrEnergo from the president, who, it seems is relishing firm and forthright action more and more.
The 33 pages of material read "like a political thriller", according to UP. Particular attention is paid to Naftogaz and RUE, and to their off-spring UkrGazEnergo.
At the beginning of 2006, when RUE became monopolist supplier of Turkmen and Russian gas in Ukraine, Yushchenko claimed he did not know who its Ukrainian owners were, and even consulted Vladimir Putin on this matter.
UP claim most of the stuff was prepared when Vitaliy Hayduk was still secretary of the NSDC.
LEvko says this could be a big story..and there have been straws in the wind..
RUE's and other middlemen's skimming off of funds is obviously detrimental to Ukrainian consumers, and to large Financial Industrial Groups in particular - its time the parasites were made redundant. It remains to be seen what political capital will be gained by political rivals during the oncoming VR election campaign from this affair.
Praise from Yush
At a press conference yesterday, president Yushchenko, in a convoluted and long-winded manner, offered some praise to Rinat Akhmetov.
"I would say that the association that I have with this person prompts me to tend to say that that there are constructive positions being formed in this person with regard to national development paths. I recall discussions which took place during the political regulation [period]. I can say that this person held important and beneficial positions on regulating the political crisis. I would like journalists to know this," said Yushchenko.
Its not so long ago that that Akhmetov made himself scarce [after the OR] and 'The Donetsk Mafia' book was distributed at NSNU party conferences..
Tuesday, June 12, 2007
RosUkrEnergo, Firtash, and a car smash..
The front page splash story in Rinat Akhmetov's 'Segodnya' newspaper was about RosUkrEnergo big-shot Dmytro Firtash's step-son, Sergiy Kalinovskiy, who was recently involved in an early-morning car crash in central Kyiv that resulted in the death of two people. Kalinovskiy was at the wheel of the immensely powerful BMW M6 convertible which slammed into a stationary Zhiguli. The 'beemer' is owned by Kyiv city council secretary Oles' Dovhiy - a pal of president Yushchenko's son Andriy... who also likes M6,s...
Firtash holds 90% of Centragas Holding AG shares, who, in turn own 50% of RUE.
'Ukrainska Pravda' covered the car smash, and its consequences several days ago.
'Segodnya' reveals that on Monday an attempt was made to smuggle Kalinovskiy out of the country on a chartered aircraft from the small Zhulyany airport in Kyiv. He was hastily returned to a private clinic where is being guarded by private security after the attempt failed.
In yesterday's posting about RUE and the elections I wrote "irreconcilable rivals PoR, BYuT, NU, and Socialists are however linked by a common objective - a low price for gas for Ukrainian industrial enterprises, and businessmen from all political camps will co-operate in order to obtain this.."
Ukraine's biggest businessmen have had enough of dealing with shady middlemen - they want to deal with the 'organ grinder - not the monkey'. And this story is gift of an opportunity to bring down Firtash a rung or two.
Update: By attempting to slip out of the country, Kalinovskiy broke the terms of his bail, and may be detained in custody after a court hearing tomorrow. [Not all airport officials are bribable, then.]
The two victims of the car smash were a ministry of internal affairs officer Volodymyr Kulikovskiy who was on his way to work as a security official at the Japanese embassy, and Kalinovskiy's 25 year old girl friend Anastasiya Bronnikova. Her funeral was attended by many well-known politicians and their 'golden children', including the president's son.
Firtash holds 90% of Centragas Holding AG shares, who, in turn own 50% of RUE.
'Ukrainska Pravda' covered the car smash, and its consequences several days ago.
'Segodnya' reveals that on Monday an attempt was made to smuggle Kalinovskiy out of the country on a chartered aircraft from the small Zhulyany airport in Kyiv. He was hastily returned to a private clinic where is being guarded by private security after the attempt failed.
In yesterday's posting about RUE and the elections I wrote "irreconcilable rivals PoR, BYuT, NU, and Socialists are however linked by a common objective - a low price for gas for Ukrainian industrial enterprises, and businessmen from all political camps will co-operate in order to obtain this.."
