Saturday, August 30, 2008

PoR on Crimea

'Kommersant' carries this story:

Party of Regions leaves Crimea in peace

"Regionaly" assert that the experiences of South Ossetia and Abkhaziya will not repeated in the Autonomous Republic [of Crimea]

Yesterday the Crimean PoR organization supported the actions of the Russian Federation in the Caucasus in recognizing the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. But PoR also emphasized that a similar scenario could not be repeated in the Crimea, because it is "an integral part of Ukraine". However, despite this clarification the medzhlis of the Crimean-Tatar nation, and the Crimean branch of Rukh both accused PoR of attempting to unite Crimea and Russia.

Representatives from PoR emphasized that the Autonomous Republic the Crimea must not become a region of instability and geopolitical rivalry. "Crimea is an integral part of Ukraine, in contrast to the republics Abkhazia and South Ossetia, whose citizens were not the citizens of Georgia," stated the leader of the Crimean PoR Vasiliy Kiselev.

Yesterday Crimean Communists responded to PoR's statements thus: "It's a great pity, that they expressed support [for South Ossetia and Abkhaziya] so late, complained the first secretary of the Crimean Communist Party leader Leonid Grach. "As always they sat and swallowed their tongue until Viktor Fedorovich Yanukovich appeared from Altai [where he likes to go for a spot of R&R] and made some vague pronouncement," Grach added.

"This [acknowledgement of the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhaiya] is hundred per-cent provocation and ignores fact that similar moves can end badly, said an indignant leader of Rukh in Crimea, Leonid Pilunskiy.

In the opinion the first deputy chairman of the medzhlis, Refat Chubarov, any revision of boundaries in the post-Soviet space is a sure path to the destabilization of relations between all of its states."

LEvko's view is that no-one really knows what the Kremlin's intentions are in Crimea, provoking much anxiety both in Ukraine and elsewhere. A brief statement of clarification on this matter from president Medvedev or PM Putin would greatly reduce tension, but it is unlikely any such statement will be forthcoming. This alone is a cause for concern.

ps. Did Ukraine ever officially recognize Kosovo's independence? I seem to recall consultations were to be held but didn't they just 'kick the ball into the long grass?'

Saturday a.m. Update:

Last night PM Putin, in a German TV interview, clarified the situation on Russia's attitude to Crimea.

"Crimea is no kind of disputable territory. There have been no ethnic conflicts there...inside Crimean society complex processes are taking place. There are problems of the Crimean Tartars, the Ukrainian population, the Russian population, the entire Slavic population. But this is an internal political problem for Ukraine itself," he said, adding, "We have an agreement with Ukraine about our fleet remaining there until 2017, and we will be governed by this agreement."

"Russia recognised the borders of Ukraine a long time ago. In essence we have concluded, in general and totally, our negotiations on borders. The talk [now] is about democracy, but these are technical matters," said Putin.

LEvko says, that's more like it. Maybe the bear's appetite has now been sated.

Wednesday, August 27, 2008

'Segodnya' proposes neutral stance in Russian-Western crisis

There's a sobering article in the Akhmetov-owned 'Segodnya' today entitled: "Russia and the West: war at the threshold".

Here are some loosely translated portions:

"After the recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, unavoidable conflict awaits the Russian Federation and the West..."

The article predicts two possible consequences:

"The first, a new full-scale confrontation of the West and Russia - indications of which will be Nato's MAP being offered to Georgia and Ukraine, and also exclusion, in one form or another, of Moscow from the G8.

The second could be that the West will swallow the bitter pill and accept that Russia has rights also. Russia may have calculated on the creation of new global security structures with leading roles for Russia, Germany, France and China, when it embarked on it's dangerous game.

"In the event of the final break-up of Russian-Western relations, they will lose everything", said Deputy of the RF Gosduma, Sergey Markov to 'Segodnya', "But the West will lose more because [Russia] will cease to support them on Iran, North Korea, and Afghanistan. Therefore I do not believe the West will decide on large scale confrontation," he added. It is not yet clear whether these calculations will be justified.

"As for Russia, Putin and Medvedev have nowhere to step back to - either they will make Russia a powerful and flourishing power, or they will go the way of Milosevic. The posing of this question has already brought down Russia's stock market; local oligarchs, who have placed a substantial part of their wealth in the West, fear they could become the first victims of the new Cold War; simultaneously western investors are withdrawing their assets, frightened by the Russian-Western stand-off. It is possible certainly, to rely on the nuclear shield and billions of petrodollars, but they will not save the situation if corruption, technological backwardness and poverty of [the Russian] population remain at the present level...

As far as the Ukraine is concerned, no matter how things pan out, we should remain on the sidelines during this struggle of titans. Moving closer to either of the sides of this conflict makes us, inevitably, the target for the first strike of the enemy. We risk becoming a "hot" battlefield in the new Cold War with a major threat of division of the country", says 'Segodnya'.

Tuesday, August 26, 2008

Tymoshenko's Mediterranean junket?

There may be some substance to alleged events which led to accusations of 'national betrayal' levelled at PM Yulia Tymoshenko recently by President Yushchenko's Secretariat.

The normally relatively politically independent 'Obozrevatel' has run a couple of stories about what it calls PM Tymoshenko's 'Sardinian cruises'. These stories allege that Tymoshenko, while cruising between Mediterranean islands earlier this month, conducted a series of meetings and negotiations with influential politicians and businessmen - including Russians. The central theme, in all cases, the paper suggests, was her political future - in particular her presidential election campaign next year..

'Oboz' claims she met the infamous gas middleman Dmitro Firtash of RUE, and influential PoR deputy and one of the alleged principal 2004 Presidential election fraudsters Serhiy Lyovochkin, as well as representatives from Gazprom. She has also managed to gain the support of many of Ukraine's biggest mass media moguls for her Presidential campaign next year.