Ukraine's biggest businessmen have had enough of dealing with shady middlemen - they want to deal with the 'organ grinder - not the monkey'. And this story is gift of an opportunity to bring down Firtash a rung or two.
Update: By attempting to slip out of the country, Kalinovskiy broke the terms of his bail, and may be detained in custody after a court hearing tomorrow. [Not all airport officials are bribable, then.]
The two victims of the car smash were a ministry of internal affairs officer Volodymyr Kulikovskiy who was on his way to work as a security official at the Japanese embassy, and Kalinovskiy's 25 year old girl friend Anastasiya Bronnikova. Her funeral was attended by many well-known politicians and their 'golden children', including the president's son.
RUE and the elections
Today's 'Gazeta po Kiyevski' carries an article entitled 'Russian roulette', speculating whether RosUkrEnergo will become a 'political football' in the September 30th elections.
In Spring 2006, during the VR election campaign, the negative image and possible harmful activities of RUE for Ukraine were highlighted exclusively by BYuT and Yuliya Tymoshenko. Her attempts in 2005 to cut out RUE from the gas supply chain cost her the PM's job, and caused a seismic split in the orange ranks.
Now business interests and election technologies are so tightly interwoven that the shady gas intermediary may well become the object of criticism, not only from the orange NU and BYuT, but from the Communists and Sotspartiya too; and even possibly from part of the members of PoR - if this is secretly agreed by the main financial players.
In the opinion of the general public "RosUkrEnergo" is normally associated with "Regionaly". RUE is the monopolistic supplier of Russian and Central-Asian gas to Ukraine since 2006.
The official start of the PR attack on RUE has begun with the head of the SBU Mr. Nalyvaychenko's interview in today's 'Financial Times', in which he promised "that Russia and Ukraine would this summer provide greater clarity about the natural gas trade, in which the controversial RosUkrEnergo company plays a vital role. 'Ukraine and Russia should make this situation more transparent. [We need to show] what the real prices are and what the real financial sources are here, the flowing of money, and risks of dirty money and money laundering. To know the real situation, the real operators, the real deal, is key'."
The SBU head's 'FT' interview was most likely sanctioned by Pres's secretariat, where Nalyvaychenko is considered a hawk. The SBU and Nalyvaychenko personally participated in the discrediting of the Consititutional court judges Stanik and Psenychniy, who were examining the constitutionality of President's Decree on the dismissal of the VR.
But at the most, the presidential side and NU will limit itself to indirect hints of participation of "Regionaly" to the shady schemes of RUE, without the naming of concrete personalities and facts, and all the more - criminal cases from the SBU, since the response would be a wave of compromising material on the people close to the President, and in particular, on the President's brother - Petro Yushchenko. He could be connected with a certain off-shore company "Petrogaz" whose office is located in Dubai. "Petrogaz" is allegedly one of the minority shareholders RUE.
In February 2006 Social Democrat Igor Shurm and Communist Aleksandr Golub' turned to the SBU and the Prosecutor-General's office requesting verification of information that RUE transferred $53 million to Petrogaz , but he matter was 'kicked into the long grass.'
In two and a half years Yushchenko has only on few occasions spoken negatively about RUE, and has not undertaken any concrete actions on its elimination. NU started to agitate against the activities of RUE only after pressure from Yuliya Tymoshenko.
PoR during the election campaign will emphasize two facts: First, because of the mediator RUE and the Yanukovych government's handling of matters, Ukraine has gas from Russia at 130 dollars, instead of the initially proposed to 230, and PoR has no concrete links with RUE. Secondly, Yushchenko and Tymoshenko themselves have their snouts into the trough. Possibly, the Donetski-controlled media will rake up dirt on Petro Yushchenko's role, and Tymoshenko will be linked to attempts to return for the intermediary 'Itera' to the gas market.
The irreconcilable rivals PoR, BYuT, NU, and Socialists are however linked by a common objective - a low price for gas for Ukrainian industrial enterprises, and businessmen from all political camps will co-operate in order to obtain this, i.e. Ihor Kolomoyskiy (of the "Privat" group), who is considered to be one of the sponsors BYuT, Vladimir Boyko (owner of the Mariupol Metallurgical Combine im. Ilyich), SPU financial sponsor, Rinat Akhmetov (chief financier of PoR) and Vitaly Hayduk ( of ISD), a businessman close to the President.
The fact is that the the sister company of RUE "UkrGazEnergo", which exclusively supplies gas to industrial enterprises, recently increased its gas price, after including the cost storage of gas. Since the beginning of June both Boyko and Hayduk refused to buy gas, and turned for fuel to traders of the "Privat" group, who had earlier obtained and stored cheaper fuel with "UkrGazEnergo". The"Privat" reserves will soon be exhausted and Akhmetov himself has been forced to accept an increase in the price from UkrGazEnergo and signed a new agreement. Thus, the largest sponsors of the main political parties are being hit hard and are extremely negatively disposed to RUE. This will naturally be reflected in the rhetoric of party leaders and pre-election slogans.
In Spring 2006, during the VR election campaign, the negative image and possible harmful activities of RUE for Ukraine were highlighted exclusively by BYuT and Yuliya Tymoshenko. Her attempts in 2005 to cut out RUE from the gas supply chain cost her the PM's job, and caused a seismic split in the orange ranks.
Now business interests and election technologies are so tightly interwoven that the shady gas intermediary may well become the object of criticism, not only from the orange NU and BYuT, but from the Communists and Sotspartiya too; and even possibly from part of the members of PoR - if this is secretly agreed by the main financial players.
In the opinion of the general public "RosUkrEnergo" is normally associated with "Regionaly". RUE is the monopolistic supplier of Russian and Central-Asian gas to Ukraine since 2006.
The official start of the PR attack on RUE has begun with the head of the SBU Mr. Nalyvaychenko's interview in today's 'Financial Times', in which he promised "that Russia and Ukraine would this summer provide greater clarity about the natural gas trade, in which the controversial RosUkrEnergo company plays a vital role. 'Ukraine and Russia should make this situation more transparent. [We need to show] what the real prices are and what the real financial sources are here, the flowing of money, and risks of dirty money and money laundering. To know the real situation, the real operators, the real deal, is key'."
The SBU head's 'FT' interview was most likely sanctioned by Pres's secretariat, where Nalyvaychenko is considered a hawk. The SBU and Nalyvaychenko personally participated in the discrediting of the Consititutional court judges Stanik and Psenychniy, who were examining the constitutionality of President's Decree on the dismissal of the VR.
But at the most, the presidential side and NU will limit itself to indirect hints of participation of "Regionaly" to the shady schemes of RUE, without the naming of concrete personalities and facts, and all the more - criminal cases from the SBU, since the response would be a wave of compromising material on the people close to the President, and in particular, on the President's brother - Petro Yushchenko. He could be connected with a certain off-shore company "Petrogaz" whose office is located in Dubai. "Petrogaz" is allegedly one of the minority shareholders RUE.
In February 2006 Social Democrat Igor Shurm and Communist Aleksandr Golub' turned to the SBU and the Prosecutor-General's office requesting verification of information that RUE transferred $53 million to Petrogaz , but he matter was 'kicked into the long grass.'
In two and a half years Yushchenko has only on few occasions spoken negatively about RUE, and has not undertaken any concrete actions on its elimination. NU started to agitate against the activities of RUE only after pressure from Yuliya Tymoshenko.
PoR during the election campaign will emphasize two facts: First, because of the mediator RUE and the Yanukovych government's handling of matters, Ukraine has gas from Russia at 130 dollars, instead of the initially proposed to 230, and PoR has no concrete links with RUE. Secondly, Yushchenko and Tymoshenko themselves have their snouts into the trough. Possibly, the Donetski-controlled media will rake up dirt on Petro Yushchenko's role, and Tymoshenko will be linked to attempts to return for the intermediary 'Itera' to the gas market.