Apparently, her Mediterranean cruise started aboard a 30-meter yacht owned by the Party of Regions deputy, political rotweiller Nestor Shufrych. The boat had previously been owned by former President Kuchma's 'grey cardinal', Viktor Medvedchuk, hence the confusion. Incidentally, Medvedchuk now owns a 57 meter yacht, the 'Romance'.

Some of the meetings took place on what 'Oboz' claims could be Firtash's super-yacht, the 'Utopia' [70 metres long - a bauble that costs about 1/2 million Euro's a week to hire ]

Sunday, August 24, 2008

Saakashvili - Sorcerer's Apprentice

I liked this piece on the Georgia crisis, by Sir Rodric Braithwaite, a former British ambassador to Moscow and former chairman of the British Joint Intelligence Committee :

Here is a portion:

"There is a long, tangled, and disputed back history to all this. Georgia, like the former Yugoslavia, is an ethnic patchwork. The native Abkhazians are largely Muslim. The South Ossetians want to unite with their ethnic relations over the Russian border in North Ossetia. Neither liked being in Georgia, and as the Soviet Union broke up, both made a bid for independence. In an ironic parallel, the Georgians closed down the local university in the Abkhazian capital of Sukhumi just as the Serbs were closing down the Albanian university in Kosovo, on the grounds, one very distinguished Georgian philosopher said, that the Abkhazians had no proper language, history or culture, and did not need a university anyway. [Sounds familiar?]

Georgia's first democratically elected president, the disastrous Zviad Gamsakhurdia, then launched a vicious little war against Abkhazia, smashing its capital Sukhumi. But the Georgians were defeated by a combination of Abkhazians and "volunteers" from Russia and Chechnya. Tens of thousands of Georgian refugees fled to Tblisi. Much the same, though on a smaller scale, was happening in South Ossetia.

Various ceasefires were brokered, with Russian "peacekeepers" acting as guarantors. The ceasefires regularly broke down, thanks to provocations and intrigues by all sides. They were as regularly patched up again.

With the arrival of Mikheil Saakashvili, another democratically elected president, things began to go downhill. The Americans gave him political and economic support and advice, and equipped and trained his army. He turned out to be the Sorcerer's Apprentice, and outran American control. He provoked the Russians and the South Ossetians by one pinprick after another, and, above all, by his application to join Nato.
The Russians regularly warned that there would be consequences. Egged on by the Russians, the South Ossetians increased their provocations. Perhaps it was a deliberate trap. If so, Saakashvili fell right into it. His soldiers had no hope of beating the Russians in a fight. Maybe he assumed that the West would bail him out: an epic miscalculation. Many Georgians now feel that the West betrayed them. In due course they will no doubt turn on Saakashvili himself.

Most Russians believe their government's action in Georgia was entirely justified. They are hugely satisfied that they are now dictating the rules of the game, after endless lectures about their human rights record by the people who brought the world Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo, after years of having their interests systematically ignored by a triumphalist West. They are now back again, teaching an irritating neighbour a sharp lesson, dictating their will in the energy market, and cocking a snook at Nato and the European Union. It is not a pretty sight, but it is understandable.

The Americans and their allies have been made to look weak and foolish. They do not have the power to force South Ossetia and Abkhazia back into Georgia, any more than the Russians had the power to force Kosovo back into Serbia. Their offer of Nato membership to Ukraine and Georgia looks perilously like bluff.

Nato has the means to defend the Baltic States and Poland from Russian aggression. But Georgia? But Ukraine? Most Ukrainians would like to be linked with the West. But they want to remain on good terms with Russia: that is why, according to polls, a majority oppose Nato membership. Do we propose to force it on them? [LEvko's italics]

We have given small countries meaningless guarantees before. After their shameful betrayal of Czechoslovakia in 1938, Britain and France declared war on Hitler in September 1939 to honour their guarantee to Poland. Everyone else, including America, fought only after he had moved against them. But the guarantee did not save Poland, which ended the war under Soviet domination."

Friday, August 22, 2008

Russian-Georgian conflict - Conclusions for Ukraine

Rinat Akhmetov's big-selling 'Segodnya' daily carries the following interesting story entitled:

"Experts [from a Ukrainian think tank] say Russia could provoke Ukraine into employing SpetsNaz [Special Operations] Forces"

It is intriguing that a newspaper owned by PoR's biggest sponsor would run such a story which so openly discusses these matters.

I've loosely translated portions below:

"Experts do not exclude provocations from Russia aimed at goading Ukrainian authorities into decisions to utilize SpetsNaz units.

This is discussed in a study entitled "Russian-Georgian conflict - Conclusions for Ukraine", from the Centre for Army Conversion and Disarmament Studies. [Full document here ]

Future activity of the Russian Federation with respect to Ukraine will be in the format of concentrated actions by political and informational means, with continuous expansion of the RF's zone of influence inside and around Ukraine. The central objective of Russian side is to return Ukraine to the mainstream of Russian policy. Its current task is the destabilization of the situation in Ukraine, and over the long term - the creation of prerequisites for the division of Ukraine”, note experts of the centre.

In their opinion, "There are signs that the Russian side is finalizing scenarios envisaging application of armed forces, although the basic principles of action will remain political and economic pressure, [and] a policy of intimidation of the population".

The Ukrainian analysts explain: "The Russian Federation has too great an arsenal of non-military tools for them to yield to temptation and use armed forces. The latter is possible only as a "reaction" in response to military actions ordered by Ukrainian authorities.

In the opinion the experts of the Centre, at present the main thrust of Russian informational policy is directed toward formulating, in the eyes of the Russian citizens, an enemy in the form of the adjacent Ukraine, and in the eyes of Ukrainians, an enemy in the form of NATO.

"After the Russian-Georgian war the arsenal of activities of the Russian authorities, and the number of anti-Ukrainian measures on the territory of Ukraine will be noticeably extended. Provocations for the purpose of adoption by the Ukrainian authorities of solutions using SpetzNaz units are not excluded," note the analysts.