The irreconcilable rivals PoR, BYuT, NU, and Socialists are however linked by a common objective - a low price for gas for Ukrainian industrial enterprises, and businessmen from all political camps will co-operate in order to obtain this, i.e. Ihor Kolomoyskiy (of the "Privat" group), who is considered to be one of the sponsors BYuT, Vladimir Boyko (owner of the Mariupol Metallurgical Combine im. Ilyich), SPU financial sponsor, Rinat Akhmetov (chief financier of PoR) and Vitaly Hayduk ( of ISD), a businessman close to the President.
The fact is that the the sister company of RUE "UkrGazEnergo", which exclusively supplies gas to industrial enterprises, recently increased its gas price, after including the cost storage of gas. Since the beginning of June both Boyko and Hayduk refused to buy gas, and turned for fuel to traders of the "Privat" group, who had earlier obtained and stored cheaper fuel with "UkrGazEnergo". The"Privat" reserves will soon be exhausted and Akhmetov himself has been forced to accept an increase in the price from UkrGazEnergo and signed a new agreement. Thus, the largest sponsors of the main political parties are being hit hard and are extremely negatively disposed to RUE. This will naturally be reflected in the rhetoric of party leaders and pre-election slogans.
Friday, June 08, 2007
Finita la comedia?
An article in today's 'Gazeta po Kiyevski' claims Yanukovych has finished with Moroz and PoR are preparing for the early elections.
Here are some paraphrased portions:
Yesterday's statements by the premier, and the actions of companions-in-arms in his party show that "Regionaly" will no longer fight with the President over the question of early elections, and are themselves beginning preparations for the election campaign.
After the president's 5th June ukaz ordering VR elections for 30th September, Viktor Yanukovych kept silent; and in the aftermath of hysterical proclamations from VR speaker Moroz and some PoR members, experts were forecasting another round of conflict over Yushchenko's ukaz, but no challenge was forthcoming.
Yesterday Yanukovich finally spoke out, supporting Yushchenko's ukaz. "It practically supports all the understandings, which were made in [our] declaration," he said.
He promised the government not will dispute the legality of the ukaz in the constitutional court. Moreover, it is possible to assert the following: if VR speaker Moroz does not calm down and continues his games with the judicial actions, then "Regionaly" will block this process.
Voters in the southeast cannot yet understand why he made concessions in favour of the President, so Viktor Yanukovych yesterday added that, in spite of Yushchenko's ukaz, the Verkhovna Rada of the 5th convocation remains legitimate. "Until a final ruling is made or an explanation is given by the constitutional court, the VR will continue to function," the premier stated. Yanukovych did not go into detail into what final ruling he had in mind. Furthermore, he knows well that Yushchenko will not sign any law passed by the VR.
Yesterday Yushchenko gathered together foreign ambassadors and informed them on behalf of the Ukrainian state that the VR's authority has been terminated. He asked diplomats not to associate with the VR leadership or the remaining deputies in their capacity as official representatives of Ukrainian authority. In other words Yushchenko has publicly stated that Moroz is an nobody in the state hierarchy. Interestingly, no reaction followed from Yanukovych to such a frank attack on his recent ally. This silence says much.
It is clear that the period of conflict is now over. This became apparent after the distribution of new posts in the Prosecutor-General's office and in the Central Election Committee, and the adoption of necessary laws for the elections, proposed by "Regionaly". The two Viktors have finally agreed. Although, as before, they have not weakened, and expect further dirty tricks from each other.
The Yushchenko-Yanukovych truce means final defeat for Moroz. San Sanych [Oleksandr Oleksandrovych Moroz] has lost everything, particularly the "golden share" of the Sotspartiya in the VR coalition. He has now served his purpose..
Today's "Kyiv Weekly' in an article entited "Parliamentary elections: the hawks have landed!" [in English], is not quite as optimistic and describes problems that may arise in the run-up to the elections.
And RBK reports that 30 BYuT deputies want to reactivate their activity in the VR, even though 103 of their number have supposedly 'ripped up' their VR deputy mandates.
BYuT deputy Oleksandr Kovtunenko is quoted as saying that a working group of 30 has been formed. Amongst them are those that do not agree "with the hysteria created by the leader of the bloc."
LEvko thinks some of these guys paid big money for a seat in the VR and so are not best pleased with what is happening..
Here are some paraphrased portions:
Yesterday's statements by the premier, and the actions of companions-in-arms in his party show that "Regionaly" will no longer fight with the President over the question of early elections, and are themselves beginning preparations for the election campaign.
After the president's 5th June ukaz ordering VR elections for 30th September, Viktor Yanukovych kept silent; and in the aftermath of hysterical proclamations from VR speaker Moroz and some PoR members, experts were forecasting another round of conflict over Yushchenko's ukaz, but no challenge was forthcoming.
Yesterday Yanukovich finally spoke out, supporting Yushchenko's ukaz. "It practically supports all the understandings, which were made in [our] declaration," he said.
He promised the government not will dispute the legality of the ukaz in the constitutional court. Moreover, it is possible to assert the following: if VR speaker Moroz does not calm down and continues his games with the judicial actions, then "Regionaly" will block this process.
Voters in the southeast cannot yet understand why he made concessions in favour of the President, so Viktor Yanukovych yesterday added that, in spite of Yushchenko's ukaz, the Verkhovna Rada of the 5th convocation remains legitimate. "Until a final ruling is made or an explanation is given by the constitutional court, the VR will continue to function," the premier stated. Yanukovych did not go into detail into what final ruling he had in mind. Furthermore, he knows well that Yushchenko will not sign any law passed by the VR.
Yesterday Yushchenko gathered together foreign ambassadors and informed them on behalf of the Ukrainian state that the VR's authority has been terminated. He asked diplomats not to associate with the VR leadership or the remaining deputies in their capacity as official representatives of Ukrainian authority. In other words Yushchenko has publicly stated that Moroz is an nobody in the state hierarchy. Interestingly, no reaction followed from Yanukovych to such a frank attack on his recent ally. This silence says much.
It is clear that the period of conflict is now over. This became apparent after the distribution of new posts in the Prosecutor-General's office and in the Central Election Committee, and the adoption of necessary laws for the elections, proposed by "Regionaly". The two Viktors have finally agreed. Although, as before, they have not weakened, and expect further dirty tricks from each other.
The Yushchenko-Yanukovych truce means final defeat for Moroz. San Sanych [Oleksandr Oleksandrovych Moroz] has lost everything, particularly the "golden share" of the Sotspartiya in the VR coalition. He has now served his purpose..
Today's "Kyiv Weekly' in an article entited "Parliamentary elections: the hawks have landed!" [in English], is not quite as optimistic and describes problems that may arise in the run-up to the elections.
And RBK reports that 30 BYuT deputies want to reactivate their activity in the VR, even though 103 of their number have supposedly 'ripped up' their VR deputy mandates.
BYuT deputy Oleksandr Kovtunenko is quoted as saying that a working group of 30 has been formed. Amongst them are those that do not agree "with the hysteria created by the leader of the bloc."
LEvko thinks some of these guys paid big money for a seat in the VR and so are not best pleased with what is happening..
Wednesday, June 06, 2007
Discontent with all parties spreading..
Discontent with all Ukrainian politicians and their continuing endless squabbling is expressed in an article in the popular 'Donbass' newspaper. entitled: "Time to call a 'vyechye'" [a public assembly called in Russian and Ukrainian towns in earlier times]. I've paraphrased bits below:
Gloomy predictions of Ukrainian political scientists are beginning to come true. In spite of ostensibly achieving compromises, the political situation in Ukraine continues to be rooted to the spot. A number of political forces continue to disrupt the negotiation process in order to avoid, at any price, the early elections due on 30th September. Some politicians in every political force are trying to stop or at least slow down the process. They all claim concern over adherence to the law, but the true reason for their actions is fear of losing the elections.
... It's no secret to anyone, that many deputies paid big money (unofficial sources say from four to seven million dollars) for a place in the parliament.
VR speaker Oleksandr Moroz declares that until the Central Election Commision confirms that opposition deputies have revoked their mandates, the VR cannot be considered illegitimate, and therefore its work continues.