LEvko considers the above-mentioned level-headed study is well-worth reading. It concludes that the chances of Ukraine being offered MAP are almost zero, and that the Georgia/Russia conflict has terminated previously-made international agreements - the guarantees offered after Ukraine's nuclear disarmament in the early '90's are no longer valid. Ukraine has limited, and ever-decreasing defensive capabilities to ward off agression - it needs to spend much more to modernise its armed forces.

Monday, August 18, 2008

Pres's secretariat accuses PM of treason

Deputy head of the Presidential Secretariat, Andriy Kyslynskyi, has posted a nasty little statement on the official secretariat site entitled: "There are indications of state treason and political corruption in the actions of the current prime minister, says Andriy Kyslynskyi"

He declares that according to available information, the political leadership of the Russian Federation is carefully considering a decision to support the candidature of PM Yulia Tymoshenko in the Ukrainian Presidential elections [late next year] after the fulfillment of the condition by the PM and her political force to adopt a passive position on the Georgian conflict."

According to the posting, "nearly one billion US dollars have been reserved for the project to support Yulia Tymoshenko." It alleges that while on holiday in Sardinia, she has been plotting with 'yesterday's politicians' including disgraced former President Kuchma and his eminence grise Viktor Medvedchuk.'

Where this leaves the current ruling parliamentary coalition heaven knows. Fancy Tymoshenko lying in the sun with the man she used to publicly call 'the red cockroach'.

Business daily 'Delo' today announces that Russia is starting a trade war against Ukraine. Heavy industry in the country's eastern oblasts, including Rinat Akhmetov's SCM could be hard hit by shortfalls in deliveries of Russian coking coal.

As these oblasts are most inclined to support closer co-operation with the Russian Federation, wouldn't such a trade war be counter-productive?

ps The Russian Black Sea Fleet is not rushing to return to its base in Crimea. [Maybe to avoid the sight of it's capital ship being limply towed into port?]

If the fleet did indeed suffer damage in the recent conflict with Georgia, then this enabled Yushchenko to score cost-free points by announcing he was restricting their return.

Sunday, August 17, 2008

How a flat tyre took the Caucasus to war

"A flat tyre on a Russian diplomatic car triggered the slide to war in Georgia after it forced the cancellation of key peace talks the day before fighting erupted, The Sunday Telegraph has learned.

Trouble had been brewing in the disputed South Ossetian region for weeks as Moscow-backed militias skirmished with Georgian troops, yet Russian-brokered negotiations between the Georgian government and the separatists had continued.

But the first substantial face-to-face talks on August 7 fell through after a farcical chain of events in which the top Russian diplomat claimed he was unable to attend the meeting in South Ossetia because his car tyre had run flat.. "

Read on here

For want of a nail the shoe was lost.
For want of a shoe the horse was lost.
For want of a horse the rider was lost.
For want of a rider the battle was lost.
For want of a battle the kingdom was lost.
And all for the want of a horseshoe nail.

Russian Black Sea Fleet hit?

Maybe I was a bit hard on the Georgian navy in a previous posting.

'Segodnya' reports that Russian ships are not returning to their base in Crimea right now because of damage suffered when engaging Georgian warships. In particular, the flagship missile cruiser 'Moskva', one of the RFBSF's capital ships, had been hit by Georgian shore artillery.

An internet poll on the widely read Russian language 'Segodnya' website asks readers what conclusions should Ukraine draw from the Ossetian-Georgian-Russian conflict.

So far the replies are as follows: Join NATO as quickly as possible - about 30%; secure friendship and integration with Russia - 55%; strengthen its neutrality and keep away from all military-political unions - 15%. LEvko thinks the second option was loaded. Interesting, nevertheless.

This prescient UK Defence Academy paper entitled 'Georgia and Russia - A Further Deterioration in Relations' published just a month ago and accessible here may be of interest:

A brief quote:

"Conjecture and Exploitation

In view of the uneasy, apprehensive and stressful relationship which the smaller state has with its much larger and more powerful neighbour to the north, it is not surprising that suspicion, speculation and conjecture remain high in Georgia aboutRussia’s future intentions with regard to the unrecognised Abkhaz republic and to Georgian aspirations to join NATO. There can be little doubt that the bullying of Georgia will continue. Harassment and manipulation with a view to provoking a hasty, hot-tempered overreaction would of course be a well-tried stratagem."

Saturday, August 16, 2008

Gangster state

I particularly liked this commentary in today's London 'Times'

A portion here:

"One of the curious trends of recent years has been the Western business community’s enduring love affair with the unlovely Russia. With every passing week, it becomes clearer that this is a country run by and for people little different from gangsters. The tanks rolling into Georgia have reminded us that they are gangsters with keys to a big arsenal.

The largest Western companies, Shell and BP included, have been bullied, intimidated and forced into concessions by the Kremlin and its cronies. This week a Moscow court joined in the harassment, targeting the head of BP’s troubled joint venture in Russia.

This is a country that defaulted on its overseas debts less than ten years ago; a country that, after its journey from feudalism to kleptocracy via totalitarian communism, has little truck with Western-style capitalism; a country alive with corruption and not averse, it has been suggested, to the occasional state-sponsored murder. Hardly the ideal recipient of Western capital, you might think.

But Western companies have rushed to throw money at Russia, both in direct and indirect investment. The push by City bankers into Moscow and St Petersburg is matched only by the flood of billionaire oligarchs taking money out. There’s perhaps a lesson there. I’d back the oligarchs to make the shrewder investment call..."

Read the whole article here

Friday, August 15, 2008

Tymoshenko on Georgia

Today's 'Segodnya' again writes about PM Yulia Tymoshenko's most uncharacteristic current purdah.

LEvko can inform them that Ms Tymoshenko has been speaking to the "F.T." over a cup of tea. They will be running the interview in tomorrow's edition..

The question now is, have the events of the last few days in Georgia make it more likely, or less likely that Ukrainians would support membership into NATO in any referendum.
On March 11, 2008 I posted this:

"Couple of interesting O.P.'s from today's "Segodnya"

The majority of Ukrainians - 75,1%, approve of neutral status for Ukraine; 9,8% are against, 15,2% had difficulty answering.