"Zerkalo Nedeli" wrote that 'Sotspartiya' does not have any chance of success in the elections, and is having legal action brought against it. In order to avoid a similar fate, let us say the Sotspartiya has splendid chances and Moroz will gain almost all the places in parliament. And yet they are attempting to sabotage the elections. What's the problem? Maybe they don't want victory?
Vadim Kolesnichenko (PoR) considers that the political conflict in the Ukraine, "is only beginning to flare up". He does not exclude the possibility that, "In autumn it will be necessary to adopt some extraordinary measures". He properly indicates there are legal time-bombs placed under the future parliament.
According to the deputy, it is possible to assume: "Elections will take place, but there will be no change to the present situation. What happens next? The side, which lost, does not take up its mandates. And then, according to the constitution, the Supreme Rada will not be actually formed by the two thirds of deputies, as required by the constitution.
On the one hand, after the snap election the newly formed parliament will not be dissolved, but on the other hand, a proper parliament will not be formed. The country may face very serious problems...
We already heard several times, and sighed with relief that, "They have found a compromise, and the crisis is behind us". But next day everything continues as before in the traditional way. In their present composition the politicians cannot achieve a position to suit everyone - someone inevitably loses. We may conclude that qualitative changes are necessary, i.e. cancellation of elections by party lists. But this most honest of solutions greatly frightens many influential politicians, who only have chances with party list systems. And it is they that make the decisions.
The only notes of optimism during the entire political crisis are government continues to work, because according to the constitution the government can only be sacked by the Supreme Rada, and the crisis is not affecting the social and the economic sphere for the time being.
But in a normal state, its parliament must continue to work. Laws must be passed, and some changed - today this is practically impossible. What factor of safety is there in the country? How can it progress with paralysis of one of the branches of authority?
The adviser to the President questions of law, Stepan Havrish asserts that the President will sign no laws passed by the present VR, since it has ceased to be legitimate. But deputies continue to work - the result is zero - a blind alley.
Politicians from any one party are today not capable (thank goodness) to completely control the country. For them to reach a concensus is very difficult. The nation [narod] waits. If today's politician cannot sort out the problems, they should take a look at what happened to the old Communists. As it says in the constitution: the 'narod' is ultimately the main bearer of authority.
Gloomy predictions of Ukrainian political scientists are beginning to come true. In spite of ostensibly achieving compromises, the political situation in Ukraine continues to be rooted to the spot. A number of political forces continue to disrupt the negotiation process in order to avoid, at any price, the early elections due on 30th September. Some politicians in every political force are trying to stop or at least slow down the process. They all claim concern over adherence to the law, but the true reason for their actions is fear of losing the elections.
... It's no secret to anyone, that many deputies paid big money (unofficial sources say from four to seven million dollars) for a place in the parliament.
VR speaker Oleksandr Moroz declares that until the Central Election Commision confirms that opposition deputies have revoked their mandates, the VR cannot be considered illegitimate, and therefore its work continues.
"Zerkalo Nedeli" wrote that 'Sotspartiya' does not have any chance of success in the elections, and is having legal action brought against it. In order to avoid a similar fate, let us say the Sotspartiya has splendid chances and Moroz will gain almost all the places in parliament. And yet they are attempting to sabotage the elections. What's the problem? Maybe they don't want victory?
Vadim Kolesnichenko (PoR) considers that the political conflict in the Ukraine, "is only beginning to flare up". He does not exclude the possibility that, "In autumn it will be necessary to adopt some extraordinary measures". He properly indicates there are legal time-bombs placed under the future parliament.
According to the deputy, it is possible to assume: "Elections will take place, but there will be no change to the present situation. What happens next? The side, which lost, does not take up its mandates. And then, according to the constitution, the Supreme Rada will not be actually formed by the two thirds of deputies, as required by the constitution.
On the one hand, after the snap election the newly formed parliament will not be dissolved, but on the other hand, a proper parliament will not be formed. The country may face very serious problems...