62,3% of respondents are in favor of conducting a referendum on the entry of Ukraine into NATO, 24,9% against such a referendum, 12,8% had difficulty answering."

The O.P. indicated that overall, 56% of Ukraine's citizens would be against the entrance of Ukraine in NATO, 21,6% for the enty into the alliance, 8,3% would not participate in any referendum on this question."

Many Ukrainians think Georgians, Ossetians, and other Caucasian nations are, stereotypically, hot-headed cut-throats - I believe sympathy for any of them is limited. Stalin and Beria were Georgians. However, the Kremlin's heavy-handed behaviour in recent days will be a source of great anxiety..The majority may consider that the best guarantee of security for their country would be modern, well-equipped Ukrainian armed forces.

PS A few moments ago the 'Batkivshchyna' website have just posted an official statement from the BYuT VR fraction on the Georgia crisis. It is totally non judgemental - the only criticism is directed at the President's Secretariat.

E.g. "Ukraine's parliament should do everything possible to ensure that our country is not dragged into conflict on any of the sides. The effectiveness of the peacekeeping activities of Ukraine will depend on this.."

This statement is in clear contrast to those being made by the President and his Secretariat. Maybe more on this later.

PS In order to realize Ukraine's dilemma over its stance on NATO and the Georgia crisis, check out this video of BBC Newsnight discussion tonight, paying particular notice of the comments of Aleksander Nekrasov, a normally a level-headed Russian commentator. Take it from 24 minutes into the clip onward..The response from the lady leading the discussion is priceless..

Yulka hedging her bets

Deputy head of President Yushchenko's Secretariat Andriy Kyslynskyi, claims, that according to the Secretariat's investigations: "There are certain agreements between BYuT and Russia's leaders about their support in future elections."

Several NUNS deputies have already suggested the reason for the absence of any comments by PM Tymoshenko on the current S. Ossetian conflict is her wish to gain Russia's support in the 2010 Presidential elections. There are rumours that she is on holiday somewhere on a Mediterranean island.

Head of President Yushchenko's Secretariat Viktor Baloha is demanding Tymoshenko finally comes clean and say whether she is 'for Russia or for Georgia'.

BYuT VR deputy Serhiy Teryokin declared that the dearth of comments from representatives of his party about the events in Georgia is due to their desire "not to fall-out with the President."

Her signature, together with that of Interior Minister Yuriy Lutsenko is missing from the National Security and Defence Council's decision to limit the movement of Russia's Black sea fleet based in Sevastopol.

She and her ministers may be mindful that soon she will be engaging in tough haggling with Gazprom over fuel price and deliveries. Already some commentators in Moscow have praised her for keeping 'shtum', adding: "Naturally, any increase in tension between Ukraine and Russia would negatively influence all aspects of our co-operation, including gas negotiations."

'Segodnya' reports that President Saakashvili's Dutch wife Sandra is sheltering in a secure government lodge on the Crimean coast together with her children as a guest of President Yushchenko's wife Kateryna. Looks nice. So much better than a bunker in Tbilisi - and may even offer a good view of the war ships bobbing up and down the Black Sea.

Oh, and how come the Georgian navy was caught with its pants down in Poti, allowing their ships to be sunk at their moorings in port?

Wednesday, August 13, 2008

Ukraine's attitude to the Georgian troubles

According to the Presidential website, Viktor Yushchenko, accompanied by the presidents of Estonia, Lithuania and Poland, and the PM of Latvia, in a remarkable show of solidarity, is today visiting Tbilisi with the aim of "providing support for Georgia, and also assisting to achieve regulation of the current [Russian-Georgian] conflict..."

"The Ukrainian side considers this common mission of the heads of democratic European states an important part of the efforts of the international community to maintain and guarantee the territorial unity and sovereignty of independent Georgia," says the posting.

A quick look at the websites of other Ukrainian political parties is revealing:

The 'Batkivschyna' party site [whose largest constituent is BYuT] announces that the Ukrainian government, with Yulia Tymshenko at the helm, is to provide humanitarian help to the Georgian population, and that additional aircraft are being provided to assist in evacuation of Ukrainian citizens from that country.

Tymoshenko's own personal site has similar messages. But the latest posting on her site is one of congratulation to an Olympic sportsman for gaining a medal in Beijing in the Jujitsu discipline.

Viktor Yanukovych's Party of Regions' site announces they are sending humanitarian aid to Ossetians and Georgian families. They are also demanding an emabargo on the supply of weapons to Georgia, whilst PoR spokesperson Hanna Herman considers there is a need to look into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' competence in investigating the supply of weaponry to global "hot-spots". [Russia had alleged Ukraine had been supplying Georgia with weapons.]

There is also some criticism of the current authority: "The irresponsible confrontational actions of the current authorities are leading to Ukraine being dragged into the conflict between Georgia and Russia. We demand such practices be stopped....PoR condemns any agressive acts directed toward solving regional conflicts by means of force. We call for termination of military action and for the immediate return to peaceful negotiations...PoR appeals to western politicians not to employ dual standards both in the Georgian-South Ossetian-Russian conflict, and in their approach to all other regional problems as one-sided support of one or other side creates dangerous precedents....We appeal primarily to the Ukrainian leadership not to support just one side of the conflict, [but to] conduct a balanced and wise foreign policy in the conflict involving the three sides and to consider the national interests of Ukraine."

PoR and BYuT are by far the two largest political parties in Ukraine. They know which way the wind is now blowing..

p.s. - Something to think about from today's London 'Times' here

Saturday, August 09, 2008

Georgia crisis

Check out this interview with old warhorse Richard Holbrooke on the crisis in South Ossetia crisis.

On Thursday the 'Economist' predicted: "It is all too easy to imagine misjudgements on either side leading to a real war." How right they were.

The Russian Foreign Ministry is already trying to put some of the blame for the problems on Ukraine Also here

'Semi-official' Russian observers claim "Western countries and Ukraine have supplied Georgia with an arsenal of heavy weaponry.."