We already heard several times, and sighed with relief that, "They have found a compromise, and the crisis is behind us". But next day everything continues as before in the traditional way. In their present composition the politicians cannot achieve a position to suit everyone - someone inevitably loses. We may conclude that qualitative changes are necessary, i.e. cancellation of elections by party lists. But this most honest of solutions greatly frightens many influential politicians, who only have chances with party list systems. And it is they that make the decisions.
The only notes of optimism during the entire political crisis are government continues to work, because according to the constitution the government can only be sacked by the Supreme Rada, and the crisis is not affecting the social and the economic sphere for the time being.
But in a normal state, its parliament must continue to work. Laws must be passed, and some changed - today this is practically impossible. What factor of safety is there in the country? How can it progress with paralysis of one of the branches of authority?
The adviser to the President questions of law, Stepan Havrish asserts that the President will sign no laws passed by the present VR, since it has ceased to be legitimate. But deputies continue to work - the result is zero - a blind alley.
Politicians from any one party are today not capable (thank goodness) to completely control the country. For them to reach a concensus is very difficult. The nation [narod] waits. If today's politician cannot sort out the problems, they should take a look at what happened to the old Communists. As it says in the constitution: the 'narod' is ultimately the main bearer of authority.
Some early speculation..
RFE/RL reports:
"Parliament speaker Oleksandr Moroz said at a session of the Verkhovna Rada on June 5 that those lawmakers from the opposition Our Ukraine and Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc who withdrew last week did so in violation of relevant procedures.
According to last month's deal between the president, the prime minister, and the speaker, the opposition lawmakers were to withdraw to make the Verkhovna Rada illegitimate, thus paving the way for its self-dissolution and early polls in the fall. Moroz said the pullout of lawmakers should have been announced in the session hall and confirmed by him. "But this has not been done since, firstly, many deputies were absent and, secondly, there are absolutely substantiated doubts that the resignation statements were signed by the people named in them," the "Ukrayinska pravda" website quoted Moroz as saying.
"Unless the Central Election Commission signals to us that there is no one to replace those [deputies] who pulled out, and that those who pulled out have been stripped of their deputy powers, parliament will continue to work," he added.
Moroz also asserted that nearly 40 lawmakers from Our Ukraine actually do not want to give up their parliamentary seats, UNIAN reported."
Latest OP has PoR at 28.5%, BYuT at 20.1%, NU at 5.8%, Lutsenko's National Self-Defence at 5.3%, and Communists at 4.1%.
Socialists, with 2.3% would fail to enter the VR in early elections. Hence Moroz's desperate sabotaging..
LEvko thinks NU lack an attractive 'front-man' for their campaign so will struggle to gain any greater support; and these figures explain why BYuT were so keen on raising the minimum threshold for admission to the VR to 7 or 10%.
Communists will be pleased because they could well be required by PoR to form a ruling coalition [another big pay day..]
Lutsenko will be pleased too, and his political movement may be gaining momentum.
The OP figures, if repeated on September 30th, could well produce a PoR-NU coalition..But that is still a hell of long way away.
"Parliament speaker Oleksandr Moroz said at a session of the Verkhovna Rada on June 5 that those lawmakers from the opposition Our Ukraine and Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc who withdrew last week did so in violation of relevant procedures.
According to last month's deal between the president, the prime minister, and the speaker, the opposition lawmakers were to withdraw to make the Verkhovna Rada illegitimate, thus paving the way for its self-dissolution and early polls in the fall. Moroz said the pullout of lawmakers should have been announced in the session hall and confirmed by him. "But this has not been done since, firstly, many deputies were absent and, secondly, there are absolutely substantiated doubts that the resignation statements were signed by the people named in them," the "Ukrayinska pravda" website quoted Moroz as saying.
"Unless the Central Election Commission signals to us that there is no one to replace those [deputies] who pulled out, and that those who pulled out have been stripped of their deputy powers, parliament will continue to work," he added.
Moroz also asserted that nearly 40 lawmakers from Our Ukraine actually do not want to give up their parliamentary seats, UNIAN reported."
Latest OP has PoR at 28.5%, BYuT at 20.1%, NU at 5.8%, Lutsenko's National Self-Defence at 5.3%, and Communists at 4.1%.