LEvko's view is that Russia doesn't give a fig about Ossetians.

S. Ossetia is all but cut of from N. Ossetia during the winter. What this is all about is about 'The Great Game' and the trashing of Georgia's desire to join NATO.

Nevertheless, the Ossetians [and Abkhazians] have national rights too..

Tuesday, July 29, 2008

Ukrainian political battle could hit European gas prices

This excerpt from an interesting article entitled:

"Ukrainian political battle could hit European gas prices" from today's British 'Daily Telegraph':

"President Yushchenko and Prime Minister Tymoshenko, former allies since the Orange Revolution in 2004, are locked in a mounting conflict over the price of the gas that is piped across the Ukraine. The country's role as the transit country for 73pc of Western Europe's gas being exported by Russia and the CIS countries makes it vital to the EU's energy markets. What happens in the Ukraine affects what happens further west.
At the heart of the conflict is Tymoshenko's desire to abolish an intermediary arrangement that currently involves gas coming from Russia passing through a Ukrainian company called RosUkrEnergo. Instead she plans to buy gas directly from Russia and the CIS countries, through NaftagasUkrainy, controlled by her government. This is a move that most independent analysts agree will raise the price of gas for consumers in Western Europe.

"Such a course, abolishing a middleman, will increase the price of natural gas and will cause instability in the Ukraine", according to Lidia Lowson at the American Centre for Political Monitoring. "From this instability Tymoshenko will be able to impose her own middleman to calm the situation. That man will be Gayduk.

When contacted, Gayduk's office said he was unavailable for comment.

The reason that the price of gas will rise if bought directly rather than through an intermediary is that its price will be fixed by governments - principally Ukraine's and Russia's - rather than by organisations that operate through commercial criteria.
"Without an intermediary, the governments of Tymoshenko and [Dmitry] Medvedev will be able to dictate prices," Inna Weiss of the Central Group of European Political Monitoring says. "With the existing situation there is a clear interest in co-operation and good relationships with Western Europe. That is what Yushchenko represents."

Is it just me, or is there a whiff of gaseous spin in the air? Would the Kremlin ever permit Ukraine to sell gas westward?

-------------------------------------------------------------

Head of the Presidential Secretariat, Viktor Baloha, on the President's website yesterday accused BYuT of co-operating with the Communists in a report entitled: 'Tight relations between BYuT and the communists are ever more clearly defining the contours of the new majority in the Verkhovna Rada'.

He claims the two parties, together with a portion of NUNS will be forming a new coalition.

He mentions the betrayal of Oleksandr Moroz's Socialists in 2006 in favour of PoR and claims, "Now it is BYuT that find themselves in the role of traitors in the coalition of democratic values.."

He criticizes BYuT for supporting Davyd Zhvaniya, whom the President accused recently of being implicated in his poisoning [After nearly 4 years the Pres. remembers, hmm....]

He comments on Tymoshenko's absence for the commemoration of 1020 years since the conversion of Kyivan Rus' to Christianity thus: Yulia Tymoshenko explained her absence with various excuses: at first it was illness, then later other important circumstances, finally a vacation. "Is it possible that the leader of government adheres not to the orthodox faith, but to some other faith, maybe shintoism or buddhism?" This final snide, rather offensive comment says more about Baloha than Tymoshenko..

Lytvyn returning into the spotlight

'Kommentarii' run a story shedding light on Volodymyr Lytvyn's attempt to return to the top flight of Ukrainian politics.

Here are some [loosely] translated portions:

Volodymyr Lytvyn has begun a p.r. campaign to regain his status as the all-Ukrainian peacemaker, but this time he will try to reconcile not the 'white and blue' Party of Regions and the 'Orange' camps, but rather NUNS and BYuT. The Lytvyn Bloc [LB] press-service has hinted that the Lytvynites are prepared to take part in the reformatting the ruling coalition.

The LB have been speaking about possible participation in the reformatting of the coalition for a long time already. Lytvyn not unreasonably hopes that his engagement as a peacemaker between BYuT and NUNS may improve his national image.

The reality is that the conflict between the prime minister and the President has reached deadlock. On the one hand, Yulia Tymoshenko leads a semi-legitimate minority coalition from which could leave, at any moment, tens of deputies linked to the President's Secretariat on Bank Street. On the other hand, the President's Secretariat, even though it has the means to bring down the 'democratic' coalition, is absolutely not capable of creating a new majority. So both the President's Secretariat and Tymoshenko are looking ever more often toward Lytvyn as a possible ally in their coalition. Both think that Lytvyn would rather help them than the other.

Until recently the LB fraction has operated more closely on political policy with head of the Pres's Secretariat, Viktor Baloha; however the refusal of the Lytyvynites to support the vote of no confidence in PM Tymoshenko in the VR, tends to indicate that the prime minister has began to work more closely with Volodymyr Mykhaylovych [Lytyvyn]. The government in their changes in the budget has satisfied a number of policy positions lobbied by the Lytvynites. The prime minister is also ready to promote one of Lytvyn's pet schemes - an all-Ukrainian forum with the participation of the President, the government, members of parliament and heads of local governments and local authorities. After the forum is held, at which he, of course would play the major role of chief moderator, a public contract would be signed. Lytvyn has also recently contemptiously called Baloha's 'Yedyniy Tsentr' project as 'an immature party', which should please Tymoshenko also.

Bank Street is, of course, concerned by the warming of relationships between Lytvyn and Tymoshenko and under no circumstances would agree to the entry of the Lytyvynites into a coalition as covert allies of BYuT. But for the prime minister, reformatting the coalition to include the LB fraction is not too favourable either— in that case she would not be able to restrict the small concessions to LB as mentioned above. After signing of any new coalition agreement several Lytvynites could enter the cabinet, while some NUNS ministers close to her, e.g. Yuriy Lutsenko, could depart. It's no secret that Lytvyn would very much like to return to the VR speaker's chair, which would benefit neither Bank Street, nor Tymoshenko who has now sorted out her relationship with Arseniy Yatsenyuk again. Neither Yulia T, nor Yushchenko and Baloha wish to see Lytvyn as head of the VR because he would use this position to play his own game by all means possible. So at the moment tentative links with Lytvyn, and situational help from his party in exchange for certain concessions suits both Bank Street, and Tymoshenko.

In turn, Lytvyn also benefits from the current situation. Volodymyr Mykhaylovych is not rejecting the strategic possibility of participating in the coalition with BYuT and NUNS with all the benefits accruing from this, but is taking into account possible public relations benefits. He is hoping to gain favour amongst the orange electorate as the leader of a third force and a wise moderator placed between a warring prime minister and President. In this respect he could even forgo his desire to be VR speaker if a tripartite coalition were to be formed.

Lytvyn may also be aiming for higher things. He may be setting himself up for participation in next year's presidential race, hoping to eclipse the the current president, Viktor Yushchenko, whose ratings continue to steadily fall, by presenting himself as the main moderate orange alternative to Yulia Tymoshenko.

According to 'Kommentarii', Lytvyn is also being encouraged by people from within the Kremlin who have promised to give him their blessing rather than to Yanukovych, Tymoshenko or Yushchenko. In this regard, Lytvyn's statements about postponing decisions on the debatable questions separating society, e.g.relations with NATO, language and religious questions, the Black Sea fleet and the historical past, do not appear arbitrary. All these policy messages from Lytvyn, and support from Moscow could be useful not only in presidential, but in parliamentary elections. Lytvyn believes that an early parliamentary election, as well as President election may take place soon, and he would like to start his election campaign before anyone else. For this reason the Lytvynites have disturbed the summer political calm.

Friday, July 25, 2008

Presidential website becoming a rag

Head of President Yushchenko's secretariat, Viktor Baloha, continues his risible criticism of PM Yuliya Tymoshenko in a recent posting on the President's official website.

He accuses the PM of working actively with PoR head, Viktor Yanukovych: "for the purpose of gaining advantages in the future presidential elections." In his opinion, Tymoshenko and Yanukovych: "frequently operate in a tactical tandem, despite their declared irreconcilable differences".

Baloha claims that: "It is quite likely that there will be joint voting [in the VR] by the ByuT and 'Regiony' fractions for a new Constitution."

"This strange union between the ruling coalition and the opposition has a wholly prosaic explanation: the dream of both Y. Tymoshenko and V Yanukovych for the presidential post. Both political forces cheer themselves in the hope that together they may achieve the acceptance of beneficial decisions for themselves. These calculations are also made in order to gain some kind of advantages in relationships with the current head of state. However, such a construct is illusory...It is not worth expecting that [these kind] of anomalous tandems can sway President Yushchenko's positions or obstruct him to embody his declared path for the country's development, economic reform and social changes which can provide an improved [living] standard for people," said Baloha.

Baloha [concerning her recent visits to Poland, and particularly Russia] continues : "She made generous promises...of co-operation in [areas of] sensitive interest with the two neighbouring states, particularly in economics. The aims of such assurances is the search for support in future elections in exchange for substantial dividends after victory."

"It is clear that Y. Tymoshenko right now is trying to run the country as [if it were] her own dacha. On her foreign visits, without batting an eyelid, she promises her foreign interlocutors that what they are interested in. The prime minister is not greatly concerned that these promises should coincide with the interests of Ukraine. After all, personal plans and ambitions are above all!"

As further evidence of Tymoshenko's presidential ambitions Baloha cites incessant attempts by her to place under her personal control international economic projects, started without participation of the KabMin. This, he claims, is necessary in order to change their participants and introduce 'friendly' companies, giving them prefence in exchange for their political and financial support. The benefits from such exchange are intended to fund the BYuT leader's presidential campaign.

LEvko says the President and PoR have been sniffing one another's **** for many months in the hope of forming the fabled broad coalition. But when BYuT and Regiony, the two biggest political forces in the country, speak to one another, this is considered an 'abnormal tandem'.

There is no evidence provided on the Presidential site to support the serious allegations mentioned above. Well over a thousand of Ukraine's brightest work at the President's Secretariat - they should be able to produce more than this kind of political agitprop. Baloha's desperate comments are not worthy of a nation's Presidential website.

Monday, July 21, 2008

Difficulties for any political 'third force'

Some portions from an article in the latest 'Kommentarii' weekly, giving reasons why any 'third force' is unlikely to emerge in Ukrainian politics any time soon, even though the current polarized 'orange'-'white and blue' political set-up that sprung forth after the Orange Revolution has not produced much benefit to the country:

"One of the central problems for the forces who have pretentions to be a 'third alternative' is the absence in their structures of charismatic leaders. No matter how interesting their party program is, Ukrainian voters invariably make their choice according to personalities. Competent election campaigns with promotion of party leaders have proven to be decisive. Because Ukraine has been living in what can be described as a permanent election campaign race in recent times, new forces never have the opportunity to shine, and if they do, the main political heavyweights 'buy them up', and the existing organizational structures of any third force are merged or absorbed by the major players.

The second problem for 'third forces' is even more difficult — they do not propose practically any alternative ideological messages. At best they manage to develop creative ideas already instigated by the leading political players, and at worst they merely plagiarize them. The thesis, 'they are all bad, and only we care about the interests of the people', seldom finds an adequate response in the hearts of electorate, more likely, it creates even more scepticism. And Ukrainian votes tend to vote only for parties that have solid prospects for entering parliament.

Finally, the the third problem for 'third forces' is the bi-polarity of the Ukrainian politicum, looking either towards the West, or to Moscow, where there is simply no place for any alternative third view. The maximum that can be be hoped for by those entering the big game and who want to 'graze' on either Pro-Russian, or westernized electoral fields, is to steal votes from the true keepers of these two vectors. Moreover, while the definitive geopolitical choice for Ukraine is undecided, political struggles cannot turn to everyday matters, and the creation of an effective project geared to the needs of a certain social group, is simply unreal.