Socialists, with 2.3% would fail to enter the VR in early elections. Hence Moroz's desperate sabotaging..
LEvko thinks NU lack an attractive 'front-man' for their campaign so will struggle to gain any greater support; and these figures explain why BYuT were so keen on raising the minimum threshold for admission to the VR to 7 or 10%.
Communists will be pleased because they could well be required by PoR to form a ruling coalition [another big pay day..]
Lutsenko will be pleased too, and his political movement may be gaining momentum.
The OP figures, if repeated on September 30th, could well produce a PoR-NU coalition..But that is still a hell of long way away.
Friday, June 01, 2007
Sense in the political maelstrom
I quite enjoyed reading this article in 'Kyiv Weekly', entitled Political showdown "Ukrainian style - senseless, yet compromising"
Here are some portions:
Unlike in the fall of 2004, Ukrainian citizens today prefer to remain on the sidelines as "observers" of the political games. Representatives of the coalition and the government already on the second day after the president’s decree on the dissolution of the Verkhovna Rada confused society with a warning that the economy may soon collapse and threatening that social programs would not be fulfilled. In reality, everything was the other way around.
The economy has positive growth indicators: GDP growth in January-April was 7.9%, industrial output – 12.5% and investments into fixed assets grew in Q1 by 33%. These figures point to two facts.
First of all, as long as the prices of metal on world markets remain high, no political crises will threaten the Ukrainian economy – unless of course a civil war breaks out. Incidentally, industry experts forecast a drop in the price of metal products exported from Ukraine in June 2007.
Secondly, it is evident that there is a gentlemen’s agreement among the political echelon to not interfere in the businesses of political opponents. This shows that some lessons were learned from the re-privatization campaign of 2005. The economic basis for such a compromise is the sufficient amount of state-owned assets that may be soon put up for sale, not to mention the possibilities of "feeding" off the budget.
As paradoxical as it may seem, Rinat Akhmetov and his large private business are the economic foundation of the "party of peace" (i.e. that which agreed to holding early elections), while those politicians who control the budget (Finance Minister Mykola Azarov and VR Speaker Oleksandr Moroz) represent the "party of war".
Despite the waning authority of the political elite, Ukrainians do not seem to show any desire for an "iron-fisted leader" coming to power. This essentially puts society in first place in terms of dialog with the government and business and means that the current political crisis is making room for a civil society in Ukraine, not one that continuously seeks grants, but one that controls and directs governance.
Here are some portions:
Unlike in the fall of 2004, Ukrainian citizens today prefer to remain on the sidelines as "observers" of the political games. Representatives of the coalition and the government already on the second day after the president’s decree on the dissolution of the Verkhovna Rada confused society with a warning that the economy may soon collapse and threatening that social programs would not be fulfilled. In reality, everything was the other way around.
The economy has positive growth indicators: GDP growth in January-April was 7.9%, industrial output – 12.5% and investments into fixed assets grew in Q1 by 33%. These figures point to two facts.
First of all, as long as the prices of metal on world markets remain high, no political crises will threaten the Ukrainian economy – unless of course a civil war breaks out. Incidentally, industry experts forecast a drop in the price of metal products exported from Ukraine in June 2007.
Secondly, it is evident that there is a gentlemen’s agreement among the political echelon to not interfere in the businesses of political opponents. This shows that some lessons were learned from the re-privatization campaign of 2005. The economic basis for such a compromise is the sufficient amount of state-owned assets that may be soon put up for sale, not to mention the possibilities of "feeding" off the budget.
As paradoxical as it may seem, Rinat Akhmetov and his large private business are the economic foundation of the "party of peace" (i.e. that which agreed to holding early elections), while those politicians who control the budget (Finance Minister Mykola Azarov and VR Speaker Oleksandr Moroz) represent the "party of war".
Despite the waning authority of the political elite, Ukrainians do not seem to show any desire for an "iron-fisted leader" coming to power. This essentially puts society in first place in terms of dialog with the government and business and means that the current political crisis is making room for a civil society in Ukraine, not one that continuously seeks grants, but one that controls and directs governance.
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