There are many examples in the country's contemporary history where movements based on agricultural workers, youth, feminists, and even ecological movements were only ever marginal. Besides, there have been separate sections for quite a while already for all these target audiences in the programs of the 'first' and 'second forces."

Also from 'Kommentarii', this:

Economic problems of Russia's Fifth column' in Ukraine.

In the light of a new wave of political, economic and informational pressure from Russia on Ukraine it is becoming clear that the Kremlin has no-one in Ukraine to promote its anti-Ukrainian messages. In earlier times Party of Regions would loyally repeat them, but now support for the Russian initiatives in the 'blue and white' camp can be heard only from isolated, withered voices.

Recent statements from Moscow have put 'Regionaly' in a rather uncomfortable position. This is revealed by the opinions of PoR leader Viktor Yanukovych who stated that the Russian State Duma statement on the possibility of revision of wide-ranging Russian-Ukrainian agreements were an unpleasant surprise. The declaration of the vice-premier of the Russian Federation Sergey Ivanov, that Russia will be compelled to respond to Ukraine's entry into NATO with the introduction of a visa regime for Ukrainians, was self-consciously called by Viktor Fedorovych, as "just a proposal".

It is clear that PoR has declined to make any firm statements, indicating an unstable internal situation exists inside 'Reginaly'. It's no secret that PoR's Ahmetov-Kolesnikov wing co-ordinates its activities in many matters with the Presidential Secretariat, which has its own views on the 'Russian vector'. Therefore it is not convenient for Regionaly right now to echo Moscow's opinions and enter into conflict with Viktor Yushchenko. In this context it is necessary to note that this conditionally"pro-presidential" wing of PoR controls a number of radically Pro-Russian organisations in Donbas, e.g the recently forbidden civic organisation 'Donetskaya Respublika', 'Svyatogora', and 'Union born by Revolution'. The Donetsk City Council Secretary Nikolai Levchenko who carefully cultivates an image of an ardent fighter with Ukrainian nationalism, is considered a protege of Boris Kolesnikov.

In Crimea there is a similar situation; 'Regionaly', having secured themselves at local authority level, do not see any economic reason for close co-operation with the Kremlin. If in earlier times financial assistance from Moscow was an attractive bonus for maintaining 'correct ideology', now there is less economic sense for the leaders of the Autonomous Republic to go into conflict with Kyiv. In order for the Kremlin to advance its policies in Ukraine it is compelled to work with political outcasts - The Progressive Socialists of Natalia Vitrenko, the Party Russian-Ukrainian Union, the Crimean Communist Leonid Grach and others. However these forces are only capable of making a lot of noise and creating an informational background, but cannot really help Russia in any way to lobby its interests in Ukraine.

Saturday, July 12, 2008

Out for summer

So the dust covers have been placed over the chairs in Ukraine's parliament for the summer recess. Sittings will resume on 2nd of September. Yulia Tymoshenko's cabinet easily survived a no confidence vote today because Communist party and Lytvyn bloc deputies reneged on their promises to support an attempt by 'Regionaly' to bring down her government.

BYuT deputies had been alerted earlier in the week to the possibility of such a vote being proposed by a rare sighting of PoR deputy Rinat Akhmetov in the vicinity of the VR. Many of his party colleagues had already departed for their summer holidays to tropical islands but had been rounded up, in some cases by charter aircraft, for the vote. They were not best pleased.

But politiking will go on. The 'Yedynyi Tsentr' project is being wheeled out at a big meeting tomorrow - will it fizzle out on the launch pad?

Wednesday, July 02, 2008

PoR propose amending Constitution

Today Party of Regions presented their proposed parliamentary bill to amend certain articles in the Constitution of Ukraine.

The main points:
  • Non aligned status for Ukraine
  • A single 'vertical' executive power structure
  • Judicial reform
  • Russian as a second state language
A 'Regiony' spokesman, Oleksandr Lavrynovych, claimed that it was "quite realistic and possible" 300 deputies' signatures could be collected in support of the bill. This could occur even by next week.

Other observers described as "minimal" the chances of PoR's constitutional project containing the points above being passed through parliament.

PoR currently have 175 deputies in the VR. Maybe they should go back and redo their homework.

Sunday, June 29, 2008

Tymoshenko fights on?

A loose translation of an article in the current 'Kommentarii':

Yushchenko scared off by Tymoshenko's [possible] resignation

The president decided against personally calling [VR speaker] Arseniy Yatsenyuk to announce the fall of the ruling coalition

The two-pronged attacks on the Yulia Tymoshenko government by the President's Secretariat and Party of Regions has ceased despite the the fact that her demise - her resignation as prime minister - was seconds away. It seemed nothing could prevent Tymoshenko's opponents finishing her off.

The leader of BYuT was to be removed from power according to the following scenario: the announcement of the dissolution of the democratic coalition; the reading of the KabMin's economic progress report in parliament [see previous blogs]; a vote of no confidence in the government; and the formation of a new semi-legitimate 'broad' coalition and new 'broad' KabMin. Bank Street [Pres's Secretariat] had planned all this according to tight schedule: even the date for Tymoshenko's 'execution' - June 24th - had been 'pencilled in' by 'Regionaly' when the reading of the KabMin report at an extraordinary parliamentary session of parliament was to take place. But the extraordinary VR session proposal was still-born as it became clear that at each stage of the plan, [named by ill-wishers as the Baloha/Kolesnikov plan], there were unsurmountable obstacles.

Yatsenyuk acts dumb

Problems for the initiators of reformatting of the parliamentary majority begun at the first stage, i.e. the official announcement of "death" of the ruling BYuT/NUNS coalition following the exit of deputies Ihor Rybakov and Yuriy But. The speaker of the Supreme Rada Arseniy Yatseniuk showed unexpected obstinacy. The ignoring of demands and threats from the Party of Regions fraction by the VR speaker was quite predictable, but a similar reaction from Yatsenyuk to desperate requests from the President's Secretariat to 'bury' the democratic coalition was an unpleasant surprise for Bank Street. A 'Kommentarii' source claimed that Arseniy Petrovich Yatsenyuk had a long telephone conversation with the head of this joint venture, Viktor Baloha, about this. Baloha demanded the speaker make an official statement in parliament declaring the absence in the VR of a majority during an extraordinary session planned for June 24th. Such a statement would have cleared a direct route to resignation of PM Yulia Tymoshenko, and would at least downgrade the government and its head to "acting" status only. The source asserts that the conversation between Yatseniuk and Baloha was heated, but without success for the head of the presidential office. It seems the speaker Yatsenyuk had explained to the head of the joint venture that he would terminate the democratic coalition only if he was personally asked to do so by the President. Yatsenyuk's calculations were correct - the president did not have the guts to make this request and as a result all the clever schemes to get rid of Tymoshenko collapsed like a house of cards.

Its no secret that any reformatting of the parliamentary majority would harm Yatsenkyuk's political interests and the chances of him hanging onto the speaker's chair would diminish. He has begun to enjoy his leading role parliament, and for him it had become important to find ways to rescue the democratic coalition, thereby raising his own rating. Yatseniuk had spent a fruitful round of personal negotiations with Tymoshenko, and right away the parties agreed mutual neutrality and non agression postures. So, in exchange for his adherence to principles of preservation of the coalition the premier promised Yatsenyuk support in the mass-media controlled by BYuT. After Bank Street became aware of the mutual understanding reached between the prime minister and the speaker, Baloha broadcast a statement on behalf of Yushchenko that the head of parliament is a key figure in action to renew the democratic coalition, and has tried to place all responsibility for the majority's future prospects on speaker's shoulders.

Publically, the formation of this 'situational' union between Tymoshenko and Yatseniuk was marked by a meeting of the prime minister, the speaker, and leaders of fractions of the coalition covered by television cameras when Yulia T. entirely supported Arseniy Petrovich's initiative to urgently pass a law about internal and foreign policy of the country until 2010. (In truth, the prime minister is suggesting consideration be given to this bill in a package together with a statement on the program of activity of the government which would give Tymoshenko a year's immunity from dismissal). She also informed of the KabMin's intention in the near future to submit the long-awaited project of changes to the state budget. At the same meeting both Tymoshenko on behalf of BYuT, and Vyacheslav Kirilenko from NUNS mutually declared pre-term parliamentary elections of which the opposition and also President's Secretary frequently speak, to be unnecessary.

'Regionaly' fail to do homework set by President

'Kommentarii' sources in Bank Street assert that Yushchenko has already approved the formation of a new parliamentary majority, requesting Party of Regions do the 'spadework', the President's position being: "I am ready to support you if you collect the necessary 226 VR votes".

'Regionaly' quickly got down to business garnering 150 VR deputies' votes demanding examination of the question of responsibility of the KabMin, but then encountered problems organizing an extraordinary session of parliament. The Communist Party declared they were against any extraordinary sitting of parliament. Party head Petro Symonenko even called a special press conference to explain there was no sense in it. Their position is clear - they realize they will not be asked to participate in any majority coalition of whatever variety, primarily because of a Yushchenko's hostile attitude to the Communist Party. At this moment the Communist Party is more inclined to co-operation with Tymoshenko, situationally supporting some of BYuT's initiatives, so to change the current political set-up would serve no purpose for them.

Bank Street and PoR placed much hope in co-operation with Lytyvyn's Bloc too. According to observers, Volymyr Lytyvyn really did engage with them on the creation of a broad coalition, but simultaneously continued a dialogue with the democratic coalition about the possibility of joining the still-existing de jure majority. Lytvyn's aim, by operating on two fronts, was to secure the VR speaker's chair for himself. However, Yushenko is against giving Lytyvn this important position because he is afraid that under a Lytvyn speakership he would definitively lose control over parliament. At least the current VR speaker, Yatseniuk, does not have his own political project, or ideas of political independence, so dialogue between Bank Street and Yatsenyuk are much simpler.

So, at the moment its is unlikely that the necessary number of votes in favour of a non confidence vote in the KabMin could be assembled. The situation is aggravated by that fact that those in favour of reformatting of parliamentary majority are split on the nomination of any future prime minister.

There are several pretender to replace Tymoshenko from the Bank Street/Akhmetov combination - Bohatyryova, Baloha, Yatseniuk and others, but not one of them is a candidate of general concensus. The are different views on who should head the government even in the Party of Regions where Viktor Yanukovych's ambitions are well-known. The internal party group focused on the current PoR leader were the most enthusiastic in proposing the resignation of the KabMin and were most heavily engaged in conducted a mass p.r. attack against the goverment. Authors of the no-confidence vote project included Alexander Efremov, Elena Lukash and Alexander Lavrinovich -all of them from Yanukovych's circle, rather than that of Akhmetov. And nobody is seriously mentioning one important nuance: according to the new version on the law on the KabMin Viktor Yanukovych actually has no right to hold a post in the government because of previous criminal convictions. Unlike previous versions, the new version does not include a clause stating that a citizen can be a member of Cabinet, if any previous convictions have been legally quashed. Therefore any second premiership for Yanukovych could be met with the most serious legal problems.

p.s. Tonight Spain beat Germany 1-0 in the final of the Euro 2008 soccer competition and have been crowned soccer champions of Europe. The next European championship is planned to be hosted jointly by Ukraine and Poland in 2012, but a final decision is to be made in the Autumn.

The whole of Spain are united by the joy of victory, but there is a lesson to be learned by Ukraine here. Seventy years ago Spain was in the grip of a bitter civil war. Regional and linguistic differences are deeply felt even today, but the country has prospered partly as a result of putting aside old scores.

In soccer too their national team has perennially underachieved, in no small part because of the disharmony between players from different regions. It seems these problems have been overcome too, and as a result their team has produced success on the field of play. Well done Spain.

p.p.s. LEvko is sorry for not posting more recently - have been engaged in other matters..Will try and do more in the days and weeks to come..